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	<title>Max-EuP 2012 - User contributions [en]</title>
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	<updated>2026-05-28T16:17:51Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom&amp;diff=1312</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom&amp;diff=1312"/>
		<updated>2025-07-14T12:21:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Retrieved from [{{fullurl:{{FULLPAGENAME}}}} {{FULLPAGENAME}} – Max-EuP 2012] on {{CURRENTDAY2}}. {{CURRENTMONTHNAME}} {{CURRENTYEAR}}.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Terms of Use ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, published as a print work in 2012, has been made freely available in 2021 as an online edition at &amp;lt;max-eup2012.mpipriv.de&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materials published here are subject to exclusive rights of use as held by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and the publisher Oxford University Press; they may only be used for non-commercial purposes. Users may download, print, and make copies of the text files being made freely available to the public. Further, users may translate excerpts of the entries and cite them in the context of academic work, provided that the following requirements are met: &lt;br /&gt;
* Use for non-commercial purposes&lt;br /&gt;
* The textual integrity of each entry and its elements is maintained&lt;br /&gt;
* Citation of the online reference according to academic standards, indicating the author, keyword title, work name, and date of retrieval (see [[How to use#Suggested Citation Style|Suggested Citation Style]]).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Print.css&amp;diff=1310</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Print.css</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Print.css&amp;diff=1310"/>
		<updated>2025-07-14T12:19:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: &lt;/p&gt;
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		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom&amp;diff=1308</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Retrievedfrom&amp;diff=1308"/>
		<updated>2025-07-14T12:18:59Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Retrieved from [{{fullurl:{{FULLPAGENAME}}}} {{FULLPAGENAME}} – HWB-EuP 2009] on {{CURRENTDAY2}}. {{CURRENTMONTHNAME}} {{CURRENTYEAR}}.  == Terms of Use == The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, published as a print work in 2012, has been made freely available in 2021 as an online edition at &amp;lt;max-eup2012.mpipriv.de&amp;gt;.  The materials published here are subject to exclusive rights of use as held by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International P...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Retrieved from [{{fullurl:{{FULLPAGENAME}}}} {{FULLPAGENAME}} – HWB-EuP 2009] on {{CURRENTDAY2}}. {{CURRENTMONTHNAME}} {{CURRENTYEAR}}.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Terms of Use ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, published as a print work in 2012, has been made freely available in 2021 as an online edition at &amp;lt;max-eup2012.mpipriv.de&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materials published here are subject to exclusive rights of use as held by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and the publisher Oxford University Press; they may only be used for non-commercial purposes. Users may download, print, and make copies of the text files being made freely available to the public. Further, users may translate excerpts of the entries and cite them in the context of academic work, provided that the following requirements are met: &lt;br /&gt;
* Use for non-commercial purposes&lt;br /&gt;
* The textual integrity of each entry and its elements is maintained&lt;br /&gt;
* Citation of the online reference according to academic standards, indicating the author, keyword title, work name, and date of retrieval (see [[How to use#Suggested Citation Style|Suggested Citation Style]]).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Imprint&amp;diff=1306</id>
		<title>Imprint</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Imprint&amp;diff=1306"/>
		<updated>2025-07-01T14:51:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__TOC__&lt;br /&gt;
The following provides mandatory data concerning the provider of this website, obligations with regard to data protection, as well as other important legal references involving the Internet site of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (www.mpipriv.de) as required by German law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Provider ==&lt;br /&gt;
The provider of this Internet site within the legal meaning of the term is the registered association Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science e.V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Address ==&lt;br /&gt;
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Hofgartenstraße 8 D-80539 Munich&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Phone: +49 (89) 2108 - 0&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Internet: https://www.mpg.de&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Register of Societies and Associations ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Max Planck Society is registered in the Official Register of Societies and Associations at Berlin-Charlottenburg Local Court under the register number VR 13378 B.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Representatives ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Max Planck Society is legally represented by its Board of Directors which, in turn, is represented by the President of the Society, Prof. Dr. Martin Stratmann and by Secretary General Rüdiger Willems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Value Added Tax Identification Number ==&lt;br /&gt;
The value added tax identification number of the Max Planck Society is DE 129517720.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Editors ==&lt;br /&gt;
Responsible editors for the contents of the website of the Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law einfügen Max-EuP 2012 (https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de) with regard to media law:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels (Managing Director)&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Mittelweg 187&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
D-20148 Hamburg&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[mailto:michaels@mpipriv.de michaels@mpipriv.de]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Technically responsible ===&lt;br /&gt;
Technically responsible for the website of &amp;quot;Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law – Max-EuP 2012&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
David Schröder-Micheel&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
E-Mail: [mailto:micheel@mpipriv.de micheel@mpipriv.de]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legal Structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Max Planck Society is a non-profit research facility which is organized as a registered association. All of the institutes and facilities of the Max Planck Society are largely autonomous in terms of organization and research, but as a rule have no legal capacity of their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreign Language Pages ==&lt;br /&gt;
To the extent that parts of this Internet site are offered in languages other than German, this represents a service exclusively for staff and guests of the Max Planck Society who are not proficient in German.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Liability for Contents of Online Information ==&lt;br /&gt;
As the provider of contents in accordance with Section 7 Paragraph 1 of the Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz (German Digital Service Act), the Max Planck Society shall be responsible for any contents which it makes available for use in accordance with general legal provisions. The Max Planck Society makes every effort to provide timely and accurate information on this Web site. Nevertheless, errors and inaccuracies cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, the Max Planck Society does not assume any liability for the relevance, accuracy, completeness or quality of the information provided. The Max Planck Society shall not be liable for damage of a tangible or intangible nature caused directly or indirectly through the use or failure to use the information offered and/or through the use of faulty or incomplete information unless it is verifiably culpable of intent or gross negligence. The same shall apply to any downloadable software available free of charge. The Max Planck Society reserves the right to modify, supplement, or delete any or all of the information offered on its Internet site, or to temporarily or permanently cease publication thereof without prior and separate notification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Links to Internet Sites of Third Parties ==&lt;br /&gt;
This Internet site includes links to external pages. These external links are designated as follows: https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/img/external-ltr.png. The respective provider shall be responsible for the contents of any linked external pages. In establishing the initial link, the Max Planck Society has reviewed the respective external content in order to determine whether such link entailed possible civil or criminal responsibility. However, a constant review of linked external pages is unreasonable without concrete reason to believe that a violation of the law may be involved. If the Max Planck Society determines such or it is pointed out by others that an external offer to which it is connected via a link entails civil or criminal responsibility, then the Max Planck Society will immediately eliminate any link to this offer. The Max Planck Society expressly dissociates itself from such contents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Icon Credits ==&lt;br /&gt;
[https://thenounproject.com/term/encyclopedia/4185691 &amp;quot;Encyclopedia&amp;quot;] by Rudolf Horaczek from [https://thenounproject.com/ the Noun Project] (for the logo and the favicon)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All icons are licensed under [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY)].&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=How_to_use&amp;diff=1304</id>
		<title>How to use</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=How_to_use&amp;diff=1304"/>
		<updated>2025-07-01T14:44:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
==Search==&lt;br /&gt;
The search field in Max-EuP2012 enables search methods known from platforms such as Wikipedia:&lt;br /&gt;
* Queries are made via a &#039;&#039;&#039;search bar&#039;&#039;&#039; and are activated by pressing the enter key or by clicking on the magnifying glass symbol. &lt;br /&gt;
* As word input progresses, the search function &#039;&#039;&#039;suggests all matching keywords&#039;&#039;&#039; available in the work. &lt;br /&gt;
* Do &#039;&#039;&#039;not distinguish between upper- and lower-case&#039;&#039;&#039; characters.&lt;br /&gt;
* The search function uses &#039;&#039;&#039;whole words&#039;&#039;&#039;. Thus, a search for &#039;&#039;jurisdiction&#039;&#039; will not return hits for pages that contain only the word &#039;&#039;jurisdictional&#039;&#039;. &lt;br /&gt;
* Only pages containing &#039;&#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039;&#039; entered search terms will be found.&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;&#039;Word components&#039;&#039;&#039; can be searched for by using a &#039;&#039;&#039;truncation character&#039;&#039;&#039; (*). Thus, a search for &#039;&#039;jurisdiction*&#039;&#039; will return hits for &#039;&#039;jurisdictional&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;&#039;Phrases&#039;&#039;&#039; or word groups can be searched for with &#039;&#039;&#039;quotation marks&#039;&#039;&#039;. This function works only with whole words. The use of truncation characters and quotation marks cannot be combined. Thus, “conflict of law” and “conflict of law*” will not return hits for conflict of laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Internal References==&lt;br /&gt;
The systematic linking of all entries functions as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;&#039;Cross-references&#039;&#039;&#039; to other keywords are highlighted in the text and can be accessed by clicking on them.&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;&#039;Reverse references&#039;&#039;&#039; to the displayed keyword can be displayed and called up via the link “What links here”.&lt;br /&gt;
* When a keyword is also available in a German &#039;&#039;&#039;language version&#039;&#039;&#039; ([https://hwb-eup2009.mpipriv.de HWB-EuP 2009]), the corresponding entry can be retrieved via the menu option &amp;quot;In Other Languages&amp;quot;.&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;&#039;Print jobs&#039;&#039;&#039; are started by clicking on the “Printable version” link. This function can also be used to conveniently create PDFs.&lt;br /&gt;
* A link to the currently displayed page can be sent via &#039;&#039;&#039;e-mail&#039;&#039;&#039; by clicking on “Share via email”.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggested Citation Style==&lt;br /&gt;
Entries can be cited by indicating the author, link, and retrieval date based on the following &#039;&#039;&#039;model&#039;&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
* Jürgen Basedow, &amp;lt;https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php/Private_International_Law_(PIL)&amp;gt;, Section 4 (1 January 2022).&lt;br /&gt;
* Klaus J Hopt, &amp;lt;https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php/Corporate_Governance&amp;gt; (1 January 2022)&lt;br /&gt;
* Reinhard Zimmermann, &amp;lt;https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php/Roman_Law&amp;gt;, Section 3 (1 January 2022)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Print.css&amp;diff=1302</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Print.css</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Print.css&amp;diff=1302"/>
		<updated>2025-07-01T09:04:09Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;/* CSS placed here will affect the print output */  .printfooter { display: none; }&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
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		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Common.css&amp;diff=1300</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Common.css</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Common.css&amp;diff=1300"/>
		<updated>2025-06-09T19:22:56Z</updated>

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#iframeframe { height: 6em; }&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Disclaimerpage&amp;diff=1288</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Disclaimerpage</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Disclaimerpage&amp;diff=1288"/>
		<updated>2025-06-09T15:51:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Imprint&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Imprint&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Disclaimers&amp;diff=1287</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Disclaimers</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Disclaimers&amp;diff=1287"/>
		<updated>2025-06-09T15:51:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Imprint&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Imprint&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Aboutsite&amp;diff=1286</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Aboutsite</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Aboutsite&amp;diff=1286"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T15:08:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Terms of Use&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Terms of Use&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Aboutpage&amp;diff=1285</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Aboutpage</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Aboutpage&amp;diff=1285"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T15:07:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Terms_of_Use&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Terms_of_Use&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Privacy&amp;diff=1283</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Privacy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Privacy&amp;diff=1283"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T15:04:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Data Protection Information&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Data Protection Information&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Privacypage&amp;diff=1282</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Privacypage</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Privacypage&amp;diff=1282"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T15:02:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Data_Protection_Information&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Data_Protection_Information&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Mainpage&amp;diff=1281</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Mainpage</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Mainpage&amp;diff=1281"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T14:24:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;Max_Planck_Encyclopedia_of_European_Private_Law&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Max_Planck_Encyclopedia_of_European_Private_Law&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Category:Authors&amp;diff=1280</id>
		<title>Category:Authors</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Category:Authors&amp;diff=1280"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T12:50:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created blank page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Category:A%E2%80%93Z&amp;diff=1279</id>
		<title>Category:A–Z</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Category:A%E2%80%93Z&amp;diff=1279"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T12:49:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created blank page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Sidebar&amp;diff=1278</id>
		<title>MediaWiki:Sidebar</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Sidebar&amp;diff=1278"/>
		<updated>2025-06-06T12:41:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: Created page with &amp;quot;* navigation ** mainpage|Introduction ** Keyword_Entries_A–Z|Keywords A–Z ** Contributors|Contributors ** Print_Edition|Print Edition ** How_to_use|How to use * Links ** https://www.mpipriv.de|mpipriv.de ** https://hwb-eup2009.mpipriv.de/index.php|HWB-EuP 2009 * TOOLBOX * LANGUAGES&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;* navigation&lt;br /&gt;
** mainpage|Introduction&lt;br /&gt;
** Keyword_Entries_A–Z|Keywords A–Z&lt;br /&gt;
** Contributors|Contributors&lt;br /&gt;
** Print_Edition|Print Edition&lt;br /&gt;
** How_to_use|How to use&lt;br /&gt;
* Links&lt;br /&gt;
** https://www.mpipriv.de|mpipriv.de&lt;br /&gt;
** https://hwb-eup2009.mpipriv.de/index.php|HWB-EuP 2009&lt;br /&gt;
* TOOLBOX&lt;br /&gt;
* LANGUAGES&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ye%C5%9Fim_M_Atamer&amp;diff=1277</id>
		<title>Yeşim M Atamer</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ye%C5%9Fim_M_Atamer&amp;diff=1277"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Yeşim M Atamer&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., LL.M. (Istanbul), Professor,  Chair for Private, Commercial, European and Comparative Law, University of Zurich (as of October 2021)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Yeşim_M._Atamer]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Yeşim_M_Atamer}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Atamer, Yeşim_M}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=World_Intellectual_Property_Organization_(WIPO)&amp;diff=1275</id>
		<title>World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=World_Intellectual_Property_Organization_(WIPO)&amp;diff=1275"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Axel Metzger]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. History and development of WIPO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
WIPO (or OMPI, &#039;&#039;Organisation Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle &#039;&#039;or &#039;&#039;Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual&#039;&#039;) was established in 1967 by the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. WIPO’s headquarters are in Geneva. The main objective of WIPO is ‘to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3 WIPO Convention). WIPO performs the administrative tasks of the Paris Union, the special unions established in relation with that Union and the Berne Union. The ‘Paris Union’ was established by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, last revised in 1967 in Stockholm (Paris Convention), the ‘Berne Union’ by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, last revised in 1971 in Paris (Berne Convention). Both Unions have kept their status as international organizations but have delegated their administrative tasks to WIPO. In 1974 WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations in the sense of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;57 of the UN Charter. Since its establishment, various treaties and recommendations regarding intellectual and industrial property have been negotiated under the auspices of WIPO (see 3. below).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Members and structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among the founding members of WIPO were all of the then Member States of the European Union, the United States, Japan and Switzerland. Today, WIPO has 184 Member States including China and the Russian Federation. Membership is open to all members of the Paris Union, the Berne Union, one of the special unions established on the basis of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;19 Paris Convention or parties to any other international agreement designed to promote the protection of intellectual property whose administration is assumed by WIPO. In addition, members of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice may become members of WIPO. Furthermore, the General Assembly of WIPO may invite states to become members. The possibility of becoming a member of WIPO without being a member of one of the Unions aims at opening the organization to those states which are not willing to adopt the high level of protection provided by the conventions establishing the Unions. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5 WIPO Convention, only states may become a member of the organization. Therefore, the membership of the European Union is not possible under the current regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The organizational structure of WIPO is largely in line with the typical structure of international organizations but with the special feature of being closely interrelated with the Paris and Berne Unions. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;6 WIPO Convention provides rules for the composition and the functions of the ‘General Assembly’, in which only member states being at the same time members of at least one of the Unions are represented. Besides the General Assembly, the WIPO Convention has established a ‘Conference’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7) in which all members are represented regardless of whether or not they are members of any Union. The central aspects of WIPO’s work are delegated to the General Assembly, especially the appointment of the Director General, whereas the ‘Conference’ is in charge of discussing matters of general interest. The functions of a board of the organization are fulfilled by the ‘coordination committee’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;8), which is composed of representatives of those WIPO member states that are at the same time members of the Executive Committee of the Paris Union or the Executive Committee of the Berne Union. The ‘coordination committee’ is in charge of nominating a candidate for appointment as Director General. The Director General directs the ‘international office’, serves as the chief executive of the organization and represents it (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Treaties and recommendations ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Currently WIPO administers 24&amp;amp;nbsp;international treaties in the field of intellectual property. Regarding industrial property, besides the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, last revised in 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks of 1989 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970 deserve special attention because they have established significant improvements for the international registration of patents ([[Patent Law|patent law]]) and trade marks ([[Trade Mark Law|trade mark law]]). For [[Copyright|copyright]] and neighbouring rights, the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961 are of primary importance, the latter because it recognized the principle of national treatment and certain minimum standards of protection for the most important neighbouring rights ([[Related Rights (Copyright)|related rights (copyright)]]). However, the United States and many other countries have not signed the Rome Convention, and this led to significant gaps in the protection of performing artists, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations. This gap has been closed partially by the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 (WPPT), which has been signed by more than 80 states to date. Also in 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) was adopted. The WCT supplements the Berne Convention with additional minimum rights that member states must grant to the nationals or residents of other member states. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;11 obliges member states to provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights. The WCT has been ratified by more than 80 states. Different from the older Conventions administered by WIPO, the WPPT and the WCT are open for the membership of the European Union (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;26(3) WPPT, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;17(3) WCT). The European Union has signed both treaties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, no agreement could be reached during the 1996 diplomatic conference on the European initiative to implement an additional instrument for the protection of database producers ([[Database Protection|database protection]]). Other initiatives for conventions on the protection of audiovisual performances and broadcasting organizations have not been successful so far. Also, it is unclear whether the negotiations regarding an instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge, genetic resources and traditional cultural expressions or folklore will finally be successful. Even though the subject matters discussed at WIPO are rather diverse, the fundamental conflict of interests between the rightholders coming from the industrial states on one side and the less developed states and NGOs representing the user’s perspective on the other, is clearly visible as the main impediment in all current negotiations. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides the classic instrument of the treaty, WIPO has since the late 1990s been successfully using ‘recommendations’ to promote the protection of intellectual property through cooperation among states. Up to this point, three joint recommendations of WIPO and the Paris Union regarding the law of trademarks have been published: the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks of&amp;amp;nbsp;1999, the Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses of 2000 and the Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet of 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1994, WIPO established the Arbitration and Mediation Center, which provides several specialized alternative dispute resolution procedures for intellectual property matters. The most successful of these procedural options is the WIPO Domain Name Dispute Resolution, which is utilized in more than 2,000 cases per year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 5. WIPO and the World Trade Organization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The international protection of intellectual property was fortified significantly by the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. The WTO Treaty comprises as an annex the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). According to Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;2 and 9 of TRIPS, the members of the WTO must comply with the requirements of the Paris and Berne Conventions with the exception of author’s moral rights, which are expressly excluded (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9(1) TRIPS). TRIPS contains standards of protection that go beyond the protection granted under the Berne Convention (‘Berne plus’). The integration of intellectual property in the WTO system has increased the number of member states of the conventions administered by WIPO. The benefits of the WTO rules on free trade have set an additional incentive to enter into the international protection scheme of TRIPS and the several treaties administered by WIPO. Another added value of TRIPS in respect of the previous conventions is the chapter on enforcement of intellectual property ([[Intellectual Property (Enforcement)|intellectual property (enforcement)]]), Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;41&amp;amp;nbsp;ff TRIPS, and the availability of the WTO dispute resolution procedure. Regarding these institutional advantages, one may expect WTO to take a leading position in the further development of international protection of intellectual property. The European Union is member to the WTO. As a consequence, the Paris and Berne Conventions are a part of the law of the European Union and may be interpreted authoritatively by the ECJ.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Paul Katzenberger, ‘TRIPS und das Urheberrecht’ [1995] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Internationaler Teil 447; Silke von Lewinski, ‘Die diplomatische Konferenz der WIPO 1996 zum Urheberrecht und zu den verwandten Schutzrechten’ [1996] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Internationaler Teil 667; Hans Ballreich and Anja Meyer, ‘World Intellectual Property Organization’ in &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia of Public International Law&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;4&#039;&#039; (2000); Torsten Bettinger (eds), &#039;&#039;Domain Name Law and Practice&#039;&#039; (2005); Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg, &#039;&#039;International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2006); Silke von Lewinski and Jörg Reinbothe, &#039;&#039;The WIPO Treaties 1996&#039;&#039; (2007); Christopher May, &#039;&#039;The World Intellectual Property Organization&#039;&#039; (2007); Silke von Lewinski, &#039;&#039;International Copyright Law and Policy&#039;&#039; (2008); Paul Goldstein and Bernt Hugenholtz, &#039;&#039;International Copyright—Principles&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Law&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; and Practice&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2010).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:World_Intellectual_Property_Organization]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Works_Council&amp;diff=1273</id>
		<title>Works Council</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Works_Council&amp;diff=1273"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Markus Roth]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Employee participation via works councils ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Works councils at the operational level provide an important form of employee participation, which is firmly anchored in the national legal tradition of many European countries, especially Germany. European works councils were introduced by the Works Councils Directive (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;94/ 45) in 1994. The Directive’s amended version of 2009 had to be transposed into national law by June 2011. Works councils and [[Co-Determination|co-determination]] both provide employee involvement through access to information and participation in decision-making rather than in the form of financial participation in the earnings of the company or via [[Occupational Pensions|occupational pensions]]. Works councils provide for employee participation mainly at the operational level via special institutions, whereas co-determination provides for employee participation at [[Board|board]] level (board of directors or in the supervisory board) and therefore in existing institutions of the company.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Works councils are more widespread than co-determination. They operate in the overall context of worker representation. Other persons and institutions representing employees are employee representatives in the supervisory board or in the board of directors, but also unions and union delegations. Countries with national legislation for works councils but without a national co-determination regime covering all private enterprises are, inter alia, France, Poland, Greece, Spain, Switzerland and Portugal. National legal regimes for employee participation via works councils vary. Systems of worker representation which are largely independent from unions are found in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In France, Greece, Portugal and Spain, both unionized and independent systems of worker representation exist. The Scandinavian countries rely heavily on a representation of workers’ interests through trade unions. In England and Ireland, employee involvement in entrepreneurial decisions is based almost entirely on European requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. European rules  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Truly European works councils are subject to Council Directive&amp;amp;nbsp;94/45 of 22&amp;amp;nbsp;September 1994, which provides for a European works council. The amended directive on the establishment of a European works council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2009/ 38) had to be transposed into national law by June 2011. According to the [[European Commission]], in February 2008, a total of 820 companies had implemented European works councils, representing approximately 14.5 million employees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Directive applies when a company employs more than 1,000 employees and at least 150 in a different Member State. European works councils are to be set up at the request of 100 employees or the company’s management. A special negotiating body is to negotiate the powers and the framework of the European works council. Contrary to the first proposal, the Directive refrained from setting a mandatory standard for all companies. The Directive on European Works Councils has served so far as a model for the regulation on employee participation in Europe. Since 2001, co-determination in a [[European Company (Societas Europaea)|European Company (&#039;&#039;Societas Europaea&#039;&#039;)]] is provided via negotiations and a fallback provision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The amended Directive provides that information and consultation in European works councils and in national employee representation bodies are linked, with due regard to the competences and areas of action of each. The link can be made with an agreement between the central management and the central negotiating body. The Member States must ensure that the processes of informing and consulting are conducted in the European works councils as well as in the national employee representation bodies even in the absence of such an agreement. According to the amended Directive, the agreement between central management and the special negotiating body is the central instrument for employee participation. The agreement must determine in particular the undertakings that are covered by the agreement, the composition of the European works council, the number of members and the functions and the procedure for information and consultation of the European works council. In this context, information is defined as transmission of data to the employee representatives. Information must be given at such time and with such content to enable employee representatives to examine the information adequately and, where necessary, prepare for consultation. The competences, the establishment and the composition of the European works council are specified in the annex of the Directive, which also makes special provision for the event of non-agreement between the special negotiating body and the central management.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the Directive on European Works Councils, Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2002/14 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Union provides a tool for employee participation. The body or persons to be informed and consulted are to be designated by the national legislature. This Directive does not directly refer to employee participation via works councils or via co-determination. Information requirements exist on the recent and probable development of the undertaking’s or the establishment’s activities and economic situation; information and consultation requirements exist on the situation, structure and probable development of employment within the undertaking or establishment and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a threat to employment as well as on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or in contractual relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Works councils in the Member States ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rules concerning works councils in Europe are extremely heterogeneous. Works councils are based in some countries solely on the EU Directive. Before the implementation of the Directive to inform workers, for example, no national regulations on works councils existed in the United Kingdom. In Ireland, there was only a scheme for public servants and a common declaration of the social partners for the framework of negotiated works councils. In continental Europe, most countries have additional rules or at least operating practices which provide for employee participation at operational level. In most countries, works councils are made up only of employee representatives, while other legislation provides for parity representation of employees (eg Belgium and Luxembourg). Other countries have developed a special regime (eg Finland).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regulation of works councils in Germany is particularly detailed. A first comprehensive settlement was already covered by the Works Councils Act in the Weimar Republic. Legal rules governing works councils are also in place in Belgium, Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain as well as many eastern European countries. The objects of employee participation, the design and the criteria for the formation of a works council vary considerably in these countries. Even outside of England and Ireland, mandatory employee participation via works councils is not a common European standard. In Denmark and Sweden, for example, works councils are not regulated, yet there is a practice based on collective agreements. In France, co-determination and works councils are merged in a &#039;&#039;comité d’entreprise&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides works councils, special bodies that allow for representation of employee interests exist in Belgium (&#039;&#039;Gewerkschaftsdelegation&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;délégations syndiccales du personnel des enterprises&#039;&#039;). Special representatives are in place as regards, inter alia, job security, youth workers and women. In most countries (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and others) works councils are made up of employees only, whereas others (Belgium, Denmark) provide for joint bodies with representatives both for employees and the employer. In France, participation of employees is provided for by the works council, the &#039;&#039;comité d’entreprise&#039;&#039; (for a wide range of economic affairs) and by the &#039;&#039;délégués du personnel&#039;&#039; (for personal affairs of the employees). A similar differentiation is provided by the Luxembourgian Labour Act. Spain distinguishes between personal delegates (&#039;&#039;delegados de personal&#039;&#039;) for companies from 11 to 49 employees and works councils (&#039;&#039;comités de empresa&#039;&#039;) for companies with 50 or more employees and also provides for union representation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the European countries providing worker representation at plant level, employees are entitled to set up a works council once an enterprise reaches a certain size. The number of employees required to set up a works council varies between five (Germany, Austria) and 100 (Belgium). Greece distinguishes between firms in which a union exists (50 employees) and firms without a union (20 employees). Some countries, such as Germany and France, differ also in respect of the affairs concerned. In Germany, for participation in economic affairs there must be at least 20 employees and for some matters even 100 or 500 employees; in France, by contrast, there must be at least 11 employees for personal affairs (to elect &#039;&#039;délégués du personnel&#039;&#039;) and 50 employees for economic affairs (to set up a &#039;&#039;comité d’entreprise&#039;&#039;). Switzerland provides for works councils in enterprises with more than 50 employees if more than 20 per cent or 100 employees request the establishment of a works council. In the Netherlands, in enterprises with more than 50 employees, it is up to the employer to organize elections for a works council. A works council in the Netherlands can set up committees composed of works council members and other employees and delegate some of its competences to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some countries, such as Germany and Austria, give works councils the power to conclude special agreements with the employer, binding all employees ([[Company Agreement|company agreement]]). In Germany, employee participation via works councils was introduced as early as the 1920s with the Works Councils Act of 1922. After being abolished in the Third Reich, works councils were reintroduced after World War&amp;amp;nbsp;II with the Works Councils Act of 1952 and are now subject to the Works Councils Act of 1972. The Works Councils Act provides for information, consultation and co-determination rights in various forms in specific social, personal and economic affairs. When the works council has a right of approval and refuses to approve measures planned by the employer, the approval of the works council may, as in the Netherlands, be substituted by the Labour Court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. Common rules and development prospects ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike co-determination in supervisory boards or in boards of directors, works councils are not dependent on the company form. Not only stock corporations but also private companies, companies without their own legal personality and even businesses not organized in a company law form are subject to employee participation by works councils. Works councils are special bodies independent from the corporate governance form provided by national or European [[Company Law|company law]]. Therefore, national works council regimes also apply independently from national company law to foreign companies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Works councils are established to give employees a voice in the enterprise, to build trust and to enhance the collaboration between employees and the employer. They protect employees (members of the works council are protected against dismissal), but they also facilitate the restructuring of the company. Therefore, it would be too narrow to regard works councils as merely a device for employee protection. National legislatures specify the information, consultation and co-determination rights of works councils but often allow agreements between the works council and the employer or between unions and the employer to broaden the scope of employee participation. The effects of employee participation via works councils are difficult to evaluate, yet well-framed works councils are likely to enhance public welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economists favour works councils to co-determination. They assume that establishing works councils with specific authority could enhance public welfare, since granting general authority might likely result in employees calling for too much competence and employers being willing to provide too little. Therefore, the areas which are covered by information, consultation and co-determination rights are to be framed carefully according to the specific circumstances. The diversity of working conditions might explain the different legal regimes in Europe. Common features in the jurisdictions providing for works councils are that works councils lack the right to call for a strike, that they are equipped by the employer with appropriate resources and that the works council members are both released from their employment obligations (for the necessary periods or even fully) and are protected from dismissal. Most jurisdictions exclude ordinary dismissal, while some provide only for the presumption that there is no good cause for the dismissal of the works council member.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the future development of employee participation in decision-making, works councils and co-determination have to be analysed together. In relation to the subjects dealt with above, such as social, personal or business affairs, employee participation via works councils or via co-determination cannot be clearly distinguished at the national and European levels. At the national level, the difficulty of classifying the French &#039;&#039;comité d’entreprise&#039;&#039; and the numerous interactions of all works councils with the business decisions of the employer exemplify this point. At the European level, European works councils deal with business decisions. This, together with the fact that works council regulation is more widespread in Europe than co-determination, suggests that works councils might in the future be more important for employee participation in decision-making than co-determination at the board level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Roger Blanpain, ‘Representation of Employees at Plant and Enterprise Level’ in IECL XV (1994) ch 13; Joel Roger and Wolfgang Streek (eds), &#039;&#039;Works Councils&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Consultation&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Representation and Cooperation in Industrial Relations&#039;&#039; (1995); Ole Hasselbalch and Per Jacobsen, &#039;&#039;Labour Law in Denmark&#039;&#039; (1999); Manfred Weiss, ‘Arbeitnehmermitwirkung in Europa’ [2003] NZA 177; Antoine TJM Jacobs, &#039;&#039;Labour Law in the Netherlands&#039;&#039; (2004); Catherine Barnard, &#039;&#039;EC Employment Law&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2006); Ronnie Eklund, Tore Sigeman and Laura Carlson, &#039;&#039;Swedish Labour and Employment Law&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Cases and Materials &#039;&#039;(2008); Lars Gellner and Lars Sydolf, &#039;&#039;Swedish Labour Law&#039;&#039; (2008); Markus Äimälä, Johan Åström, Hannu Rautiainen and Mikko Nyyssölä, &#039;&#039;Finnish Labour Law in Practice&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2009); Brian Bercusson, &#039;&#039;European Labour Law&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2009); Maeve Regan (ed), &#039;&#039;[Irish]&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Employment Law&#039;&#039; (2009); Markus Roth, ‘Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm, A Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination’ (2010) 11 EBOR 51; Stefan Lingemann, Robert von Steinau-Steinrück and Anja Mengel, &#039;&#039;Employment and Labor Law in Germany&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2010); Martin Henssler and Axel Braun (eds), &#039;&#039;Europäisches Arbeitsrecht&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2011); &#039;&#039;Dalloz Code de travail&#039;&#039; (73rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2011).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Working_Time&amp;diff=1271</id>
		<title>Working Time</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Working_Time&amp;diff=1271"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Andrea Potz]]&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;[[Ulrich Runggaldier]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Subject and objective  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The determination of working time between employer and employee (particularly its length and its organization) is a fundamental aspect of every employment relationship. The legal opportunities of working time regulation offered by private law represent just a small quantitative part in the dense normative setting of working time legislation. The subject matter of working time is traditionally regarded as part of occupational safety and health law ([[Employment Protection|employment protection]]), and accordingly is dominated by public law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regimentation of working time is based on several interactive aspects including health policy, economic policy and also social policy. The primary purpose of working time legislation is to protect the health of workers—the limitation of working time is to prevent workers from exploitation at work. In this context the socio- political intention of promoting workers’ personal freedom and free time also needs to be mentioned. Workers must have the opportunity to play an active part in social and cultural life and to take care of their own interests. The regulation of working time also constitutes an important aspect of the question as to the compatibility of work and family life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The effect of working time legislation is not only relevant on an individual level, but it also prevents social and economic disadvantages as a consequence of the exploitation of workers. Such damages cause high costs for national economies because the financial risks of accidents at work needs to be borne primarily by national social security systems (eg benefits disbursed through accident insurance and early retirement because of disability).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Simultaneously, working time legislation needs to be seen as an instrument of economic policy for the regulation and improvement of employment levels, especially by reducing the maximum permissible working hours. In an international context, the organization of working time law plays a fundamental role for the competitiveness of business locations. It is therefore also in the focus of the discussion on more flexible working times. On a national level, rules concerning working time have to guarantee the same framework for companies which are in competition with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Definition  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
‘Working time’ denotes any time period, during which a worker is at the disposal of his employer and providing his professional services. ‘Rest period’, in contrast, denotes any time period which is at the disposal of the worker. The Working Time Directive (Dir 2003/88/EC) defines ‘rest period’ in the negative form as any period which is not working time. The broad scope of the definition leads to problems concerning the difference between special forms of working time and rest periods, as for example on-call duty. The qualification of working time is not only relevant for workers’ safety but also for questions of payment (eg pay for overtime). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Union law defines ‘working time’ as any period during which the worker is working at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties. The ECJ interprets the term ‘working time’ broadly. Consequently, any period of time in which workers are present and available at the workplace, even without carrying out their duties, is regarded as working time (ECJ Case C-303/98 – &#039;&#039;SIMAP&#039;&#039; [2000] ECR I-7963). If the workers must merely be contactable at all times when on-call, only time linked to the actual provision of services will be regarded as working time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Tendencies in legal development  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The introduction of legal restrictions on working time was an important step in the development of national labour law in its beginnings in the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. The reason for these legislative acts was not primarily the socially motivated protection of workers but far more the political interest of the state in the health of young men who were supposed to serve in the army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century most Member States established a complex legal system of working time rules which covered all kinds of normative levels depending on national constitutions and traditions. The normative organization of working time at the European level started rather lately. The primary target of Union law was the creation of a framework of free competition between Member States and not the harmonization of national labour and social law, areas that did not fit into the original concept of the EEC. According to this attitude the founding treaties did not contain general provisions empowering the Community to issue legal measures in these special fields. This lack of competence is the reason why several Community acts are based on former Art&amp;amp;nbsp;48 EC (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;45 TEU/39 EC) concerning the establishment of free movement for workers ([[Free Movement of Workers|free movement of workers]]) as well as on the general clause of former Art&amp;amp;nbsp;100 EC (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;115 TEU/94 EC).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problematic lack of legislative competence ([[Legislative Competence of the EU|legislative competence of the EU]]) has taken more and more centre stage in ongoing political debates. In the 1980s employment protection ([[Employment Protection|employment protection]]) noticeably became the focus of attention, which finally led to the introduction of former Art&amp;amp;nbsp;118a(1) and (2) EC (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;153 TEU/137 EC) by the Single European Act 1986. Thus the direct competence of the Community for the improvement of the working environment to protect workers’ health and safety was founded. Another important step was the release of the Social Policy Agreement (SPA) which extended the legislative powers of the Community into the field of labour and social law. The SPA was ultimately ratified by all Member States and could therefore be integrated into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;151 TEU/ 136 EC). In this context the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2001 need to be mentioned as well, although neither of them is legally binding. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time was the first Working Time Directive which laid down minimum health and safety requirements for the organization of working time. This directive has been amended several times. In order to clarify the applicable provisions a codification was consequently drawn up in the form of the Working Time Directive (Dir 2003/88/EC).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of working time rules in Union law is characterized by the successive establishment of provisions providing for the empowerment of the Community and the extension of competences in the field of workers’ protection ([[Legislative Competence of the EU|legislative competence of the EU]]). One example of this would be the amendments made to the Working Time Directive which changed its legal basis in favour of an increased involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Union law also provides rules for atypical forms of employment relationships. During the past 25 years new models of working time appeared which were not compatible with traditional models. For the purpose of guaranteeing the same minimum level of protection, the European legislator thus released several directives such as for example the Part-Time Directive (Dir 97/81/EC). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With a view to the national level, different strategies in regulating working time can be found. However, there is a trend towards the shifting of legislative competences from national legislatures to the parties of [[Collective Labour Agreements|collective labour agreements]], social partners and even to representative bodies of workers at company level. This way the ‘flexibilization’ of working time is to be guaranteed; additionally bargaining powers are to be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why working time law proves to be a rather dynamic and developing field of law embedded in the strained relationship of economy and workers’ protection (key word &#039;&#039;flexicurity&#039;&#039;). The ECJ which had to deal with the interpretation of the term ‘working time’ in several of its cases has played an important role in the development of the law in this context (ECJ Case C-303/98 – &#039;&#039;SIMAP&#039;&#039; [2000] ECR I-7963; ECJ Case C-151/02 – &#039;&#039;Jäger&#039;&#039; [2003] ECR I-8389). These decisions of the ECJ led to a discussion about a fundamental amendment of the Working Time Directive. The amendment process focused on a legislative solution to the problems concerning the treatment of on-call time and the timing of compensatory rest as well as on the possibility of an opt-out. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. Union law ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important rules are laid down in directives, which differ according to the type of employment relationship in question as well as to their scope of application. Nevertheless, relevant aspects that stand in close relationship with the regulation of working time (eg payment) still cannot be regulated by Union law because of the restricted competences according to the treaties (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;153(5) TEU (2007)/137(5) EC).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The aim of this important directive is the harmonization of working time law in its main areas for the purpose of supporting the completion of the internal market and improving the living and working conditions of workers in the European Community. For that reason the directive laid down minimum requirements which had to be transposed into national law by all Member States. Nevertheless the directive also provides for the possibility that certain provisions may be subject to derogations by Member States or the two sides of industries (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;17–22). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scope of application of the Working Time Directive is based on that of Council Directive 89/391/EEC ([[Employment Protection|employment protection]]): therefore, the directive applies to all sectors of activity, both public and private, except for special activities in the public arena (eg military forces). The directive does not apply to seafarers who fall within the scope of the Seafarers Directive (Dir 1999/63/EC). For certain types of activity the directive provides specific provisions (eg mobile workers and offshore work). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The directive is applicable to every ‘employee’ which denotes any person employed by an employer, including trainees and apprentices but excluding domestic servants. According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ the essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration. Children and adolescents do not fall within the scope of the Working Time Directive but are subject to the rules of Council Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Working Time Directive refers to matters such as the minimum daily, weekly and annual periods of rest and adequate breaks, and the maximum limit on weekly working hours. Moreover the directive applies to certain aspects of night work, shift work and patterns of work (maximum limits of duration). The Working Time Directive contains definitions of ‘working time’, ‘rest period’, ‘night time’, ‘shift work’, ‘mobile worker’, ‘offshore work’ as well as ‘adequate rest’. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of eleven consecutive hours per 24-hour period (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3) and a minimum uninterrupted rest period of 35 hours (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5). Where the working day is longer than six hours, every worker is entitled to a rest break (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4), the details of which, including duration and the terms on which it is granted, shall be laid down at the national level. The average weekly working time (including overtime) is not to exceed 48 hours. The reference period for the calculation of the average weekly working time is limited to four months or 17 weeks respectively (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;16(b)). Under certain circumstances the Member States have the option of setting longer reference periods of up to six or twelve months (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;19). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Working Time Directive also provides for rules concerning annual leave. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7 every worker is entitled to paid annual leave of at least four weeks. The right of paid annual leave is a fundamental principle of social law in Union law. Therefore the directive does not allow for any derogation to the detriment of workers. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) Part-Time Directive 97/81/EC and Fixed‑Term Work Directive 1999/70/EC ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Part-Time Directive and the Fixed-Term Work Directive exhibit similarities with regard to content as well as structure. Both directives are based on framework agreements and their annexes which contain the substantive law, concluded by UNICE (now BUSINESS EUROPE), CEEP and the ETUC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of the Part-Time Directive is to provide for the improvement of the quality of part-time work on the one hand and, on the other hand, to contribute to the flexible organization of working time in a manner which takes into account the needs of workers and employers. The framework agreement applies to part-time workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the laws, [[Collective Labour Agreements|collective labour agreements]] or practices in force in each Member State. The term ‘part-time worker’ refers to an employee whose normal hours of work, calculated on a weekly basis (or on average based on a period of employment of up to one year), are less than the normal hours of work of a comparable full-time worker. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Part-Time Directive establishes a general framework for the elimination of discrimination against part-time workers ([[Discrimination (Employment Law)|discrimination (employment law)]]) and sets out the principle of &#039;&#039;pro rata temporis&#039;&#039;. Further, it provides rules to assist the development of opportunities for part-time work on a basis acceptable to employers and workers and to improve the quality of part-time work. Therefore, both Member States and social partners are expected to identify and review obstacles of a legal or administrative nature which may limit opportunities for part-time work and, where appropriate, to eliminate them, which is to facilitate the development of part-time work on a voluntary basis. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Fixed-Term Work Directive is another tool of Union law, which aims to regulate atypical forms of employment relationships. The term ‘fixed-term worker’ denotes a person with an employment contract or relationship entered into directly between an employer and a worker where the end of the employment contract or relationship is determined by objective conditions such as the passing of a specific point in time, the completion of a specific task, or the occurrence of a specific event. The term ‘employment contract’ is not defined in the directive but depends on national legal systems and their definitions. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of the Fixed-Term Work Directive is to improve the quality of fixed-term work and to establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. Therefore the directive provides that fixed-term workers are not to be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract or relation unless a different form of treatment is justified on objective grounds (principle of non-discrimination) ([[Discrimination (Employment Law)|discrimination (employment law)]]). According to the Part-Time Directive the Fixed-Term Work Directive also contains the principle of &#039;&#039;pro rata temporis&#039;&#039;. Furthermore, Member States are obliged to introduce one or more of the following measures where there are no equivalent legal measures in national law to prevent abuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts. These measures may be the establishment of objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, or the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships. The directive also provides for participation rights in employee representation bodies in the form of information and consultation rights with regard to fixed-term employment contracts within the undertaking or establishment in question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 5. Jurisdiction and amendments ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ECJ decisions concerning on-call duty have started a broad political discussion on working time within the EU. The key issues of the amendment of the Working Time Directive are the introduction of new definitions of working time to be added to existing definitions, the new opt-out-rule and different reference periods. The first proposal of the Commission was highly controversial and did not obtain a majority in the first reading in the European Parliament. One reason for its disapproval was the fear that the amended directive would lead to a reduction of workers’ protection levels. The amended Commission’s proposal was accepted by the Council in June 2008, but amended in the second reading in the European Parliament. In March 2009 the amendments made by the European Parliament were rejected by the Council which finalized the amendment procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) On-call duty ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In several cases the ECJ (Joined Cases C-397/01 and C-403/01 – &#039;&#039;Pfeiffer &#039;&#039;and others&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039; [2004] ECR I-8835) was faced with the question as to whether inactive on-call duty should be considered as working time for the purpose of the Working Time Directive. The ECJ came to the conclusion that time spent on-call at the work place should in its entirety be regarded as working time and was to be taken into account with regard to the maximum (weekly) working time. Deviating from what had been decided by the ECJ, the Commission’s first proposal draws a line between active and inactive on-call time stating that the inactive part of on-call time is not to be considered as working time. This distinction was not accepted by the European Parliament. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) Opt-out ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The directive establishes the conditions to be met by the Member States which exercise their right not to apply Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6 (maximum weekly working time). If Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6 is not to apply, this must be authorized by a collective agreement or an agreement between the social partners at the appropriate level. This condition is not applicable when a collective agreement is not in force and there is no collective representation of the workers within the undertaking or the business that is empowered, in accordance with national law and/or practice, to conclude a collective agreement or an agreement between the two sides of industry on the issue. In such cases, the individual worker’s consent, in accordance with the established conditions, is sufficient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The possibility of an opt-out is restricted by limiting the period of validity (maximum of one year) and by the formal requirement of a worker’s agreement given in writing. Furthermore, a worker’s agreement cannot be given at the beginning of the employment relationship or during any probation period. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== c) Reference periods ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The standard reference period for the average weekly period according to the current state of the law is four months, but this period could be extended to up to six or twelve months by the partners of a [[Collective Labour Agreements|collective labour agreement]]. However, the amended proposal would provide for extension of this period of up to one year by the Member States even outside of a collective labour agreement, subject to the consultation of concerned social partners in this matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Brian Bercusson, &#039;&#039;European Labour Law&#039;&#039; (1996); Wolfgang Balze, &#039;&#039;EAS B 3100&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Arbeitszeit&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Urlaub und Teilzeitarbeit&#039;&#039; (79th&amp;amp;nbsp;update October 2002); Peter Hanau, Heinz-Dietrich Steinmeyer and Rolf Wank, &#039;&#039;Handbuch des europäischen Arbeits- und Sozialrechts&#039;&#039; (2002); Dirk Neumann and Josef Biebl, &#039;&#039;Arbeitszeitgesetz&#039;&#039; (14th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2004); Rudolf Anzinger and Wolfgang Koberski, Arbeitzeitgesetz (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2005); Maximilian Fuchs and Franz Marhold, &#039;&#039;Europäisches Arbeitsrecht&#039;&#039; (2006); Lukas Stärker, &#039;&#039;Kommentar zur EU-Arbeitszeit-Richtlinie&#039;&#039; (2006); Roger Blanpain, &#039;&#039;European Labour Law&#039;&#039; (11th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2008); Josef Cerny, Gerda Heilegger, Christoph Klein and Bernhard Schwarz, &#039;&#039;Arbeitszeitgesetz&#039;&#039; (2008); Franz Schrank, &#039;&#039;Arbeitszeitgesetze&#039;&#039; (2008).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Arbeitszeit]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Wolfgang_Wurmnest&amp;diff=1269</id>
		<title>Wolfgang Wurmnest</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Wolfgang_Wurmnest&amp;diff=1269"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Wolfgang Wurmnest&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., LL.M. (Berkeley), Professor of German and European Private and Commercial Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Wolfgang_Wurmnest]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Wolfgang_Wurmnest}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Wurmnest, Wolfgang}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Wolfgang_Ernst&amp;diff=1267</id>
		<title>Wolfgang Ernst</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Wolfgang_Ernst&amp;diff=1267"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:37Z</updated>

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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Wolfgang Ernst&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., LL.M. (Yale), Professor of Roman Law and Private Law, Universität Zürich&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Wolfgang_Ernst]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Wolfgang_Ernst}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Ernst, Wolfgang}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Wills&amp;diff=1265</id>
		<title>Wills</title>
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Sebastian Herrler]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Subject matter and purpose of last wills ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all European legal systems the testator enjoys great autonomy in determining his succession. The concept of [[Freedom of Testation|freedom of testation]] is thus of fundamental importance. The right of near relatives and spouses to a [[Compulsory Portion|compulsory portion]] (alternatively, forced heirship) is the only substantial restriction on freedom of testation. The power to determine one’s succession has existed since Roman times, when it was a social obligation of each good &#039;&#039;pater familias&#039;&#039; of the upper class to designate an heir. After the decline of the Roman Empire, however, strict rules concerning the hereditary rights of near relatives were recognized in, inter alia, the Kingdom of the Franks, from which a testator could not deviate. Later, this rigid concept of succession was incrementally abolished, not least because of the influence of the church. This was initially done by creating the so-called &#039;&#039;Seelteil&#039;&#039;, a part of the estate which the testator could give to the church for the benefit of his soul. Ultimately, however, the concept of freedom of testation was reconstituted, and since traditional family structures in recent times have been and remain in a state of dissolution, the significance of testamentary dispositions is continually increasing. Intestate succession ([[Succession upon Death|succession upon death]]) based on and legitimated by close family ties, is often no longer regarded as appropriate. Given the fact that a last will, by definition, creates legal effects only after the death of the testator and that the latter cannot therefore be asked about the meaning of the words used, the following aspects are of vital importance: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)&amp;amp;nbsp;The significance of the act of making a will has to be made clear to the testator; at the same time his &#039;&#039;animus testandi&#039;&#039; has to be documented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b)&amp;amp;nbsp;It has to be ensured that the wishes of the testator can be ascertained with sufficient certainty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c)&amp;amp;nbsp;Finally, falsification of the testator’s will must be prevented as far as possible. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The existing formal requirements concerning last wills take account of these concerns. Furthermore, they determine both the interpretation of the last will and the treatment of mistakes by the testator in the process of making his testamentary dispositions. In view of the existence of private wills, the form requirements for wills can hardly be seen to ensure (d) that the testator receives legal advice before making his will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Tendencies of legal development ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all European legal systems the statutory provisions concerning last wills are rather static. Only very occasionally have the existing rules been modified—to some extent by the legislature, but primarily by the courts. Overall, this development is characterized by an increasing emphasis on the testator’s intention. This already applies to antiquity. Nowadays, the formal requirements for testamentary dispositions only refer to the way in which a last will has to be drawn up. However, pre-classical [[Roman Law|Roman law]] placed a greater emphasis on the formal requirements, in that they also affected the content of testamentary dispositions. Legal consequence could only take effect from the testator’s having used &#039;&#039;specific words&#039;&#039;. Form and content of last wills were indissolubly intertwined, thus providing for maximum legal certainty at the expense of regard for the testator’s real intention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, the liberalizing tendency, based on a shift of emphasis towards the testator’s intention, is apparent in a more lenient approach towards the existing form requirements. For example, a missing date no longer invalidates a last will, or at least does not automatically invalidate it, in most European states. When it comes to the infringement of a formal requirement which does not have a substantive significance or does not defeat its purpose there is an increasing tendency to desist from any sanction in order to give effect to the testator’s intention. This development is also reflected by the current methods of interpreting a last will. Unlike in the past, the interpretation does not so much focus on the wording of the will but on the testator’s intention, which has to be determined by considering all relevant circumstances even if these do not emerge from the last will. Some European legal systems even permit the courts to correct erroneous last wills in order to give effect to the (assumed) wishes of the testator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Key issues in comparative perspective ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Form ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Originally, the formal requirements for testamentary dispositions expressed the solemnity of such an important act. Nowadays, the formal requirements no longer exist for their own sake, but rather reflect the above-mentioned practical purposes (provability, protection against falsification, delimitation vis-à-vis preliminary considerations, and consultation). Most modern European legal systems recognize both public wills, typically drawn up by notaries, and private wills. It is only in the United Kingdom and Ireland as well as in Finland, Norway and Sweden that last wills can exclusively be made as private wills, as the Latin notarial system is unknown in these countries ([[Notary Public|notary public]]). The Netherlands, in turn, do not recognize the private will as a generally applicable form of a testamentary disposition because of (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;the aspect of legal certainty (especially the risk of falsification) which can only be ensured by a public will; furthermore, (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;emphasis is placed on the advisory function of the form requirements which is confined to public wills. Consultation with a notary aims at determining the real intention of the testator and at putting it down in the document in an unambiguous way. Despite the appreciable advantages of the public will and the corresponding difficulties with private wills, especially in determining and thus giving effect to the wishes of the testator, which often result in civil proceedings, there is currently no inclination to discourage the making of private wills in favour of public wills or perhaps even to abolish private wills as a generally applicable form of testamentary dispositions. This is probably due to the greater flexibility of private wills.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form requirements relating to private wills differ among the various European states. Basically, there are two main types of private wills. While the holograph&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;will, which exists, inter alia, in Germany, France, Italy and Poland, requires the testator to draw up the entire document and sign it in his own hand, the allograph&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;will, which exists, inter alia, in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Latvia and Sweden, only requires the testator to sign a document that does not have to be written by himself in the presence of a certain number of witnesses. Some states make both types of private will available (inter alia, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary). (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;Compared to the holograph will, the allograph form facilitates falsifications. (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;Moreover, there is a higher risk that the testamentary dispositions do not reflect the testator’s own free will. Legal systems providing for the allograph&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;will require the presence of witnesses as a condition for the last will’s validity to counter these risks. The dangers inherent in the allograph&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;are confirmed by the fact that countries that permit both the holograph and allograph will require the participation of witnesses only for the latter. Austrian law, which generally places great emphasis on the intention of the testator, even recognized oral wills made in the presence of witnesses as a main type of private wills, although this jeopardized the purpose of the formal requirements considerably. For private wills executed after 31&amp;amp;nbsp;December 2004, the oral will was abolished in Austrian law due to numerous malpractices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some legal systems, infringements&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;of the&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;form requirements cause &#039;&#039;ipso iure&#039;&#039; invalidity of the wills (inter alia, Germany, France and the Czech Republic). Other legal systems consider the will as valid, unless it is, within a certain period of time, contested because of the formal defect (inter alia, Sweden and Slovenia). Sometimes, in this respect, there is a distinction between the different form requirements. In Italy, for example, infringements of form requirements in principle result in the invalidity of the will &#039;&#039;ipso iure&#039;&#039;, the exception being a missing date which does not have legal consequences unless an action for declaration of nullity is brought. In view of the fact that the form requirements for wills aim at protecting the interests of the testator and also serve the public interest, the automatic invalidity is preferable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) Testamentary capacity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing up a last will requires that the testator is mentally capable of doing so (testamentary capacity). Accordingly, in order to guarantee an autonomous decision, he has to understand the nature of the last will and its effects. Given the rationale of testamentary capacity, the execution of a last will requires, in all European legal systems, (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;a certain minimum age to ensure sufficient mental maturity and (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;the absence of mental insufficiencies. Even in Roman times already, reaching the age of puberty was a prerequisite for the capacity to make a will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most European states grant unlimited testamentary capacity from the age of 18. In some states the necessary age for making a will is decreased by a preceding marriage (inter alia, Sweden and the Czech Republic). Almost all legal systems provide for a limited testamentary capacity (usually from the age of 16, sometimes also 14 or 15) which exists before a person reaches the age of unlimited capacity. Basically, there are two types of limitations in the case of a minor with limited capacity to make a will. On the one hand, not all testamentary forms are available. Because he has not yet completed the process of reaching mental maturity, a testator with limited testamentary capacity is obliged to use the public form of will, thus ensuring that he is properly advised. Consequently, the private will is excluded as a testamentary form (see, inter alia, the Czech Republic, Germany and Spain). On the other hand, especially in Scandinavian law and in the sphere of influence of the &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;, the limited testamentary capacity is reflected in the admissible content of wills. Thus, a person with limited testamentary capacity may only dispose of half of his estate (eg France and Belgium) or only over those assets over which he would also be allowed to dispose &#039;&#039;inter vivos&#039;&#039; (eg Denmark and Finland). With respect to the legal consequences arising from a testator’s lack of testamentary capacity, the above-mentioned principles concerning infringements of form requirements apply. In some legal systems, the will is invalid &#039;&#039;ipso iure&#039;&#039;, in others the will must be contested within a prescribed period of time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== c) Interpretation ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nowadays, the aim of interpretation is primarily to give effect to the wishes of the testator at the time when he drew up his will (subjective approach). Giving effect to the testator’s (ex- pressed) intention is the guiding principle of interpretation in all European legal systems, except for the restrictions mentioned below. Yet, this is by no means self-evident. As late as the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, it was common practice to focus on the ordinary meaning of the words used by the testator (literal approach). In the interests of legal certainty a specific meaning was attached to specific terms, regardless of whether the testator had understood the words in that sense or not. The so-called plain-meaning-rule&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;(&#039;&#039;Eindeutigkeitsregel&#039;&#039;) was characteristic of the literal approach: there is no need for interpretation in case of an unambiguous wording. Beginning at the end of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, the subjective approach gained more and more adherents in continental Europe. In England, however, it was not before the decision of the House&amp;amp;nbsp;of&amp;amp;nbsp;Lords in &#039;&#039;Perrin v Morgan&#039;&#039; [1943] AC 399 that it prevailed. The legal developments in the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;and the first half of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;centuries thus correspond to the evolution of Roman law. In pre-classical times the interpretation of wills focused on the literal, ordinary meaning of the words used. The &#039;&#039;causa Curiana&#039;&#039; of 92&amp;amp;nbsp;BC (&#039;&#039;Cicero&#039;&#039;, de oratore I,&amp;amp;nbsp;180) marked the turning point towards a method of interpretation focusing on the meaning intended by the testator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In most European legal systems, however, the testator’s intention will not necessarily prevail in all cases. This is due to the fact that the requirement of legal certainty, underpinning the form requirement, has to be taken into account. At the same time, a balance has to be found between what may be termed positive and negative freedom of testation. For while effect has to be given to the expressed wishes of the testator, ie to his (presumed) intention, the testator must also be protected against falsification of his testamentary dispositions. In the various European legal systems different approaches exist in order to reconcile emphasis on the testator’s intention with the requirements of legal certainty. In some legal systems, the first step is to determine the testator’s ‘real’ intention by considering all relevant circumstances, even if they are not reflected in the will, eg oral statements made by the testator concerning his dispositions. In a second step, however, only those wishes of the testator are recognized as binding which have at least been intimated, or hinted at, in the duly executed document (eg Germany, Greece, Austria and Switzerland). Contrary to this substantive approach,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;other European legal systems pursue a procedural approach, according to which the admission of evidence outside of the four corners of the will (so-called extrinsic evidence) is restricted (United Kingdom and Ireland). Yet, in recent years, there has been a considerable liberalization concerning the admissibility of extrinsic evidence (see s&amp;amp;nbsp;21 Administration of Justice Act 1982). The remaining restrictions only concern oral statements made by the testator vis-à-vis third parties; these can only be taken into account under exceptional circumstances. Apart from that, all evidence outside of the will is admissible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in some countries the interpretation solely aims at establishing the ‘real’ intention of the testator at the time when he drew up his will. In particular, mistakes (as to the words used or as to their legal effect) are to be corrected in the process of interpretation as long as the testator’s real intention can be determined (purely subjective approach, used, inter alia, in Denmark, Finland and Sweden). A similar approach is pursued by the procedural institution of rectification, established in English law by s&amp;amp;nbsp;20 Administration of Justice Act 1982. This allows for a correction of the last will’s content in case of an inadvertent mistake or clerical error. Even in those legal systems which have not adopted a purely subjective approach, and thus do not always give effect to the ‘real’ intention of the testator, there is widespread agreement that the testator’s particular use of language, ie the sense in which he habitually used certain words, is decisive for the interpretation of his will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the determination of the testator’s actual intention, interpretation also aims at filling gaps in a will. If the testamentary dispositions do not provide for a particular point which has become relevant, this gap is to be filled by way of what is known as supplementary interpretation (&#039;&#039;ergänzende Testamentsauslegung&#039;&#039;). Supplementary interpretation aims to establish what the testator would have intended if he had considered that particular point. The actual testamentary dispositions form the point of departure for this process. Inevitably the judge will be influenced by his own value judgments and preconceptions. In order to prevent this, supplementary interpretation is given no scope (eg in the United Kingdom) or only limited scope (eg in France) in some European legal systems. Instead, these systems primarily apply general rules of construction established by legislation or by the courts. Switzerland, having previously rejected supplementary interpretation, now favours it over its previous, more generalizing approach. Given the increasing significance of the testator’s intention in the historical development of interpreting last wills, a method of gap-filling by closely adhering to the expressed testamentary wishes does indeed seem preferable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== d) Mistake/avoidance ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Closely related to the method of interpretation is the question as to whether there are mechanisms to correct possible mistakes of the testator. If the mistake can be remedied by way of interpretation, there is no need to avoid the will. Only legal systems where the process of interpretation can lead to a result that is contrary to the real intention of the testator (due to the requirement that the real intention must have been ‘hinted at’ in the document constituting the will,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;or due to the restricted admissibility of extrinsic evidence) have to answer the question as to whether and, if so, under which circumstances an erroneous testamentary disposition can be corrected or avoided. Generally, all deficiencies of intention on the part of the testator will allow the avoidance of a will, as—unlike with declarations of intention addressed to another person—there are no interests of third parties which need to be considered. Only in the United Kingdom are mistakes in drawing up a will irrelevant (apart from the admissibility of extrinsic evidence and the availability of rectification (see above c)). The assertion of a mistake is either made by informal declaration (Germany) or by bringing an action (inter alia, France and Austria); the latter mechanism serves the purposes of legal certainty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An error in motive is, in principle, also a relevant mistake. In this respect, however, there is a risk that the avoidance of wills becomes the rule rather than the exception, as the motives for drawing up a will are often complex and therefore highly prone to error. To counter this risk, some European legal systems only allow avoidance for an error in motive, if the erroneous motive was the only cause for the testamentary disposition at hand (Italy and Austria). Other legal systems (eg Greece) require an indication of the mistaken motive in the testamentary document itself. In Bulgaria, these two criteria are combined. Moreover, in Austria an error in motive only renders the will voidable if the ensuing result would reflect the wishes of the testator better than giving recognition to the erroneous will. That may be a useful approach, but no such general principle for all types of mistakes exists in any European legal system. Insofar, therefore, greater importance is attached to legal certainty than to giving effect to the intention of the testator. If a disposition contained in a will has been avoided, it is substituted either by a previous disposition or, as far as there is no previous disposition, by the rules of intestate succession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== e) Testamentary burden ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike a [[Legacies|legacy]], the testamentary burden obliges the beneficiary of a will to do something without necessarily granting the beneficiary of that burden a claim to enforce that obligation. The testator thus intends to influence the behaviour of the beneficiary. As the person who benefits from a testamentary burden does not automatically have a claim, the question of who is entitled to demand the execution of the testamentary burden is of great significance. In some legal systems the range of persons is very limited (eg Germany), whereas the majority of the legal systems give a right of action to all persons interested in the fulfilment of the testamentary burden (eg Finland, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland), thereby in fact blurring the borderline between legacy and burden.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. Projects of harmonization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Currently, harmonization of the substantive law of succession and, thus, also the law of wills is not on the agenda in the [[European Union]]. There are, however, harmonization efforts specifically concerning form requirements relating to wills. According to the Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions of 5&amp;amp;nbsp;October 1961, which has been ratified in most EU states, the testator can choose, inter alia, between the form requirements existing in the law of the state where the last will is signed, in the law of the nationality of the testator, or in the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile or habitual residence (either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time of his death). Another international treaty, the&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Washington Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will of 26&amp;amp;nbsp;October 1973, has not gained comparable recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further harmonization of the conflict of laws provisions regarding the applicable substantive law of succession has been initiated by the European Commission in its green paper on succession and wills published on 1&amp;amp;nbsp;March 2005. On 14&amp;amp;nbsp;October 2009, the Commission published a Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, according to which the law applicable to the succession as a whole is to be that of the state in which the deceased had his habitual residence at the time of his death (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;16), thereby increasing the incidence of application of foreign succession laws by the national courts. However, the proposal grants the testator the right to choose the law of the state whose nationality he possesses (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;17(1)). Nonetheless, there are reservations against this conflict rule, especially with regard to the [[Compulsory Portion|compulsory portion]]. These concerns can be remedied only by harmonizing the substantive laws of succession of the various Member States. Given the considerable differences in the European legal systems, however, a comprehensive harmonization seems hardly achievable in the near future. The harmonization of certain areas (such as form requirements and testamentary capacity) is more promising because of the extensive conformity already existing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Literature == &lt;br /&gt;
Deutsches Notarinstitut, Heinrich Dörner and Paul Lagarde (eds), ‘Etude de droit comparé sur les règles de conflits de juridictions et de conflits de lois relatives aux testaments et successions dans les Etats membres de l’Union Européenne, 1892002/8112002’ &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;&amp;lt;http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/testaments_successions_fr.pdf&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;; Roger Kerridge and Julian Rivers, ‘The Construction of Wills’ (2000) 116 LQR 287; Rembert Süß (ed), &#039;&#039;Erbrecht in Europa&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2008); Roger Kerridge, &#039;&#039;Parry and Kerridge&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; The Law of Succession&#039;&#039; (12th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2009); Kenneth Reid, Marius de Waal, Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Testamentary Formalities, 2011.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Testament]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Walter_Pintens&amp;diff=1263</id>
		<title>Walter Pintens</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Walter_Pintens&amp;diff=1263"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Walter Pintens&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Professor of Civil Law and Comparative Law, Instituut voor familiaal vermogensrecht, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Walter_Pintens]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Walter_Pintens}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Pintens, Walter}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Walter_Doralt&amp;diff=1261</id>
		<title>Walter Doralt</title>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Walter Doralt&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Professor, University of Graz (as of October 2021)&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Walter_Doralt]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Walter_Doralt}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Doralt, Walter}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Vicarious_Liability&amp;diff=1259</id>
		<title>Vicarious Liability</title>
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Hartmut Wicke]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Concept ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nearly all modern European legal systems recognize a more or less strict liability of principals for unlawful acts ([[Law of Torts/Delict, General and Lex Aquilia|law of torts/delict, general and &#039;&#039;lex Aquilia&#039;&#039;]]) committed by their employees within the scope of their employment. This functionally limited liability for the actions of employees is justified primarily by the argument that the employer can broaden his scope of action by employing vicarious agents; in exchange for the advantages resulting from the division of labour, the employer must also assume liability for increased risks to third parties. Employers can take out an insurance policy for damages or loss, and pass the costs on to their customers in the form of higher prices. Most European legal systems also recognize the liability of parents or other legal guardians for damage or loss caused by children or mentally disabled persons; this liability is based on a presumption of personal negligence.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Historical development  ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea of vicarious liability is not a recent one. Under [[Roman Law|Roman law]], the &#039;&#039;pater familias &#039;&#039;was strictly responsible for all tortious acts committed by family members and slaves; known as ‘noxal liability’, this principle was in harmony with the economic and social views of the time. The father of the family could satisfy the claim of a wronged party either by paying a certain monetary fine or by handing over the person who had directly caused the loss or damage in question. Under certain variants of this principle, the principal could be held liable for the actions of his vicarious agents. As a matter of particular importance to subsequent historical development, various praetorian actions were established, which by virtue of their intended purpose expressly encompassed an obligation to assume liability for the actions of others. Thus, shipmasters, innkeepers and stablekeepers (&#039;&#039;nautae&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; caupones&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; stabularii&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;were responsible for acts of theft and property damage committed by their employees―whether they were slaves or free persons― in areas under their physical control. The liability of the house dweller (&#039;&#039;habitator&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;for damage or injuries caused when objects or fluids were thrown or poured out of windows (&#039;&#039;actio de effusis vel deiectis&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;was justified as a matter of public interest&#039;&#039;. &#039;&#039;Tax farmers (&#039;&#039;publicani&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;were responsible for tortious acts of the members of their &#039;&#039;familia. &#039;&#039;Due to the fact that in classical times the concept of &#039;&#039;familia &#039;&#039;was no longer based strictly on the status of the acting person, but rather on the actions performed within the scope of the publican’s duties, the &#039;&#039;publicanus &#039;&#039;could be held liable for the actions of free persons insofar as they assisted in the collection of taxes. On the other hand, he could also exonerate himself from liability for the actions of his slaves if they were not acting within the scope of duties assigned to them. In this from today’s perspective rather remote area of Roman law, we can thus observe a shift from status-bound noxal liability to functionally limited liability for the actions of vicarious agents. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of liability for the acts of others, moreover, was repeatedly passed in situations where contractual (or other) obligations existed between the parties at the time of the conduct that resulted in damage or loss. Especially important in this regard, from the perspective of historical development, is the fragment on the column transport Gai. D. 19,2,25,7. The column in question was broken in the process of being transported under a contract for work. In the opinion of the Roman jurist Gaius,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;the debtor was to be responsible for the risk if the damage had been caused due to his own fault or due to the fault of persons whose services he had utilized for that purpose. The formulation of this fragment served as the model for some European codifications, including §&amp;amp;nbsp;278 of the German [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (BGB)]], which establish a strict liability for the actions of auxiliaries in the event of an obligatory relationship between the principal and the wronged party (see below)&#039;&#039;. &#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Roman cases of vicarious liability, including the liability of the &#039;&#039;publicanus&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; nauta&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; caupo &#039;&#039;and &#039;&#039;stabularius &#039;&#039;and the &#039;&#039;actio de effusis vel delectis&#039;&#039;, were later to a large extent adopted into the &#039;&#039;ius commune. &#039;&#039;Various regional statutes also recognized instances of vicarious liability, including the liability of the house owner for damage or loss caused by fire that spread from his house to a neighbour’s property. However, because noxal liability, which had been the central Roman instance of vicarious liability, had become obsolete with the abolition of slavery, the authors of the &#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039; did not agree on how the resulting gap in the liability system should be closed. Hugo Grotius,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;for example, argued for liability only up to the amount of outstanding wages of the servant, in accordance with local custom. Other authors such as Johannes van der Linden,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;whose thinking was influenced by natural law, argued that a generally formulated form of the &#039;&#039;pater familias&#039;&#039;’ personal fault should be the prerequisite for liability for the actions of his servants. However, the most influential argument was the one that conforms to the prevailing concept today, namely that of strict liability of the principal for the tortious acts of auxiliaries committed in the course of performing the duties assigned to them. This functionally limited liability for the actions of others can be traced back to a commentary by Bartolus de Saxoferrato&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in the 14th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, in which he expressed the general principle in the specific context of the publican’s liability. In the 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, this principle was advocated with reference to the praetorian actions by Johannes Voet&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in Holland and by Robert-Joseph Pothier&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in France, whose arguments came to be the model for the modern rule in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (5) of the French [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]] (see also Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2049 Italian [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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In English legal literature, this principle has been known since the work entitled ‘Doctor and Student’ by Christopher St Germain&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;(1460–1540). Jurists educated in Roman law, who were known as ‘civilians’,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;had long dominated the administration of justice in areas of commercial and maritime law. For that reason, the liability of the &#039;&#039;nauta &#039;&#039;for the tortious acts of his people was incorporated into English law by the Court of Admiralty. It would therefore seem to be not a coincidence that the first common law&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;decision on vicarious liability,&#039;&#039; Boson v Sandford &#039;&#039;(1691) 2 Salk 440, related to the liability of the shipmaster for the wrongful acts of his vicarious agents. Lord Holt, who possessed extensive knowledge of Roman law, formulated the concept of vicarious liability in general terms and by that means created a legal principle that became generally accepted in all [[Common Law|common law]] legal systems up to the present day. The influence of Roman law was likewise discernible in the subsequent decision, &#039;&#039;Turberville v Stampe &#039;&#039;(1698) 1 Ld Raym 264. Although the judgment related to fire damage, Lord Holt&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;justified the master’s liability for the actions of his servant by way of the following sentence, inserted somewhat arbitrarily into the reasoning of the judgment and referring to the &#039;&#039;actio de effusis vel delectis&#039;&#039;: ‘But if my servant throws dirt into the highway, I am indictable’. Like Pothier&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in France, Lord Holt&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in England derived the doctrine of vicarious liability&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in a general manner from the conceptual bases of the Roman legal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, the German [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (BGB)]] never arrived at such a strict liability for the tortious acts of others. In the liberalistic 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, the pandectist fault principle formed the ethical basis for the law of torts. In this spirit, the functionally limited liability for vicarious agents set forth in §&amp;amp;nbsp;831 BGB was rooted in the (presumed) personal negligence of the principal, in the sense of a &#039;&#039;culpa in eligendo vel custodiendo &#039;&#039;(see also Art&amp;amp;nbsp;55 of the [[Swiss Code of Obligations (OR)]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Following the demise of the Roman concept of noxal liability on the part of the &#039;&#039;pater familias &#039;&#039;for the tortious acts of his slaves and family members, there was a need to define not only vicarious liability for the actions of auxiliaries in the modern sense, but also the independent responsibility of parents for the wrongful acts of their underage children.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Vicarious liability in modern European legal systems  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Liability of the principal for the tortious acts of his auxiliaries  ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After what has been said before, the functionally limited liability for the actions of auxiliaries is a firmly established structural element of modern European jurisprudence. Primary interest is devoted to the practically significant liability of the employer for wrongful acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment. This principle also applies when the relevant rules do not expressly require the existence of an employment relationship; instead, the tortious acts of other, more broadly defined parties, such as the &#039;&#039;préposé &#039;&#039;(Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 French &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;), the &#039;&#039;ondergeschikte &#039;&#039;(Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:170 [[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]]) or the person ‘appointed to perform a task’ (§&amp;amp;nbsp;831 BGB), can also give rise to liability on the part of the principal. However, apart from a few exceptional cases, as in the case of a so-called ‘non-delegable duty’&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;of the principal under English law a liability for the misconduct of an independent contractor is not recognized. The majority of European legal systems recognize a strict liability of the principal, ie without requiring any personal breach of duty on his part (cf Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (5) French &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (3) Belgian and Luxembourg &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;922 [[Greek Civil Code]]; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2049 [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;; &amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;500 Portuguese &#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:170 BW). Some codes, on the other hand, base liability on a presumption of personal negligence in the form of faulty selection or supervision (cf Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1903 (4) and (6) Spanish [[Código Civil|&#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;§&amp;amp;nbsp;831 BGB and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;55 [[Swiss Code of Obligations (OR)]]). In practice, however, the theoretical possibility of exculpation hardly becomes relevant. In the practical application of Spanish law, for example, it has become virtually impossible to refute the presumption of fault. In an impressive display of ingenuity, the German courts have developed numerous paths to evade or circumvent the possibility of exculpation set forth in §&amp;amp;nbsp;831 BGB. The rule of 1315 of the Austrian [[Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB)|&#039;&#039;Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (ABGB)]] holds a certain special status in this regard. According to this provision, personal fault must be demonstrated in order to establish liability of the principal, unless the wronged party can prove that the auxiliary is ‘unfit’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liability of corporate bodies (and partnerships with partial legal capacity, which are deemed equivalent to corporate bodies for this purpose) is consistently regarded as strict. Special statutory rules normally apply to cases of state liability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief characteristic of an employment relationship, which is regularly required in order to establish liability, is the employee’s subjection to the directions of the employer. In modern times, however, this is no longer an absolute prerequisite. The absence of an obligation on the part of the employee to follow his employer’s directives can be offset by other considerations. In particular, the integration of an employee into the employer’s organizational structure, as in the case of professionals who cannot be supervised by a manager for lack of sufficient expertise, constitutes one such example. Systematic difficulties are posed by the question whether and to what extent the principal can be held liable outside of the scope of normal employment contracts, and especially whether one is dealing here with additional categories or with a uniform principle. In those codifications in which the existence of an employment contract is not specified, and where liability is instead attached more neutrally to concepts such as being of a &#039;&#039;préposé &#039;&#039;or &#039;&#039;ondergeschikte &#039;&#039;or having been appointed to perform a task, liability may, in peripheral areas, be deemed to exist by virtue of the auxiliary’s obligation to follow directives. This can be the case even when an activity is performed without valuable consideration for a friend or neighbour. English law (like the BW in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:172) recognizes another category of vicarious liability, namely the liability of the principal for the wrongful acts of his agent. Aside from situations involving agency, this principle also extends to the responsibility of a car owner for the driver of his car.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the second requirement for liability, there must be an intrinsic relationship with the tasks delegated to the auxiliary. In order to ascertain whether this requirement is met in any particular case, a normative analysis is necessary which has to take account of numerous factors. This element of liability is broadly construed in modern times. Depending on the nature of the employee’s activities, and especially also on the existence of a legal relationship between the employer and the wronged party, liability may be found to exist even in the case of a personally motivated, wilful commission of a criminal offence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the principal’s liability is contingent on the commission of a tortious act by the auxiliary. In many cases, however, the latter will not be under a personal obligation to pay damages. This is either because no direct claim existed from the beginning, or because he is entitled to be relieved from any liability by his employer, or because recourse by the insurance company against the employee is excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) Contractual liability for auxiliaries  ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to the (quasi)-tortious vicarious liability, some European legal systems specifically provide for statutory rules relating to contractual liability for auxiliaries (cf §&amp;amp;nbsp;278 BGB; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;334 Greek Civil Code; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;474 Polish Civil Code and §&amp;amp;nbsp;1313a ABGB). In such cases, the rule is that the principal must be liable for the fault of his auxiliaries (employees and independent contractors alike) to the same extent as for his own fault. The same principle seems to be recognized in all other European legal systems, even in the absence of express rules to that effect because it is inherent in the nature of contractual obligations. Anyone who contractually assumes an obligation will be held strictly liable to do, or to give what he has promised by virtue of the contractual agreement, even if he avails himself of the service of another person. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) Liability of legal guardians  ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rules applicable to the liability of legal guardians for children, legally incapacitated persons and other persons requiring protection vary throughout Europe. Most European legal systems have separate statutory rules on the liability of parents (as well as adoptive parents and usually also legal guardians) for damage or loss caused by their children (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (4) and (7) French [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (2) and (5) Belgian and Luxembourg &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;1903 (2) and (6) Spanish [[Código Civil|&#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;]]and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;20 of the Spanish &#039;&#039;Code Penal&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;923 [[Greek Civil Code]]; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2048 Italian [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;491 Portuguese &#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:169 [[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]]; §&amp;amp;nbsp;1309 ABGB; and §&amp;amp;nbsp;832 BGB). In most countries, such liability is based on presumed personal fault (as in Germany, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg, whereas in Austria proof of a breach of duty still lies with the victim) and may depend on whether the child lives at home. Usually, the severity of the liability diminishes with the increasing age of the child, often accompanied by an increase in the child’s own personal liability (see in particular the definition of three age groups in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:169, 6:162 BW). A special role is played by French law, which since a ruling of the &#039;&#039;Court de Cassation &#039;&#039;from the year 1997 regards the parents’ liability as strict and consequently no longer allows an exculpation (Civ 2e, 19.2.1997, D. 1997, 265). At the other end of the spectrum, English law does not recognize a special rule concerning parents’ liability but subsumes that liability under the general liability for negligence, which must be proven by the wronged party. The same appears to be the case in the Scandinavian legal systems. When parents contractually delegate their duty of supervision to another person, that person can also be held liable for a presumed failure of supervision in certain legal systems (§&amp;amp;nbsp;832 (2) BGB; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;932 (2) [[Greek Civil Code]]; and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;491 Portuguese &#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;),&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;while other legal systems rely on the normal liability for negligent omissions (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain). Concerning the responsibility of legal guardians for mentally disabled persons, three basic positions can be identified, just as in the case of parents’ liability. They range from strict liability (France, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1384 (1) [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]]),&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;to liability based on presumed personal fault (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2047 (1) [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;427 [[Polish Civil Code]]; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;491 Portuguese &#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1903 (2) Spanish [[Código Civil|&#039;&#039;Código civil&#039;&#039;]]&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;§&amp;amp;nbsp;832 BGB, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;923 [[Greek Civil Code]]) to liability for negligence on the basis of the general requirements for tortious liability (England, the Netherlands).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Uniform law ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proposals for European rules on vicarious liability can be found in the [[Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)|Principles of European Tort Law]] of the European Group on Tort Law and in the [[Common Frame of Reference (CFR)]], which is taken almost verbatim from the preliminary studies of the [[Study Group on a European Civil Code]]. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:102 (1) PETL, a person is liable for damage caused by his auxiliaries acting within the scope of their functions, provided that they have infringed the required standard of conduct. Subparagraph 2 specifies that an independent contractor is not regarded as an auxiliary for the purposes of that article. Thus, the rule proposed in the PETL clearly and succinctly formulates the principle of functionally limited liability for the actions of vicarious agents that is recognized throughout Europe. Article 6:102 can also be applied to the tortious acts of directors and officers of a corporate entity. The principle of functionally limited liability for the actions of vicarious agents is expressed in somewhat more detail in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;VI.-3:201 DCFR. Here, liability depends on damage or loss having been caused in the performance of a task provided the damage or loss can be attributed to the auxiliary; the same principle applies to representatives of a legal person who are authorized to effect ‘juridical acts’ on behalf of the legal person by its constitution. The principle that the debtor under a contractual obligation is strictly liable for the fault of his auxiliaries, is clearly expressed, on a European level, by Art&amp;amp;nbsp;8:107 PECL: whoever entrusts performance of a contract to another person remains responsible for the performance (see also Art&amp;amp;nbsp;III.-2:106 CFR).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:101 PETL, anybody who is in charge of a minor or a person subject to mental disability is liable for damage caused by the latter unless he proves that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct in supervision. This rule bases liability on a presumed personal fault of the guardian; thus it takes the &#039;&#039;via media&#039;&#039; among the three basic approaches encountered in the national European legal systems (see above). However, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:101 differs from the majority opinion of Member States insofar as the person who has committed the act in question is not required to have infringed the law; he merely has to have ‘caused damage’. Under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;VI.-3:104 CFR, parents are held liable for damage caused by their children under the age of 14 provided it would constitute intentional or negligent conduct if it had been the conduct of an adult. Apart from that, institutions or other bodies charged with supervisory duties are held liable for personal injury or property damage caused by persons to be supervised if the conduct in question would be considered to constitute negligent or intentional conduct (if committed by an 18-year-old) and if the persons in question are likely to cause damage of that type. Both rules set forth in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;VI.-3:104 CFR are based on the presumption of personal negligence in the exercise of supervisory duties.&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Trafford Barlow, &#039;&#039;The South African Law of Vicarious Liability in Delict and a Comparison of the Principles of other Legal Systems&#039;&#039; (1939); David Johnston, ‘Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition’ (1995) 70 Chicago Kent Law Review 1515; Reinhard Zimmermann, &#039;&#039;The Law of Obligations&#039;&#039; (1996) ch 32; Christian von Bar, &#039;&#039;Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I&#039;&#039; (1996) §&amp;amp;nbsp;2 II, III and §&amp;amp;nbsp;3 II.2; Hartmut Wicke, &#039;&#039;Respondeat Superior&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Haftung für Verrichtungsgehilfen im römischen&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; römisch-holländischen&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; englischen und südafrikanischen Recht&#039;&#039; (2000); Jaap Spier&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;(ed); &#039;&#039;Unification of Tort Law&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Liability for Damage Caused by Others&#039;&#039; (2003);&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;European Group on Tort Law,&#039;&#039; Principles of European Tort Law&#039;&#039; (2005) ch 6; Cees van Dam,&#039;&#039; European Tort Law&#039;&#039; (2006) ch 16.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Haftung_für_andere]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Verwirkung_(Estoppel)&amp;diff=1257</id>
		<title>Verwirkung (Estoppel)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Verwirkung_(Estoppel)&amp;diff=1257"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Filippo Ranieri]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Formation of the doctrine ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As early as the beginning of the 1920s one can observe the case law of the German Imperial Supreme Court (&#039;&#039;Reichsgericht&#039;&#039;) ([[Reichsoberhandelsgericht (with Reichsgericht)|&#039;&#039;Reichsoberhandelsgericht &#039;&#039;(with&#039;&#039; Reichsgericht&#039;&#039;)]]) increasingly reverting to the legal concept of &#039;&#039;exceptio doli&#039;&#039; as developed under the&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;[[Ius Commune|&#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039;]] in order to prevent one party from unfairly exercising a legal right and thus acting contrary to a reasonable reliance which had been engendered in the other party. A typical example of this is the doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; (estoppel). According to this doctrine, someone who does not exercise his right for a substantial period of time forfeits his legal position if the other party has thereby been induced to believe in [[Good Faith|good faith]] that that right would, also in future, no longer be exercised. German courts consistently applied and developed this doctrine over the last few decades. The two central requirements for &#039;&#039;Verwirkung &#039;&#039;are thus the lapse of time and a specific reliance being engendered in the other party. The doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; represents one of the most remarkable developments of German case law in the years following World War I. &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; initially mainly concerned industrial property rights but the &#039;&#039;Reichsgericht&#039;&#039; later applied it as a general principle. The legal consequence is remarkable. The exclusion of the creditor’s right in order to avoid an inequitable disappointment of the reliance engendered introduces a de facto [[Prescription|prescription]] before the statutory prescription period has expired. It should be noted that, conversely, German courts also grant the &#039;&#039;exceptio doli&#039;&#039; to the creditor himself against the debtor. Thus, a party pleading the defence of prescription abuses his legal position if he has engendered reasonable reliance in the other party that he would not invoke that defence. Initially, the &#039;&#039;Reichsgericht&#039;&#039; used §&amp;amp;nbsp;826 [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch &#039;&#039;(BGB)]] to justify its approach and thus limited the doctrine’s field of application to cases where a party had acted both fraudulently and &#039;&#039;contra bonos mores&#039;&#039; (contrary to public policy). Subsequently, German courts relied on §&amp;amp;nbsp;242 BGB and expanded the doctrine into the general principle of a prohibition of an disloyal &#039;&#039;venire contra factum proprium&#039;&#039; (eg RG, 23&amp;amp;nbsp;September 1927, RGZ 117, 358&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). During the 1930s Wolfgang Siebert (1905–59) conceptualized &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; as an [[Abuse of Law|abuse of law]]. The courts have, to this day, relied on a creative understanding of the principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]] which is seen to be inherent in §&amp;amp;nbsp;242 BGB.&lt;br /&gt;
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Recent research has analysed the special precondition on the level of legal theory and legal policy which enabled courts in Germany to develop this idea in the 1920s. It continues to exist today. However, the German Federal Supreme Court (&#039;&#039;Bundesgerichtshof&#039;&#039;, BGH) has, in recent times, applied the legal doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; in an increasingly restrictive way. Whether the exercise of a legal right is excluded because of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; cannot be answered by simply referring to the expiration of a substantial period of time. Rather, the particular circumstances of each individual case must be taken into consideration. Especially &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; can only be applied if the exercise of a legal right would result in absolutely unbearable consequences for the party concerned (BGH, 18&amp;amp;nbsp;October 2001, NJW 2002, 669&amp;amp;nbsp;ff, 670; BGH, 16&amp;amp;nbsp;March 2007, NJW 2007, 2183&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). Moreover, in 2002, the law of [[Prescription|prescription]] in the BGB was comprehensively modernized, reducing the general prescription period from 30 to three years (§&amp;amp;nbsp;195 BGB new version). As a result of this rigorous reduction, it may be assumed that the practical significance of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; will decline considerably in the future. &lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. The doctrine in Europe ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In France and Italy the predominant concern, in legal doctrine and legal practice, was that the recognition of a general principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]] would entrust the judge with too much discretionary power. Other legal systems in continental Europe, however, were influenced by the prohibition of the &#039;&#039;venire contra factum proprium&#039;&#039; as developed by the German courts in order to prevent harshness that would result from a strict and formal application of the law. It served as a model particularly for Swiss, and subsequently also for Austrian and Dutch case law. Thus, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has also recognized the doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; for a number of decades on the basis of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2 [[Swiss Civil Code (ZGB)]]. The aforementioned German case law has also attracted interest in Austrian law. The [[Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB)|&#039;&#039;Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbzuch&#039;&#039;(ABGB)]] initially did not recognize a legal concept of &#039;&#039;exceptio doli&#039;&#039; and, similarly, the part reforms of 1914–16 failed to codify a general principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]]. It was only in the last few decades that the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice began to adopt the solutions found in German practice. However, Austrian courts avoid reverting to a general formula of a disloyal [[Abuse of Law|abuse of law]]. Rather, they tend to find the legal basis for the &#039;&#039;exceptio doli&#039;&#039; in §§&amp;amp;nbsp;863 and 914 ABGB. As a result, Austrian courts have adopted the legal concept of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039;, though the loss of the legal right is justified by the assumption that the person entitled to it impliedly waived it. &lt;br /&gt;
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The doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; has also been received in other European legal systems over the last few decades. For example, Polish courts exceptionally acknowledge the possibility to plead the defence of [[Abuse of Law|abuse of law]] if the defence of prescription is raised. Similarly, Greek courts allow the doctrine to be pleaded against an [[Abuse of Law|abuse of law]] (§&amp;amp;nbsp;281 [[Greek Civil Code]]). Finally, Dutch case law may be mentioned that has developed very similar solutions by using the doctrine of &#039;&#039;rechtsverwerking&#039;&#039;. Consequently, the new Dutch [[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]] of 1992 expressly codified in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:2 BW the principle that ‘creditor and debtor must act in accordance with the precepts of good faith’. In contrast, whether such legal principle has found its way into the case law of the [[European Court of Justice (ECJ)|European Court of Justice]] seems to be questionable; at any rate, the ECJ has never expressly recognized it.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Verwirkung in the doctrine of Romanistic legal systems ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In the past, the majority of Italian writers strictly opposed a legal concept involving judicial control over the exercise of legal rights based on the German model. More recently, however, the picture has changed considerably. In particular, the formula according to which the principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]] constitutes a general limit on the exercise of legal rights has been tremendously successful in Italian scholarship. Usually, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1375 [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]] is invoked in this context. During the last few years, the Italian &#039;&#039;Corte di Cassazione&#039;&#039; has adopted the new approach mapped out by legal doctrine. However, the German model has not been adopted completely in Italy. Both Italian scholarship and Italian courts have up to now unanimously and decisively refused to accept the German solutions, based on the principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]], relating to the defence of [[Prescription|prescription]]. The Italian &#039;&#039;Corte di Cassazione&#039;&#039; recently specified to what extent the defence of &#039;&#039;exceptio doli generalis&#039;&#039; can be applied in contemporary Italian law (Cass. civ., 7&amp;amp;nbsp;March 2007, No&amp;amp;nbsp;5273, &#039;&#039;Banca&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; borsa e titoli di credito&#039;&#039; 2007, II, 710&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). &lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, the French [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]] already contained in its original version of 1804 (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1134 (3)) a reference to &#039;&#039;bonne foi&#039;&#039; in the context of performance of contract ([[Performance and its Modalities|performance and its modalities]]). The same provision can be found in the &#039;&#039;Avant-projet de Réforme du droit des contrats&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Avant-projet Catala&#039;&#039;) of 2005. Despite the increasing interest of French legal scholarship displayed towards this provision, the &#039;&#039;Cour de Cassation&#039;&#039; remains very reluctant to take direct recourse to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1134 (3) &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;. A realistic and functional assessment of French case law, however, discloses that it converges with the solutions adopted by other continental legal systems under the auspices of the doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039;. Unlike German or Dutch courts, however, French counterparts do not refer to the principle of &#039;&#039;bonne foi&#039;&#039;. Instead, they tend to use the device of an implied, or fictitious, waiver of legal rights. Consequently, French courts sometimes interpret a failure to assert one’s rights as a declaration to waive those rights (eg Cass. civ. 1&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &#039;&#039;Chambre&#039;&#039;, 10&amp;amp;nbsp;May 1961, &#039;&#039;Dalloz&#039;&#039; 1961, Jurisprudence 446; Cass. civ. 31 January 1995, Bull. civ. 1995, I, No 41).&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar observations can also be made when analysing Italian law. However, the current position of Italian courts remains inconsistent and unclear. Recently the &#039;&#039;Corte di Cassazione&#039;&#039; had the opportunity expressly to refer to the legal concept of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung &#039;&#039;in other European legal systems. However, the Court refused to recognize it for Italian law (Cass. civ., 15&amp;amp;nbsp;March 2004, No 5240, &#039;&#039;Foro it.&#039;&#039; 2004 I, cols 1394&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). It should also be mentioned that two decades ago the Belgian &#039;&#039;Cour de Cassation&#039;&#039; rejected the doctrine of &#039;&#039;rechtsverwerking&#039;&#039; in a leading case. That doctrine was considered incompatible with the French and Belgian &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039; (Cass. Civ. &#039;&#039;belge&#039;&#039;, 17&amp;amp;nbsp;May 1990, &#039;&#039;Pacrisie belge&#039;&#039; 1990, No 546, 1061&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). The Belgian courts nevertheless frequently revert to the device of an implied waiver, or to the legal notion of &#039;&#039;abus de droit&#039;&#039; ([[Abuse of Law|abuse of law]]). Finally, it is worth mentioning that Spanish courts have also developed the doctrine of &#039;&#039;actos proprios &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;such cases. Recently the Spanish Supreme Court (&#039;&#039;Tribunal Supremo&#039;&#039;) emphasized the close connection between this doctrine and the German concept of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung &#039;&#039;(&#039;&#039;Trib. Supremo&#039;&#039;, 24&amp;amp;nbsp;June 1996, &#039;&#039;Rep. Jur.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Aranzadi&#039;&#039; 1996, No 4846). Recourse to a fictitious intention in the Romanistic legal systems thus occasionally seems to hide a necessary correction &#039;&#039;ex fide bona&#039;&#039; of a legal or contractual rule. &lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Verwirkung and estoppel by acquiescence ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The general principles relating to the legal concept of ‘estoppel by acquiescence’&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;developed within the framework of [[Equity|equity]] in English law can also serve as a model for the categorization of the continental European case law described above. ‘Estoppel’ is referred to in cases where a person is precluded from adopting a certain legal position because he has bound himself by his own prior conduct and a change would damage other parties who have relied on this conduct. Thus Lord Steyn&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in &#039;&#039;Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd&#039;&#039; [1997] UKHL 40; [1998] AC 867 (HL) stated: ‘That brings me to estoppel by acquiescence. The parties were agreed that the test for the existence of this kind of estoppel is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Wilberforce in &#039;&#039;Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings &#039;&#039;[1977] AC 890. Lord Wilberforce said that the question is “… whether, having regard to the situation in which the relevant transaction occurred, as known to both parties, a reasonable man, in the position of the ‘acquirer’ of the property, would expect the ‘owner’ acting honestly and responsibly, if he claimed any title to the property, to take steps to make that claim known …”: at 903. Making due allowance for the proprietary context in which Lord Wilberforce spoke, the observation is helpful as indicating the general principle underlying estoppels by acquiescence’. Numerous French authors have, in recent years, recognized the true significance of the above-mentioned French case law and its proximity to both the German doctrine of &#039;&#039;Verwirkung&#039;&#039; and the English doctrine of estoppel.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Wolfgang Siebert, &#039;&#039;Verwirkung und Unzulässigkeit der Rechtsausübung&#039;&#039; (1934); Egon Merz, ‘Die Generalklausel von Treu und Glauben als Quelle der Rechtsschöpfung’ [1961] Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht 335; Gerhard Kegel,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;‘Verwirkung, Vertrag und Vertrauen’&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in &#039;&#039;Festschrift Clemens Bleyer &#039;&#039;(1986) 515; Hans-Peter Haferkamp, &#039;&#039;Die heutige Rechtsmissbrauchslehre. Ergebnis nationalsozialistischen Rechtsdenkens?&#039;&#039; (1995); Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), &#039;&#039;Good Faith in European Contract Law &#039;&#039;(2000) particularly 18–25; Antoni Vaquer, ‘Importing Foreign Doctrines: Yet Another Approach to the Unification of European Private Law? Incorporation of the Verwirkung Doctrine into Spanish Case Law’ (2000) ZEuP 300;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Giovanni Meruzzi,&#039;&#039; L’exceptio doli dal diritto civile al diritto commerciale&#039;&#039; (2005); Benedicte Fauvarque-Cosson (ed), &#039;&#039;La confiance légitime et l’estoppel&#039;&#039; (2007); Filippo Ranieri, &#039;&#039;Europäisches Obligationenrecht&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2009), 1812&amp;amp;nbsp;ff, 1836&amp;amp;nbsp;ff, 1858&amp;amp;nbsp;ff.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Verwirkung]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Vertical_Agreements_in_EU_Competition_Law&amp;diff=1255</id>
		<title>Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Vertical_Agreements_in_EU_Competition_Law&amp;diff=1255"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Reinhard Ellger]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Concept and function of vertical agreements ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The EU competition rules set out in Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;101&amp;amp;nbsp;ff TFEU—which together with the merger control legislation under Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;139/2004 are the core elements of European competition law—aim to provide for the comprehensive protection of competition as an essential condition for a free market economy in the [[European Internal Market|European internal market]]. Within the system of competition rules, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101 TFEU prohibits restraints of competition effected by agreements and concerted practices of undertakings or decisions of associations of undertakings ([[Prohibition of Restrictive Agreements and Exemptions|prohibition of restrictive agreements and exemptions]]). &#039;&#039;Horizontal agreements&#039;&#039; between competitors give particular rise to antitrust concerns because they are capable of directly and seriously restricting or preventing the effectiveness of competition in the relevant market. However, in addition to the dangers posed by collusion among competitors, anti-competitive objects and effects can also be brought about by &#039;&#039;vertical agreements&#039;&#039; which are entered into by economic actors functioning at different levels of the supply chain. Pursuant to Article&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1)(a) of Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;330/2010 on the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) of the [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)]] to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, vertical agreements are defined as agreements or concerted practices ‘entered into between two or more undertakings each of which operates, for the purposes of the agreement or the concerted practice, at a different level of the production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services’.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vertical agreements covered by this definition are primarily distribution agreements which manufacturers enter into with undertakings operating at the distribution level, such as wholesalers and retailers, whose task is the further marketing of the product along the supply chain. Also qualifying as vertical agreements are procurement contracts concluded by a manufacturer and a supplier whose goods are used by the manufacturer as an input for his own products (&#039;&#039;industrial supply&#039;&#039;). &lt;br /&gt;
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Distribution agreements are of crucial importance for supplying the European internal market with goods because manufacturers make use of distribution intermediaries on a large scale to create marketing channels which extend all the way to the consumer. According to estimates of the [[European Commission]] in 2003, the trade sector accounts for 15&amp;amp;nbsp;per cent of all European employment and comprises 5.5 million undertakings. The overall contribution of the sector is no less than 13&amp;amp;nbsp;per cent of the GDP of the Union, generating an added value of €880 billion. The Commission regards trade as ‘an essential element for the proper functioning of the internal market’ and has observed that ‘distributors not only build up marketing channels for the distribution of goods and services to end consumers, but also pass on information to the producers on the demand structure and trends in consumer taste’ (European Commission, &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;&amp;lt;http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/brs/distri-trades_en.htm&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;. &lt;br /&gt;
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To the extent that contractual stipulations between manufacturers and distributors only determine the price to be paid by a distributor to a manufacturer and the volume of goods or services that the distributor purchases from the manufacturer, vertical agreements do not in most cases cause anti-competitive effects. However, such effects can occur if the agreement imposes restrictions on either the supplier or the purchaser which go beyond the aforementioned arrangement. This is, for instance, the case where a supplier grants a distributor the sole right to distribute the supplier’s goods in a defined territory (&#039;&#039;exclusive distribution agreement&#039;&#039;). By such an arrangement, other distributors are prevented from distributing goods of the supplier (ie are prevented from competing) in the territory of the advantaged distributor. Anti-competitive effects may also be caused by agreements which oblige a distributor to purchase specific goods exclusively from a single supplier (&#039;&#039;exclusive supply agreement&#039;&#039;). Under these agreements, the distributor is prevented from purchasing the goods from other, possibly cheaper suppliers. &lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, vertical agreements may also cause positive effects. For example, an exclusive distribution agreement might serve to prevent other distributors from free-riding on the promotional efforts of a single distributor (&#039;&#039;free rider problem&#039;&#039;) or might help to reduce the potential of either the supplier or the distributor attempting to exploit relationship-specific investments made by the other party to the agreement (&#039;&#039;hold-up problem&#039;&#039;). Furthermore, the exclusive position can drive a distributor to concentrate more efficiently on distribution and marketing than would be the case if he were to deal in the same or similar products of several manufacturers. &lt;br /&gt;
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A vertical agreement is prohibited pursuant to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU if it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market and is capable of affecting trade between Member States. In the early years of the European Union, after the coming into force of the competition law provisions, it was disputed whether Art&amp;amp;nbsp;85(1) EEC (now Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU) covered vertical agreements at all. In one of its first decisions with respect to the competition rules, the [[European Court of Justice (ECJ)]] decided very clearly that it does: as the Treaty speaks of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in very general terms and applies indiscriminately to all agreements, the Court concluded that, with regard to the general scope of application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;85(1) EEC, it would not be appropriate for the Court to make a distinction between vertical and horizontal agreements where the treaty itself does not (ECJ Joined Cases 56 and 58 – &#039;&#039;Consten and Grundig&#039;&#039; [1966] ECR 299, 339; [1966] CMLR 418). The ECJ and the [[General Court of the European Union (GC)]] have confirmed this approach in several subsequent judgments.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a matter of competition policy, the dangers caused by vertical restraints are generally rated lower than the risks emerging from horizontal restraints of competition (Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para&amp;amp;nbsp;98&amp;amp;nbsp;f). Anti-competitive agreements between competitors interfere with &#039;&#039;inter-brand competition &#039;&#039;(ie competition between substitutable products of different manufacturers), tend to result in higher prices and reduce consumer choice. In contrast, while vertical restraints may reduce competition between distributors of the same brand (&#039;&#039;intra-brand competition&#039;&#039;), they do not necessarily produce higher prices. For the parties to vertical agreements, the product of one side is the input of the other. This means that the exercise of market power ([[Abuse of a Dominant Position|abuse of a dominant position]]) by either the upstream or downstream undertaking, ie setting a higher price for its product, negatively affects the demand for the product of the other undertaking. Consequently, companies involved in a vertical agreement usually have an incentive to prevent an exercise of market power by their counterpart.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, this incentive should not be overstated. Companies lacking market power which wish to increase their profits will need to improve their manufacturing and distribution methods regardless of whether vertical restraints are employed. Enterprises with market power, however, may enhance their profits at the expense of their competitors by increasing the latter’s costs on the up- and downstream markets and by attempting to appropriate both buyer and consumer surplus. &lt;br /&gt;
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The negative effects of vertical restraints on the market may be summarized as follows: (1) They can be used for raising barriers to entry leading to the foreclosure of other suppliers or buyers of products from the market. (2) They can contribute to a reduction of inter-brand competition and to an increase in collusion amongst suppliers or buyers. (3) Intra-brand competition may be reduced. (4) Exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive supply agreements can lead to territorial segmentation of markets and preclude the consumer from enjoying the benefits of the internal market. &lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, an antitrust analysis of vertical restraints under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU needs to be mindful of the potential positive effects of such agreements; where the requirements of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU or a relevant [[Block Exemption Regulations|block exemption regulation]] are met, beneficial effects may justify an exemption from the prohibition of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU. In this fashion, vertical restraints can lead to a strengthening of non-price competition, eg improvement of pre- and post-sales consumer services (advice, instruction and repair services) for technically complex goods like home entertainment appliances and other consumer electronic goods. Vertical agreements with anti-competitive restraints may also be used as an effective tool for opening up new markets for economic actors, as may be the case with regard to exclusive distribution agreements or franchise agreements ([[Franchising|franchising]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU distinguishes between agreements which restrict competition either by their object or by their effect. If an agreement envisions a restraint of competition as its object, it is prohibited pursuant to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU without any actual impact of the restrictive agreement on competition in the relevant market having to be shown. Rather, only the (objective) purpose of the measure and not the (subjective) intentions and motives of the parties to the agreement are taken into account. Moreover, an unwritten requirement of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU is that the agreement must be capable of appreciably restricting competition in the relevant market (‘de minimis’). This requirement is, however, not applicable to hardcore restrictions, ie certain types of agreements which intend to impose anti-competitive restraints. Examples of hardcore restrictions in the sphere of vertical agreements are resale price maintenance or an exclusive territory concession for the purchaser of goods as through this mechanism intra-brand competition is restrained. &lt;br /&gt;
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As with measures that intend a restraint on competition, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU also prohibits agreements which have (or produce) anti-competitive effects. Here the effects of the measure on the circumstances of the relevant market have to be investigated separately. In this context, it depends in particular on the unwritten definitional element of &#039;&#039;appreciability&#039;&#039;: an agreement only falls within the prohibition of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU if it has appreciable effects on the relevant market. In its &#039;&#039;de minimis&#039;&#039; notice, the Commission determined that vertical agreements do not appreciably restrict competition if the number of market shares held by each of the participating undertakings does not exceed 15&amp;amp;nbsp;per cent on any of the affected relevant markets.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the assessment of vertical agreements under competition law, it is not always enough to take only the effects of a single, isolated agreement into consideration. The effects of the entire contractual network also need to be considered. Accordingly, a single agreement, eg a beer supply contract between a brewery and an innkeeper, may have no noteworthy effects on the relevant market; however, if the agreement is part of an overall system of homogeneous contractual obligations which characterize the entire market, eg beer supply contracts between a multiplicity of breweries and a multiplicity of innkeepers, only an evaluation of the overall system can guarantee appropriate legal scrutiny of the potential market effects for breweries which are not represented on the relevant market. Judicial consideration of homogenous agreements between undertakings as well as agreements with third parties is made possible by the &#039;&#039;bundle theory&#039;&#039; of the ECJ. According to that theory the evaluation of a single agreement cannot be distinguished from the overall economic and legal context; rather, the agreement has to be assessed in light of the cumulative effects of the entire contractual network (ECJ Case C‑234/89 – &#039;&#039;Delimitis v Henninger&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Brau&#039;&#039; [1991] ECR 977, 983&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; ECJ Case 23/67 – &#039;&#039;Brasserie de Haecht&#039;&#039; [1967] ECR 407, 414&amp;amp;nbsp;ff).&lt;br /&gt;
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The jurisprudence of the ECJ and the administrative practice of the Commission have restricted the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101 TFEU to certain kinds of vertical agreements. For instance, so-called &#039;&#039;genuine agency agreements&#039;&#039;, where the agent ([[Commercial Agents|commercial agents]]) sells or purchases goods or services for the principal without assuming commercial risk in excess of the agent’s commission (eg market specific investment or the adoption of storage costs), do not fall under the scope of application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU. Furthermore, the ECJ has excluded selective distribution systems in the form of specialized trade from the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU. This exemption is subject to the condition that (i)&amp;amp;nbsp;the selective distribution system is necessary due to the nature of the product; (ii)&amp;amp;nbsp;the selection of the reseller takes place according to strictly qualitative criteria and is non-discriminatory; (iii)&amp;amp;nbsp;the system strengthens competition and is in the interest of the consumers and, finally, (iv)&amp;amp;nbsp;the anti-competitive restraint does not exceed what is necessary to reach these goals (ECJ Case 26/76 – &#039;&#039;Metro&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;Commission I&#039;&#039; [1977] ECR 1875, 1906&amp;amp;nbsp;ff).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Types of vertical agreements ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The various forms of vertical agreements reflect the divergent economic and legal needs of the companies involved and their attempt to meet these needs by arranging a single distribution channel extending from the manufacturer to the consumer. In more than 50 years of experience in applying Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU (ex 81(1) EC, 85 EEC), certain types of agreements have proven to be particularly significant and frequent in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Exclusive distribution agreements ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exclusive distribution agreements refer to agreements in which a manufacturer, with respect to a particular territory, undertakes to deliver certain goods to only a single distributor for the purpose of resale in that territory. Usually, the distributor promises at the same time not to sell to customers in a specific territory. Often, the manufacturer also undertakes to refrain from direct sales to customers in the territory of the distributor. A threat to competition arises mainly from the reduction of intra-brand competition and market partitioning. Price discrimination is also possible. Furthermore, in the case of wide application of exclusive distribution systems, there is a high risk of collusion among manufacturers and distributors. However, exclusive distribution agreements that entail anti-competitive restraints may also have positive effects: they can reduce transaction costs if the supplier limits his marketing activity to few distributors. Moreover, the sole distributor frequently markets the goods in his own territory in an especially intensive way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) Exclusive supply agreements ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an exclusive supply agreement, a purchaser binds himself to purchase a product solely or to a predominant degree from a particular supplier. This makes market entry for competing suppliers more difficult. Additionally, it creates potential for collusion between different suppliers. Furthermore, inter-brand competition at the point of sale by the purchaser may be limited if the supplier only delivers certain—and not all—brands. Possible positive effects include the reduction of distribution costs through the long-term planning of a marketing scheme, stabilization of distribution channels, restriction of risks in the event of market fluctuations plus an incentive for the purchaser to support the marketing of the goods in question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== c) Selective distribution systems ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A selective distribution system is a scheme whereby a manufacturer restricts his distribution by corresponding contractual clauses to certain distributors and prevents them from delivering goods purchased under the contract to other distributors who are not members of the distribution system. Generally, selective distribution systems are not permissible for the marketing of all products; it is permissible only for goods which require such systems—eg to preserve their quality or to ensure their proper use. Examples include long-lasting, high-quality and technically complicated products or certain luxury goods which require consumer advice, information and service. Over time, different types of selective distribution have developed through the legal practice which affects competition to varying degrees. The ECJ has held that a simple selective distribution system under which resellers are chosen according to objective criteria of a qualitative nature with regard to the technical qualifications of the reseller and his staff and in which those criteria are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are applied indiscriminately to all such resellers (‘qualitative selective distribution system’), does not fall within the ambit of the prohibition of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU (ECJ, Case 75/84 – &#039;&#039;Metro II&#039;&#039;, [1986] ECR 3021, paras&amp;amp;nbsp;37, 40). However, selective distribution systems in which the reseller is charged with obligations going beyond the ‘objective criteria of a qualitative nature’ or through which from the outset the number of resellers to be admitted to the system is restricted (‘quantitative distribution systems’) are subject to the prohibition of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU, but they might be exempted from the prohibition if they comply with the requirements of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU or a block exemption regulation. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As selective distribution systems affect competition to varying degrees of intensity, they need to be considered in a differentiated manner under competition law. Selective distribution systems can lead to a reduction of intra-brand competition and—if such systems are used by all important manufacturers—to a foreclosure of certain types of distributors. Such systems also facilitate collusion between distributors and manufacturers. But these systems can also have positive effects by ensuring the supply of certain services (eg post-sales service to consumers), reducing free rider problems between distributors (eg in the sphere of advertisement and advice), securing a particular brand image and protecting relationship-specific investments of contract distributors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== d) Franchising agreements ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of (goods or services) [[Franchising|franchising]] relates to a form of distribution where the franchisor permits the franchisee to use the name, brand, equipment and know-how of the franchisor in producing or marketing his products and/or services. Franchise agreements normally provide that the franchisee obtains the contracted goods exclusively from the franchisor. Additionally, such agreements often contain further anti-competitive elements, eg an obligation on the part of the franchisee to distribute the contracted goods only in a certain salesroom. This serves to protect franchisees from competition by other franchisees. The same aim is followed by the so-called municipal area rules where the franchisor is obliged not to license any other franchisees in a certain geographical area surrounding the salesroom of a franchisee. Besides anti-competitive effects, such agreements can also have positive effects. They enable manufacturers to establish themselves on new markets without high investment. Franchise contracts can generate cost savings due to the unification of business methods. Also, inter-brand competition may potentially be improved when distribution through franchise contracts increases the competition faced by the large-scale, highly networked distribution chains otherwise dominant in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Exemption ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU provides the conditions and the forms under which a vertical agreement with an anti-competitive element is exempted from Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU includes two different possibilities for exemption: block exemptions and direct exemptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As concerns the exemption of vertical agreements, the European Commission has adopted two [[Block Exemption Regulations|block exemption regulations]] which are of extraordinary practical importance. These are Regulation&amp;amp;nbsp;330/2010 of 20&amp;amp;nbsp;April 2010 on the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) of the [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)|Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]] to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices and Regulation&amp;amp;nbsp;461/2010 of 27&amp;amp;nbsp;May 2010 on the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector. The regulations add specificity to the otherwise vague and undefined conditions for exemptions outlined in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU, especially for the sector of vertical agreements. In so doing, they relieve companies, competition authorities of the Member States and courts from a complicated examination of the lawfulness of such agreements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditions for one of the above-mentioned block exemption regulations are not fulfilled, eg if the 30&amp;amp;nbsp;per cent thresholds established in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3(1) Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;330/2010 are exceeded, a single agreement among two or more parties can nonetheless be exempted by direct application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU. For this exemption to apply, four cumulative conditions must be satisfied: the agreement must contribute to improving production or distribution or to promoting economic or technical progress; it must allow consumers a fair share of the accrued benefits; the restraints must be indispensable to the attainment of these benefits in question; and competition for a substantial part of the concerned products must not be eliminated. Agreements which contain the above-noted hardcore restrictions can normally not be exempted under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. Legal consequences of a violation of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101&amp;amp;nbsp;TFEU ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a vertical agreement falls under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(1) TFEU because it pursues anti-competitive aims or contains anti-competitive elements and is exempt neither on the basis of a block exemption regulation nor directly under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(3) TFEU, the agreement is null and void in accordance with Art&amp;amp;nbsp;101(2) TFEU and does not generate any estoppel effect ([[Prohibition of Restrictive Agreements and Exemptions|prohibition of restrictive agreements and exemptions]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
DG Goyder, &#039;&#039;EC Competition Law&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 1998) 177–260; Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker and Heike Schweitzer, &#039;&#039;Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2004) §§&amp;amp;nbsp;12 and 14; Volker Emmerich, &#039;&#039;Kartellrecht&#039;&#039; (10th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2006) §&amp;amp;nbsp;5&amp;amp;nbsp;II; Thorsten Mäger, ‘§&amp;amp;nbsp;16: Kartellrecht’ in Reiner Schulze and Manfred Zuleeg (eds), &#039;&#039;Europarecht. Handbuch für die deutsche Rechtspraxis&#039;&#039; (2006); Markus Buchner, &#039;&#039;EG-Kartellrecht und Vertriebssysteme&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; insbesondere der KFZ-Vertrieb&#039;&#039; (2006); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, &#039;&#039;The EC Law of Competition &#039;&#039;(2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2007) 9.01–9.359; Peter Roth and Vivien Rose (eds),&#039;&#039; European Community Law of Competition&#039;&#039; (6th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2008) 6.001–6.196.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Vertikalvereinbarungen_im_EG-Kartellrecht]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Verena_Brandt&amp;diff=1253</id>
		<title>Verena Brandt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Verena_Brandt&amp;diff=1253"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Verena Brandt&#039;&#039;, LL.M. (Cambridge), Notary Assessor in Hamburg&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Verena_Brandt]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Verena_Brandt}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Brandt, Verena}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Utility_Model&amp;diff=1251</id>
		<title>Utility Model</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Utility_Model&amp;diff=1251"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Joseph Straus]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Subject matter and scope  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to §&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1) of the German Utility Model Act (GUMA) inventions that are new, are based on an inventive step and are susceptible to industrial application shall be protected as utility models. Whereas this wording may suggest that the term ‘utility model’ stands for the subject matter of protection, in fact the object of protection is an invention which fulfils the protection requirements under the Act. As far as the latter are concerned, a linguistic clarification as regards the protection requirement of ‘inventive step’ seems appropriate: ‘inventive step’ is a literal translation of &#039;&#039;erfinderischer Schritt&#039;&#039;, used in the original German text in order to designate a lower level of non-obviousness than that for which the German Patent Act and the European Patent Convention ([[European Patent|European patent]]) use the term &#039;&#039;erfinderische Tätigkeit&#039;&#039;, a term which translates as ‘inventive activity’, but which is generally equated with ‘inventive step’ in patent law terminology. Like patents ([[Patent Law|patent law]]), utility models, constitute an object of the protection of industrial property under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (PC) and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;42 TFEU/36 EC. The filing of an application for the registration of a utility model in one of the countries member to the PC establishes a priority right of 12 months for filing subsequent applications in other Paris Union Member States (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;4A and 4C PC). Apart from the right of priority and apart from safeguarding the national treatment principle (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2(1) PC), the PC does not provide for any minimum rights as regards utility models. The International Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS; [[Intellectual Property|intellectual property]]) does not even mention the terms ‘utility model’, &#039;&#039;certificat d’utilité&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;modello de utilitad&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;Gebrauchsmuster&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically, utility model protection was first introduced in Germany as a supplement to design and patent protection. The need for such a supplementary protection was felt because, on the one hand, the &#039;&#039;Reichsoberhandelsgericht&#039;&#039; (Higher Commercial Court of the German Reich) denied protection under the Design and Model Protection Act of 11 January 1876 (&#039;&#039;Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Mustern und Modellen&#039;&#039;) for models which served no ‘aesthetic’, or ornamental purpose, but only a practical use—useful purpose (&#039;&#039;Gebrauchszweck&#039;&#039;) (3&amp;amp;nbsp;September 1878 ROHGE 24, 109). On the other hand, for utility models protection under the Patent Act of 25&amp;amp;nbsp;May 1877, which required the examination of substantive protection requirements, appeared too costly. Moreover, it was soon realized that many utility models would barely meet patentability requirements beyond the requirement of novelty. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to meet the needs of small and medium-sized businesses for a simple and inexpensive protection for less significant but useful technical innovations, the German legislature on 1&amp;amp;nbsp;June 1891 adopted the Utility Model Act (&#039;&#039;Gebrauchsmustergesetz&#039;&#039;—GUMA), which entered into force on 1&amp;amp;nbsp;October 1891. The Act introduced protection to ‘models of working equipment or utility articles or parts thereof … to the extent that a new design, arrangement or device is intended to serve the working or utility purpose’ (§&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1)). The protection, which only required a regular registration at the patent office, but no examination of substantive protection requirements, was limited to six years from the filing of applications. Although the Act placed utility model protection close to patent protection and inventions, ie technical instructions, most often the object of protection, significant differences continued to exist between utility model protection and patent protection. The subject matter of protection under the Utility Model Act had to be in three-dimensional ‘spatial form’, ie it required a ‘new tangible spatial design’ (&#039;&#039;neue körperliche Formgestaltung&#039;&#039;); moreover, it was not applicable to process inventions. Only in 1990 was the requirement of ‘spatial form’ abandoned by the Act to Reinforce Intellectual Property and Combat Product Piracy (German Federal Supreme Court, BGH 17&amp;amp;nbsp;February 2004, BGHZ 158, 142). Despite the fact that the 1891 Act only mentioned ‘new tangible spatial design’, soon the understanding had prevailed that novelty alone did not suffice as a protection requirement but that rather something progressively new must be added, without being already inventive itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Relationship to patent protection ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The protection offered to utility models under the German Utility Model Act as amended on 1 January 1987 shares many commonalities with patent protection. Its objects of protection are inventions, ie technical instructions; it is an exclusive right limited in time and geographic scope; it confers on the first applicant a priority and it generates blocking effects. Thus, utility model protection is also effective against third parties who independently generated the invention but did not, or did only later, file a patent or utility model application with the Patent and Trademark Office. The same invention can be protected by a patent as well as by a utility model. Cumulative protection is allowed. This can be achieved either by filing applications separately and independently of each other or by filing a utility model application and claiming the priority of an earlier filed patent application, a right which can be exercised up to the end of the tenth year after the filing date of the patent application (§&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1) GUMA). In spite of these commonalities, however, a number of important differences exist between utility models and patents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards the subject matter of protection, the Utility Model Act excludes from protection, in addition to inventions excluded from patent protection, all biotechnological inventions, ie products which consist of or contain biological material, as well as all biotechnological processes in general (§§&amp;amp;nbsp;1, 2 GUMA). Also, the state of the art decisive for determining novelty differs between the two forms of protection. On the one hand, knowledge made available to the public by use or oral descriptions outside the jurisdiction of the GUMA does not constitute relevant state of the art. On the other hand, any description or use within six months prior to the date relevant for the priority application is disregarded if it is based upon the work of the applicant or his predecessor in title (§&amp;amp;nbsp;3(a) GUMA). Thus, under GUMA a general grace period of six months preceding the priority date exists. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As noted at the outset, apart from the novelty of the invention, §&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1) GUMA also sets forth as a protection requirement that the invention is industrially applicable and is based on an inventive step. However, whereas §&amp;amp;nbsp;3(2) GUMA, like §&amp;amp;nbsp;5 GPA, provides that the subject matter of a utility model shall be considered susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture, the GUMA, unlike §&amp;amp;nbsp;4 GPA, remains silent as to when an invention is to be considered as being based on an inventive step. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the adoption of the GUMA in 1891, the courts and with rare exceptions, also legal scholarship, have generally assumed that utility model protection requires a lower degree of inventive step than patent protection (RG 25 January 1908, [1908] &#039;&#039;Blatt für Patent-&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Muster- und Zeichenwesen&#039;&#039; 188, 189). This was also the understanding of the legislature when the Act was revised in 1986 and, as emphasized at the beginning of this contribution, the term &#039;&#039;erfinderischer Schritt&#039;&#039; instead of &#039;&#039;Erfindungshöhe&#039;&#039; was introduced into the Act. The requirement of a lesser inventive step should enable in particular small and medium-sized businesses to acquire an inexpensive and easily achieved—though briefer—protection for smaller inventions, thus offering incentives for innovative behaviour and helping to secure the necessary investment. The Federal Patent Court confirmed that the inventive step is at hand if the inventor could not have already found the solution off-hand based on his professional skills and taking into consideration the state of the art (Federal Patent Court 13&amp;amp;nbsp;February 2003, [2004] GRUR 852), or in those cases where the solution would be obvious to the person skilled in the art, but that person would nevertheless have to deal with technical circumstances in detail in order to find that solution (Federal Patent Court 2&amp;amp;nbsp;August 2000, Mitt.2002, 46).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, by a decision of 20&amp;amp;nbsp;June 2006, the German Federal Supreme Court rejected that understanding and stated, inter alia, in an official headnote: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
‘Determination of an inventive step can have recourse to the principles developed in patent law, if account is taken of the differences that result from the fact that the state of the art in utility model law is defined differently in Section&amp;amp;nbsp;3 of the Utility Model Act in terms of oral description and in terms of uses outside the Act’s scope of application. It is not permitted to find that the obvious is based on an inventive step on the grounds that the person skilled in the art could not easily find it on the basis of his general knowledge, taking routine account of the state of the art’ (BGH 20&amp;amp;nbsp;June 2006, BGHZ 168, 142—quoted from (2007) 38 IIC 104).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The BGH emphasized, inter alia, that like the requirement of non-obviousness as a precondition for patentability, the criterion of inventive step in utility model law is not a quantitative but rather a qualitative criterion. Hence, the determination of an inventive step was, like that of non-obviousness, the result of value judgment and the criteria to be applied differ marginally. If one attached the exclusivity in utility model law to a ‘lesser’ inventiveness than in patent law, the utility model law would be exposed to the danger of becoming a collecting pond for subject matter not eligible for patent protection. The court, moreover, opined that applying different thresholds for assessing inventiveness under the two forms of protection would also disregard the fact that the effects of protection as provided for patents under §§&amp;amp;nbsp;9, 10 GPA and for utility models under §§&amp;amp;nbsp;11, 12a GUMA are by and large the same (BGH 20&amp;amp;nbsp;June 2006, [2006] GRUR 845).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of this BGH decision, some fundamental deliberations seem appropriate as regards German law. As compared with [[Patent Law|patent law]], does a somewhat narrower subject matter eligible for protection and a somewhat narrower state of the art determinative for the assessment of novelty justify a second form of protection for inventions in addition to the patent protection? Moreover, can such a form of protection for inventions which can be acquired parallel to patent protection without examination of substantive protection requirements by the Patent and Trademark Office and which directly leads to an enforceable exclusive right to deny third parties the use of the invention be defended in view of the fact that in the case of patents, such an enforceable right is only available upon the patent grant? Can the shorter term of protection alone justify such a difference in approach?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. International and European developments ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The German Utility Model Act of 1891 was the pioneer of this specific form for protecting inventions. In the meantime, utility model protection has been introduced in many countries. The respective statutes, however, reveal differences as regards the subject matter of protection (eg the requirement of spatial form), protection requirements, the term of protection and the examination of protection requirements. The overall development, however, indicates a trend towards lower/lesser requirements for eligibility of inventions for utility model protection as regards the novelty (eg local novelty sufficient) and the ‘inventive’ activity as compared with patents. At the same time, the term of protection reveals a tendency of extension (up to 10 years), and, as a rule, full protection is available based on examination solely as to formalities upon the entry into the respective register, ie without examination of substantive protection requirements. The examination of substantive protection requirements only takes place in infringement suits before courts or upon a motion for cancellation of the utility model in separate proceedings. In some jurisdictions, however, the enforcement of protection is made dependent on an examination by the responsible office. Empirical data reveals that utility model protection is predominantly used by nationals and relatively seldom by foreign applicants. Among the Member States of the [[European Union]] only Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom do not offer any protection for utility models. Outside the Union, in Europe, no such protection is available in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Specific statutory regulations exist in Austria (1994, 1998), Bulgaria (1993), Czech Republic (1992), Denmark (1992), Estonia (1994, 2002), Finland (1995), Greece (1987), Hungary (1991), Italy (1940), Poland (1972, 1984), Portugal (1995), Slovakia (1992) and Spain (1986). In France protection exists in the form of utility model certificates—&#039;&#039;certificat d&#039;utilité&#039;&#039; (Book VI of the &#039;&#039;Code de la Proprieté Intellectuelle&#039;&#039; 1992) and in Belgium (1984), Ireland (1992), the Netherlands (1995) and Slovenia (1992, 1993) short-term patents are available. It should be added that outside Europe utility model protection exists, for instance, in Australia, where innovation patents are available (2001), Brazil (1996), the People’s Republic of China (1984, 1992), Japan (1905, 1959, 1994), the Republic of Korea (1908, 1961, 1998) and Mexico (1991).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After some preparatory work, in 1995, the [[European Commission]] also took up the cause of utility model protection. In the green paper ‘Utility Model Protection in the Internal Market’ (COM(95) 370 final), which subsequently served as the basis for extensive consultations on the introduction of utility model protection at Union level, the Commission brought forward the following reasons in favour of this form for protecting inventions: rapid and simple registration; less stringent protection requirements than in the case of patents; lower costs; and provisional protection available based on entry in the register alone. While noting that the protection available in the Member States revealed considerable differences, the Commission also emphasized that this form of protection was only unavailable in Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Commission observed that all national regulations provided protection for technical inventions, thus establishing that this form of protection fulfilled the function of an ‘additional protection for technical inventions’. They further noted that it was available in all Member States upon registration (entry into the register) without prior examination of the utility model as regards novelty and inventive step. Thus, the protection could be obtained in a fast and inexpensive manner. As regards the existing differences, three different groups were identified by the Commission: the first group applied the same criteria for the inventive activity and (absolute) novelty for the (patent protection supplementing) utility model protection as for patents but did not include spatial form as a protection requirement (Belgium, France and the Netherlands); the second group applied less stringent requirements as regards the inventive step but required that the invention be realized in spatial form (Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain); the third group applied less stringent requirements for the inventive step but did not require spatial form at all or attached to it only a low level of importance (Austria, Denmark and Ireland). Germany was classified as falling into the last group with the qualification that only relative novelty was required.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the green paper, utility model protection was of particular importance for medium-sized and small companies. The Commission also emphasized that in this respect considerable differences existed between different branches of industry. The following fields were identified as the main users of utility model protection: mechanical engineering; electrical industry; producers of precision instruments; optics; toys industry; and car industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The green paper concluded that it was the obligation of the [[European Union]] to undertake steps aimed at removing this disadvantageous situation for the [[European Internal Market|European internal market]] and at improving its functioning. The development of innovative activity in the European Union was characterized by a trend towards a lesser (lower) inventive step, higher sensitivity for costs, shorter production and commercialization cycles, as well as a shorter life-span of inventions, all of which resulted in an increased need for a simple and inexpensive protection of technical inventions in the common market. As possible options for an initiative of the Union, an approximation of national protection systems, on the one hand, and the establishment of a Union Utility Model System, on the other, were considered. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On 12&amp;amp;nbsp;December 1997, the Commission submitted a proposal for a ‘Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model’ (COM(1997) 691). The Economic and Social Committee delivered its opinion on this proposal on 27&amp;amp;nbsp;May 1998. The [[European Parliament]] adopted a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive on 12&amp;amp;nbsp;March 1999, and the Commission presented an amended proposal for a directive on 28&amp;amp;nbsp;June 1999 (COM(1999) 309 final). The recitals of this proposal emphasize the strategic role small and medium-sized firms play in relation to innovation and their rapid response to market requirements. In particular, small and medium-sized firms and researchers were in need of an instrument which is cheap, rapid and easy to evaluate and apply. Measured on these criteria, utility model protection was seen as being better suited than patent protection to technical inventions involving a specific level of inventiveness. As regards the subject matter of protection, the proposal provided for protection of products as well as of processes, but it excluded from protection inventions relating to biological material and in general inventions relating to chemical or pharmaceutical substances or processes and computer programs (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4(b), (c), (d)). With the exception of inventive activity, all other protection requirements were the same as those required for patent protection. Under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6, ‘an invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, in the utility model application, the applicant indicates clearly and convincingly that, compared with the state of the art, it exhibits either (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;particular effectiveness in terms of, for example ease of application or use; or (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;a practical or industrial advantage’. The registration of the utility model was to be based on examination as to formal requirements only, without examination of substantive protection requirements (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;15). At the request and cost of the applicant or any other interested party, the competent authority was to draw up a search report on the relevant state of the art. However, it was left to the discretion of the Member States to provide for an obligatory search report in case of an infringement action (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;16(1), (4)). The maximum term of protection was limited to 10 years (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;19), and the cumulation of protection by a patent and a utility model for the same invention (‘dual protection’) was allowed (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;22).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As revealed by a Staff Working Paper titled ‘Consultations on the Impact of the Community Utility Model in Order to Update the Green Paper on the Protection of Utility Models in the Single Market’ (COM(95) 370 final), which the EU Commission published on 26&amp;amp;nbsp;July 2001 (SEC (2001) 1307), the Commission suspended work on the proposal for a directive as of March 2000 because the majority of the Member States considered that priority should be given to the work on the Union patent. In the framework of the consultations which the EU Commission initiated following the publication of the proposal, a vast majority of interested parties replying opposed the introduction of a Union utility model based on a regulation and prompted the Commission to give up all utility model protection initiatives. Only some respondents were in favour of reopening the work on the directive. Thus, it should be clear that for the foreseeable future the European Union will neither have an EU-wide harmonized national utility model protection nor a Union utility model protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Rudolf Kraßer, ‘Die Entwicklung des Gebrauchsmusterrechts’ in &#039;&#039;Festschrift zum hundertjährigen Bestehen der Deutschen Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht und ihrer Zeitschrift&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I&#039;&#039; (1991) 617; Guenter Weitzel, &#039;&#039;Pilotstudie—Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Gebrauchsmusterschutzes in der Europäischen Union&#039;&#039; (1993); Rudolf Kraßer, ‘Developments in Utility Model Law’ (1995) 26 IIC 950; Rudolf Kraßer, ‘Harmonization of Utility Model Law in Europe’ (2000) 31 IIC 797; Hans-Friedrich Loth, &#039;&#039;Gebrauchsmustergesetz&#039;&#039; (2001); Alfred Keukenschrijver, ‘Gebrauchsmustergesetz’ in Rudolf Busse (ed), &#039;&#039;Patentgesetz&#039;&#039; (6th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2003) 1545; Takeyuki Iwai, ‘Modalities of Future Utility Model System’ [2004] IIP Bulletin 38; Peter Mes, &#039;&#039;Patentgesetz&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Gebrauchsmustergesetz&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2005); Frank Peter Goebel, &#039;&#039;Der erfinderische Schritt&#039;&#039; (2005); Frank Peter Goebel, ‘Gebrauchsmustergesetz’ in Georg Benkard, &#039;&#039;Patentgesetz&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Gebrauchsmustergesetz&#039;&#039; (10th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2006) 1561.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Gebrauchsmuster]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Usus_Modernus&amp;diff=1249</id>
		<title>Usus Modernus</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Usus_Modernus&amp;diff=1249"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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by &#039;&#039;[[Klaus Luig]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Background ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The term &#039;&#039;usus modernus pandectarum&#039;&#039; designated, in the broadest sense, the entire period in European legal history in which the [[Roman Law|Roman law]], as compiled by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (527–567 CE), was regarded as binding in scholarship, doctrine and practice. According to this view, the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; of Roman law began in 12th-century Italy with the glossators and was only brought to an end during the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century by the modern civil codes ([[Codification|codification]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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If, however, the various eras and schools using the Justinianic law ([[Corpus Juris Civilis|&#039;&#039;Corpus Juris Civilis&#039;&#039;]]) are to be analysed more closely, a distinction can be drawn between the epochs of the glossators (1100–1250), the commentators (1250–1500), humanist jurisprudence (1500–1600), [[Natural Law|natural law]] (1650–1800), &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; in the narrow sense (1650–1800) and pandectism (1800–1900; [[Pandektensystem|&#039;&#039;Pandektensystem&#039;&#039;]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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European development began with an age of ‘absolute’ Roman law, in which lawyers formulated the principle ‘omnia in corpore iuris inveniuntur’ or ‘hic liber comprehendit omnia iura’. By that time, however, the glossators had already started to adapt the Justinianic law to their own views and beliefs and thus, in a way, to establish an &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;. This process, never explicitly acknowledged, of a modernization was accomplished by generalizing the content of some texts and narrowly interpreting others. The commentators then undertook a deliberate modernization of the law through a rather liberal interpretation of the Roman texts.&lt;br /&gt;
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The oath taken by the judges of the [[Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court) |&#039;&#039;Reichskammergericht&#039;&#039; (Imperial Chamber Court)]], founded in 1495, represented the starting point of the development in Germany. With this oath, the judges undertook ‘to judge … according to the common laws of the Empire … and the fair and honourable individual ordonnances, statutes and customs of the principalities, sovereignties and courts, which are brought before them.’&lt;br /&gt;
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This formula was based on the following doctrine of legal sources: the common law of the Empire included Justinian’s [[Corpus Juris Civilis|&#039;&#039;Corpus Juris Civilis&#039;&#039;]], the &#039;&#039;Corpus Juris Canonici&#039;&#039; of the Roman Catholic Church ([[Canon Law|canon law]]) and the &#039;&#039;Libri Feudorum &#039;&#039;of feudal law. In particular, Roman law was regarded as having been adopted as imperial law by a statute of Emperor Lothar III of Supplinburg in 1137. The Roman law was only applicable in the absence of particular imperial statutes or the statutes in individual territories or towns. All of these legal sources had priority over Roman law. However, their applicability was limited because their validity for any given territory had to be proved by the party invoking it. In contrast, the common law ([[Ius Commune|&#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039;]]) was presumed to be applicable (&#039;&#039;fundata intentio&#039;&#039;) and was regarded to be within the knowledge of the court. In addition, the non-Roman rules were to be interpreted narrowly—with as little deviation from Roman law as possible. Finally, they had to be tested and found to conform to the &#039;&#039;boni mores&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Modernization ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== a) Doctrine of legal sources ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The doctrine of legal sources just described was gradually replaced, from the middle of the 17th&amp;amp;nbsp;century onwards, by another theory and corresponding practice which sought to combine native law and Roman law. It characterized itself rather self-confidently as ‘modern-use’ (&#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;) of Roman law. &lt;br /&gt;
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The most important reason for this modernization was the laborious task of establishing the applicable law in every case that came before the court. This was criticized by Herman Conring (1606–81), a doctor and lawyer from Helmstedt. Conring observed that while Roman law had the most important place among the different sources from which the law of a particular case was to be derived, it was written in a foreign language and at the same time, in many respects, contrary to German values. Moreover, it comprised the opinions of the old Roman jurists, ie the jurists of the classical period of Roman law, rather than clear statutory rules and was therefore bedevilled by innumerable controversies.&lt;br /&gt;
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The renewal and modernization began in 1643 with Conring’s proof that, contrary to the majority view, Roman law had not been adopted by a statute of Emperor Lothar III of Supplinburg in 1137. Rather, it had been received by custom, gradually and rule by rule, through practical use (&#039;&#039;usu sensim&#039;&#039;), and approved and affirmed by legislation. But what had been received through practical use could also, again, become obsolete by non-use.&lt;br /&gt;
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If this was to be taken seriously, there could be no presumption of applicability (&#039;&#039;fundata intentio&#039;&#039;) of Roman law in every individual case. Strictly speaking, therefore, the [[Reception|reception]] of every particular rule had to be demonstrated. However, not all authors promoted such an extreme consequence of the modern understanding of the reception of Roman law. The more moderate view, widely adopted, was that there was a presumption in favour of the applicability of both Roman and native law (&#039;&#039;ius patrium&#039;&#039;). This compromise could only be applied to areas in which Roman and native law did not contradict one another but dealt with issues unknown to the other, ie &#039;&#039;Einkindschaft &#039;&#039;(equal treatment of children born to one parent from two different marriages), &#039;&#039;Leibgedinge&#039;&#039; (a kind of pension), &#039;&#039;Morgengabe&#039;&#039; (a gift from husband to wife on the morning after the wedding), &#039;&#039;Auflassung&#039;&#039; (agreement concerning the transfer of real property), etc. Insofar as native law contradicted Roman law—for instance, Roman law did not recognize [[Representation|representation]], a well established concept in native law—a compromise recognizing two common laws was not possible. Such conflicts had to be settled case-by-case through legislation, judicial decision or doctrinal writing; and they required that Roman law was tested rule by rule for its conformity with German values. To a large extent, this was done by measuring the indigenous law against [[Natural Law|natural law]]. The natural law school had been active since the second half of the 17th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, simultaneously with that of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;. Its adherents started from the assumption that the local German law, deriving from native roots, was in complete agreement with the natural law.&lt;br /&gt;
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Furthermore, the rules of native law no longer had to be interpreted restrictively; just as those of Roman law, they were capable of analogical extension. This played a role in the adoption of the principle, based on [[Canon Law|canon law]], &#039;&#039;germanische Treue&#039;&#039; (German faithfulness) and natural law, that informal contractual agreements (&#039;&#039;pacta nuda&#039;&#039;) were to be enforceable. This, in turn, allowed the development of a general law of contract, quite independent of Roman law. &lt;br /&gt;
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In the eyes of lawyers in the late 17th&amp;amp;nbsp;and 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;centuries, the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; was not only designed to protect the native law from the infiltration of Roman law, but also to renew and adapt the rules and institutions of Roman law, the reception of which was not denied by the proponents of such renewal. The boundary between genuinely indigenous rules on the one hand, and those which were received, and then adapted to contemporary requirements, on the other, cannot always easily be drawn. However, such a distinction is necessary because the really interesting aspect of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus pandectarum &#039;&#039;is the adaptation of Roman law to modern conditions. Since no distinctive period for the rise of the native &#039;&#039;ius germanicum &#039;&#039;can be identified, both phenomena, in combination, characterize the era normally referred to as &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;. For the purposes of this entry, even those native institutions, which, because they were more modern, prevailed over rules received from Roman law, have to be considered as fruits of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) Examples of modernization ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The seller’s right to set aside a sale for [[Laesio Enormis|&#039;&#039;laesio enormis&#039;&#039;]] (C. 4,44,2) was initially received from Roman law but then extended to buyers by an interpretation intended to adapt the rule to modern requirements. There was also evidence of an &#039;&#039;usus modernus pandectarum &#039;&#039;in the deduction of a general &#039;&#039;clausula rebus sic stantibus&#039;&#039; from two special cases preserved in the Digest (D. 12,4,8 and D. 46,3,3 pr.), a process which began in the Middle Ages. In a similar way, the decision of questions of contributory negligence according to the predominant fault of one of the parties, rather than according to the rule in the ‘barber case’ in D. 9,2,11, according to which even minor contributory fault excludes liability, can be seen as the creation of a &#039;&#039;usus modernus &#039;&#039;of a rule of Roman law ([[Roman Law|Roman law]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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A liberalizing tendency is illustrated by the modernization of the rules on transfer of ownership concerning contracts of [[Sale|sale]]. In order to allow a transfer of ownership although the purchase price had not been paid, the granting of credit that was required was presumed to have occurred by the proponents of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; despite the absence of any basis for such rule in the Roman texts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, an assignee was no longer considered to be a mere &#039;&#039;procurator&#039;&#039;, but rather as being truly entitled to the right assigned to him. Here, as in other cases, the modern solution to a problem of the Roman law, as it had been received, was supported from the point of view of Germanic or natural law. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) The ‘purging’ of Roman law ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;usus modernus &#039;&#039;was not just based on the extension of Roman law to new situations. It was also concerned with ‘purging’ (Bernhard Windscheid) Roman law of limitations which were no longer appropriate. Insofar as Roman rules were thus rendered obsolete, it was said that the ‘subtleties’ of Roman law had never been received or had at least been derogated from in the course of its modernization. This applied, for instance, to the &#039;&#039;duplum&#039;&#039; penalties of Roman law. Another example of the abandonment of specific rules limiting commercial freedom was the derogation—established by case law—of the prohibition on [[Assignment|assignment]] to someone in authority over the debtor (&#039;&#039;cessio in potentiorem&#039;&#039;) based on C. 2,13,1. The &#039;&#039;lex Anastasiana&#039;&#039; (C. 4,35,22) preventing an assignee from exercising a right at a higher price than he had paid himself. Though just as significant for commerce, it resisted all attempts at modernization. A further modernization lay in the abolition of the prohibition on the accumulation of interest beyond the amount of the capital which was owed (&#039;&#039;ultra alterum tantum&#039;&#039; or, more precisely, &#039;&#039;ultra sortis summam&#039;&#039; (C.&amp;amp;nbsp;4,32,10; [[Interest|interest]])). The Roman restriction limiting &#039;&#039;fideicommissa &#039;&#039;(trusts)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;to four generations also failed to prove suitable for modern times. Moreover, the assessment rules concerning damages claims under the &#039;&#039;lex Aquilia&#039;&#039; fell victim to the modernizers’ reforms.&lt;br /&gt;
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The starting point for the introduction of innovations was often the law of a particular town or territory. The lawyers of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; were able to take rules from one place to another, extending their physical area of application, and they were also able to generalize the interpretation of rules found in different places. A rule that could be found in many territories, could thus be extended to an area where there was no concrete evidence of its use. In regard to the validity of particular rules, lawyers of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; inferred &#039;&#039;ubique in Germania&#039;&#039; from &#039;&#039;fere ubique in Germania&#039;&#039;. Thus, there were rules of customary law valid across the whole of Germany (&#039;&#039;consuetudines universales&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;generales&#039;&#039;). Insofar as these had no counterpart in Roman law and were not related to it, they were, from the 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;century onwards, presented under the name of &#039;&#039;Deutsches Privatrecht&#039;&#039; as an autonomous system of private law, separate from Roman law.&lt;br /&gt;
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If an attempt is made to summarize the predominant substantive tendencies of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;, the general impression is that the lawyers of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; generally sought to create a liberal law, suitable for commercial relations and focusing on the will of the parties. The greatest achievement of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; was the scholarly penetration of the system of private law and the consolidation, and integration, of legal practice. On this basis, a modern &#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039; was created, which laid foundations for the system of private law which have remained important until today. Consequently, rules of Roman, German, canon and natural law origin as well as modern statutory and (judicial) customary law formed a uniform legal system developed in a scholarly fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Textbooks ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The cumulative effect of these innovations made a new type of textbook necessary. Conring rejected the predominant approach of producing commentaries on the Justinianic Digest. Instead, he set out to write a concise handbook, an &#039;&#039;exiguus libellus&#039;&#039;, covering the whole of the law in force but leaving out all of the materials which were no longer useful. It only contained what either as customary law (German law) or as written law (Roman-canon law) was used in practice. The &#039;&#039;Institutes coutumières&#039;&#039; by the Frenchman Antoine Loisel (1536–1617), which appeared in 1607, may be seen as a forerunner of this kind of treatise. Comparable accounts of the law in force, which can be characterized as [[Institutional Textbooks|institutional textbooks]], were thereafter published at an increasing rate. Essentially, they constituted first steps on the way towards the subsequent codifications. Their authors used a modified version of the scheme underlying Justinian’s Institutes as their model. The rules of Roman law, which had become obsolete, were left out, while those without a Roman law basis, such as insurance, contracts of inheritance ([[Contracts of Inheritance and Joint Wills|contracts of inheritance and joint wills]]) and gambling, were inserted at appropriate places.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the earliest of these works was Hugo Grotius’ (1583–1645) &#039;&#039;Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid&#039;&#039; ([[Roman-Dutch Law|Roman-Dutch law]]). Grotius followed the example of Justinian’s Institutes and divided his work into three parts: persons, things and succession, and obligations. He did not deal with the law of actions. Throughout, attention was drawn to the modern use made of the rules of Roman law. Into this system, at the appropriate points, he inserted both institutions of specifically Dutch origin and those with more widespread areas of application such as the law relating to interest, shipping, sailors, insurance, the law of average, and the law of currency exchange.&lt;br /&gt;
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Georg Adam Struve’s (1619–92) influential &#039;&#039;Juris-Prudenz&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; oder&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Verfassung der landüblichen Rechte&#039;&#039; (1689) followed the same model. The same approach was maintained in further editions, in 1696 and 1711. The work incorporated—within a slightly modified institutional scheme with chapters on persons and things, including succession and obligations—such native institutions as insurance, bottomry loan, contracts of succession, liability for defects in animals, gambling, redemption, interest and feudalism. An abridgement of ‘&#039;&#039;Juris-Prudenz&#039;&#039;’ was revised and re-published many times under the title &#039;&#039;Jurisprudentia Romano-Germanica &#039;&#039;between 1670 and 1771. However, the entire era takes its name from a commentary on the Digest by Samuel Stryk (1640–1710) entitled &#039;&#039;Usus modernus Pandectarum&#039;&#039;, the first volume of which appeared in 1690. It fulfilled the ambition of contemporary lawyers so well that the title of the work could be used to designate the whole period. The Roman-national (ie Roman-Dutch and Roman-German, but also Roman-Neapolitan, Roman-French, Roman-Hispanic etc) institutional works ([[Institutional Textbooks|institutional textbooks]]) spread across the whole of Europe in the 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;century.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Franz Wieacker,&#039;&#039; Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit&#039;&#039; (2nd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 1967); Wolfgang Wiegand, &#039;&#039;Studien zur Rechtsanwendungslehre der Rezeptionszeit&#039;&#039; (1977); Klaus Luig, ‘Conring, das deutsche Recht und die Rechtsgeschichte’ in Michael Stolleis (ed), &#039;&#039;Hermann Conring (1606–1681)&#039;&#039; (1983) 355; also in Klaus Luig,&#039;&#039; Römisches Recht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Naturrecht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Nationales Recht&#039;&#039; (1998) 219; Helmut&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Coing, &#039;&#039;Europäisches Privatrecht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; I Älteres gemeines Recht 1500–1800&#039;&#039; (1985); Tony Weir (tr), Franz Wieacker, &#039;&#039;A History of Private Law in Europe&#039;&#039; (1995); Hermann Lange, &#039;&#039;Römisches Recht im Mittelalter&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I&#039;&#039;: &#039;&#039;Die Glossatoren&#039;&#039; (1997); Klaus Luig, ‘Samuel Stryk und der “Usus modernus Pandectarum”’ in &#039;&#039;Festschrift Sten Gagnér&#039;&#039; (1998) 219; also in Klaus Luig, &#039;&#039;Römisches Recht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Naturrecht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Nationales Recht&#039;&#039; (1998)&amp;amp;nbsp;91; Peter Oestmann, &#039;&#039;Rechtsvielfalt vor Gericht&#039;&#039; (2002); Hermann Lange and Maximiliane Kriechbaum, &#039;&#039;Römisches Recht im Mittelalter&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;II&#039;&#039;: &#039;&#039;Die Kommentatoren&#039;&#039; (2007); Hans-Peter Haferkamp and Tilman Repgen (eds),&#039;&#039; Usus modernus Pandectarum&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Römisches Recht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Deutsches Recht und Naturrecht in der frühen Neuzeit&#039;&#039; (2007); Frank L Schäfer, &#039;&#039;Juristische Germanistik&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; eine Geschichte der Wissenschaft vom einheimischen Privatrecht&#039;&#039; (2008).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Sources==&lt;br /&gt;
Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;Inleiding tot de hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid&#039;&#039; (1631); Hermann Conring, &#039;&#039;De origine iuris Germanici &#039;&#039;(1643); Antoine Loisel, &#039;&#039;Institutes coutumières&#039;&#039; (1646); Samuel Styrk, &#039;&#039;Usus modernus Pandectarum&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I-III&#039;&#039; (1690-1712).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Usus_modernus]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unwinding_of_Contracts&amp;diff=1247</id>
		<title>Unwinding of Contracts</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unwinding_of_Contracts&amp;diff=1247"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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by &#039;&#039;[[Phillip Hellwege]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Two parties enter into a contract and exchange their performances. Then they find out that the contract has failed, for some or other reason, and that it will have to be ‘unwound’: the parties may never have reached &#039;&#039;consensus&#039;&#039; and, thus, the contract may have never come into existence, the contract may be invalid ([[Invalidity|invalidity]]) for lack of compliance with a [[Formal Requirements|formal requirement]] or [[Illegality of Contracts|illegality]], it may have been avoided as a result of [[Mistake|mistake]]], [[Fraud|fraud]], or [[Duress|duress]], it may have been terminated for [[Non-Performance|non-performance]] or one of the parties may have exercised a [[Right of Withdrawal|right of withdrawal]]. Henceforth, the term &#039;&#039;unwinding factor&#039;&#039; will be used to denote these different reasons which are the ultimate cause for unwinding the contract. Unwinding a contract always aims at restoring the parties, as far as possible, to the &#039;&#039;status quo ante contractum&#039;&#039;. For that purpose, both parties have to give back what they have received under the contract. This sounds rather simple. Yet, a number of difficult questions arise which have to be answered by every legal system. (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;What happens if the parties, or one of them, are unable to give back what they have received, eg because the object has been destroyed or has deteriorated, or the subject matter of the contract is incapable of being returned &#039;&#039;in natura&#039;&#039;? (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;There is a substantive side to this question: who is to bear the risk that the object received has deteriorated or has been destroyed due to a supervening event? (c)&amp;amp;nbsp;And there is a technical side to it: should a party be barred from requesting the unwinding of a contract if he is unable to make restoration to the other party? Or should he only be liable for the value of what he received? (d)&amp;amp;nbsp;If one opts for a compensatory model, what are the principles for assessing the value of what was provided? (e)&amp;amp;nbsp;If one party has derived benefits from the object received, does that party have to give them back as well? And what about expenses for the maintenance or improvement of the object? (f)&amp;amp;nbsp;Further problems arise in identifying the place of performance, in three-party situations, with regard to long-term contracts, and concerning the applicable law. (g) Finally, there is a systematic question that each legal system initially needs to answer: should the process of unwinding a contract be governed by a number of different regimes or is a unified approach preferable?&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. A unified approach? ==&lt;br /&gt;
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German law has developed different regimes for unwinding contracts: if the contract is void, the law of unjustified enrichment (§§&amp;amp;nbsp;812&amp;amp;nbsp;ff [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (BGB)]]) will govern the process of unwinding the contract. If the contract has been terminated, the special restitution regime of §§&amp;amp;nbsp;346&amp;amp;nbsp;ff BGB will apply. If a consumer withdraws from the contract, these special provisions are modified by §&amp;amp;nbsp;357 BGB. Finally, if the transfer of property is also invalid, the &#039;&#039;Eigentümer-Besitzer-Verhältnis&#039;&#039; (owner-possessor-relationship) contained in §§&amp;amp;nbsp;987&amp;amp;nbsp;ff BGB will be applicable. Each of these regimes will provide different answers to the above-mentioned questions, eg concerning risk allocation. A similar variety of regimes can be found in English and Scots law.&lt;br /&gt;
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Other European legal systems do not draw such a sharp distinction between different regimes for unwinding contracts. For instance, Austrian law distinguishes between the unwinding of contracts following avoidance for defects of consent (§&amp;amp;nbsp;877 ABGB), following termination for non-performance (§&amp;amp;nbsp;921 ABGB) and following the exercise of a right of withdrawal from a contract (§§&amp;amp;nbsp;4, 5g KSchG). Yet all of these scenarios are governed by the law of [[Unjustified Enrichment|unjustified enrichment]] (§§&amp;amp;nbsp;1431&amp;amp;nbsp;ff ABGB). The law of unjustified enrichment thus underlies the different regimes as a unifying concept. A similar approach is taken in France and by the Spanish judiciary. In the Netherlands the legislature has aligned the different regimes to each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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A unified approach can also be found in legal history: in [[Roman Law|Roman law]], a number of different actions and remedies aimed at setting aside a contract. However, all of them were governed by the principle of &#039;&#039;restitutio in integrum&#039;&#039;. The &#039;&#039;restitutio in integrum&#039;&#039; was an extraordinary remedy. But at the same time it described the function of a number of remedies: to restore a party &#039;&#039;in integrum&#039;&#039;. The unwinding of contracts, with whatever remedy it was achieved, aimed at restoring both parties to the &#039;&#039;status quo ante&#039;&#039;. ‘Restitutio in integrum&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;est reciproca’—that is how a German author of the 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;century paraphrased this principle which Friedrich Carl von Savigny characterized as both general and natural. This overarching principle seems to have included uniform rules on the allocation of risk, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why has this unified approach been lost in some European jurisdictions? This question has, as yet, only been researched for German, English and Scots law. The distinctions which we observe in these legal systems today have only occurred since the late 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. Of great importance has been the distinction that avoidance operates retrospectively while termination has a prospective effect. However, this difference was only introduced in order to award contractual [[Damages|damages]] and to uphold limitation-, exclusion-, and arbitration-clauses when a contract had been terminated for non-performance. However, with respect to the unwinding of contracts this distinction proves to be of no relevance.&lt;br /&gt;
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A unified approach is preferable: the purpose of unwinding contracts is always identical, ie to restore the parties to the &#039;&#039;status quo ante&#039;&#039;. Furthermore, different regimes will cause inconsistencies, especially if each of them answers the above questions differently. However, such diverging answers could only be justified on the basis of different policies underlying the different unwinding factors. Yet, in German, English and Scots law comparable unwinding factors are attributed to different unwinding regimes whereas distinctive unwinding factors are grouped together under identical regimes. German lawyers are aware of the resulting discrepancies, and they try to reduce them by aligning the different regimes with each other. In contrast, English and Scots lawyers try to justify the differences, eg by referring to the different effects of avoidance and termination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although a unified approach is preferable, it is unknown to [[Uniform Law|uniform law]]. A European directive introducing a [[Right of Withdrawal|right of withdrawal]] (Dir 85/577, 94/47, 97/7, 02/65) or introducing a right to terminate in case of lack of conformity (Dir 99/44) can only deal with the consequences of the exercise of the individual rights. The CISG, in turn, only covers termination for non-performance and its consequences. It therefore follows from the limited scope of application of these instruments that they do not introduce a unified regime for the unwinding of contracts. Furthermore, some of these instruments leave the details of how to unwind contracts to the national laws. But even the [[Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)]], the [[UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)]], the Draft [[Common Frame of Reference (CFR)|Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)]] and the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights (COM(2008) 614 final) do not adopt a unified approach. The PECL, for example, contain three different regimes, one for unwinding following avoidance (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:115), one for the unwinding of an illegal contract (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;15:104) and one for unwinding following termination (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9:305&amp;amp;nbsp;ff). Only the &#039;&#039;Avant projet&#039;&#039; of a [[Code Européen des Contrats (Avant-Projet)|&#039;&#039;Code Européen des Contrats&#039;&#039;]] has already adopted such a unified approach (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;160). The same will be true of the extended, third edition of the UNIDROIT PICC (see Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;3.2.15 and 7.3.6).&lt;br /&gt;
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A unified regime of unwinding contracts would not need to be inflexible. One can, for example, take the policy considerations underlying the different unwinding factors into account when answering the question as to the allocation of risk. At the same time one would avoid the danger, inherent in a differentiated approach, of not treating like cases alike.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Concurrent restitution ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In mutual contracts performance and counter-performance are reciprocal. If a mutual contract is unwound, the principle of reciprocity has to be taken account of even if the contract is void. That is what an 18th-century German author meant when he stated that ‘restitutio in integrum est reciproca’: the obligation to make restoration of the one party is linked to that of the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Allocation of risk ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Should the recipient of a performance bear the risk that the object received has been destroyed or has deteriorated due to a supervening event? Or should the other party—that is, the party who rendered the performance—have to shoulder this risk? Or should the loss perhaps be split between the parties? The position that this risk should be on the recipient prevails (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, DCFR, but see the Netherlands for a contrary approach). A number of factors, rules and principles are referred to in favour of this risk allocation: ‘res perit debitori’, ‘venire contra factum proprium nulli conceditur’, &#039;&#039;exceptio doli&#039;&#039;, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity’, the parties’ reliance, and their will. However, the most convincing factor is that the recipient has control over the object, and that he should thus also bear the risk. Moreover, the recipient is in a position to insure the object.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is generally accepted that this allocation of risk is only the point of departure and that there must be exceptions to it. Thus, it is beyond doubt that the destruction or deterioration of what has been received is on the other party if it was caused by a latent defect of the object received or if the other party was otherwise responsible for the loss (Germany, Italy, DCFR). Some legal systems also allow exceptions when the recipient was a minor (Germany, Spain, but see Scotland for a contrary approach), when he was defrauded (Germany, France), and whenever the policy consideration underlying the unwinding factor so requires (Germany). Finally, in some legal systems the recipient is released from having to bear the risk if the unwinding factor may be attributed to the other party as in the case of termination for non-performance (Germany).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 5. Implementation of risk allocation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But how is the risk-allocation regime to be implemented? We find a number of different models: if it is the same party who cannot give back what he received and who has a right the exercise of which will result in the unwinding of the contract, one may hold that he is barred from availing himself of such right (see the German §&amp;amp;nbsp;351 BGB until 2001, and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;82 CISG in case of termination; England, Scotland and Ireland in case of avoidance). Some legal systems distinguish between cases of a material and an immaterial deterioration (France). Yet other legal systems justify the fact that the recipient will be barred from enforcing his rights by reference to a waiver: by using the object received in such a way that it has been destroyed or has deteriorated the recipient waives his rights to claim the unwinding of the contract (Austria in case of avoidance, England in case of termination).&lt;br /&gt;
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However, this solution is increasingly criticized: in its favour it has always been argued that it avoids problems of assessing the value of the object received. Yet each legal system has to face these problems when, as in the case of services, the performance received cannot be given back &#039;&#039;in natura&#039;&#039; or when it is the other party who cannot give back an object in the same condition in which it was when he received it. Furthermore, a compensatory model is much more sophisticated. It will not bind the parties to a contract which is void, voidable or otherwise open to termination, but it will restore the parties at least in respect of the respective values of the performances exchanged to the &#039;&#039;status quo ante&#039;&#039;. Indeed, this is a model increasingly gaining recognition (Germany, Netherlands, PECL, DCFR and to a limited extent France, Spain, Italy, Austria and England). Each party thus has against the other party a claim for the value of his performance if the other party cannot, for whatever reason, give back what he received or give it back in the same condition in which he has received it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 6. Assessing the value ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one opts for the compensatory model, the principles for assessing the value of the performance—which has been received and which cannot be returned or which cannot be returned in the condition in which it was received—are of great importance: one may assess the value of the performance subjectively and argue that the subjective value of the performance received is the objective value of the counter-performance. After all, that was what the receiver was willing to pay for it in the first place. If the objective value is decisive, then it would be possible for one of the parties to escape from a bad bargain. In some legal systems the possibility of escaping from a bad bargain is regarded as problematic if the contract is unwound after termination for non-performance because termination does not avoid the contract &#039;&#039;ex tunc&#039;&#039; (England, Germany, DCFR). Yet, the different effects of avoidance and termination are of no relevance for the unwinding of contracts. Furthermore, it is not doubted that a party can escape a bad bargain if he is able to restore in kind: if a party buys an object for a price that exceeds its objective value, he can after termination give back the object and will receive back the full price. Finally, assessing the value of the performance received subjectively with reference to the objective value of the counter-performance causes problems in cases in which the parties have swapped two objects and both objects cannot be returned &#039;&#039;in natura&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one assesses the performance objectively, then it still has to be decided which point in time is decisive. That is important if market values have changed. The relevant date may be the date of the formation of contract (France), of its performance (Netherlands), of the destruction of what has been received (Spain), when one party raises an action to enforce his claim to have the contract unwound, or when the compensation is paid. It seems to be preferable to opt for the date of performance as it is the purpose of unwinding contracts to restore both parties to their &#039;&#039;status quo&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;ante&#039;&#039; and, additionally, the party who has control over what has been received should also bear the risk. After all, it is not in the control of the recipient whether the market value of the received performance changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the question of whether the recipient may subjectively devalue what he received is answered differently in Europe. This question arises especially in cases in which a service has been received and the contract is avoided or terminated after partial performance has been rendered to him: may the recipient aver that this part performance is of no value to him?&lt;br /&gt;
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== 7. Benefits; expenses for maintenance or improvements ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The question as to whether benefits derived from the received performance, such as fruits, also have to be given up, receives different answers in Europe. According to some legal systems only benefits which have actually been enjoyed have to be given up. Other legal systems grant to the other party a claim even for those benefits which the recipient has failed to derive if he ought to have derived them according to good business practice. In some legal systems benefits never have to be given up by a party that acted in good faith. In other legal systems the benefits derived from the use of an object do not have to be restored, but the depreciation of value caused to the object received through its use has to be compensated. Many legal systems adopt different solutions concerning the different regimes for the unwinding of contracts. That again may cause discrepancies which are not explicable on the ground of policy considerations.&lt;br /&gt;
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It seems to be settled that each party can claim reimbursement concerning expenses for the maintenance or improvement of the object received if these expenses resulted in an enrichment of the other party. Necessary expenses which the other party would have had to incur will enrich him as saved expenses. However, if the unwinding of the contract is based on unjustified enrichment then, &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039;, each party may claim that he changed his position no matter whether the expenses were necessary or resulted in an enrichment.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 8. Place of performance; three-party cases; long-term contracts; conflict of laws ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Especially with international contracts it is crucial to identify the place where the respective obligations have to be fulfilled. The answer to this question will decide who has to bear the risk of, and the costs resulting from, the transportation of the goods. Despite its importance, the comparative literature is silent on this matter. Only some European directives give answers, albeit different ones, to the question of who has to bear the costs resulting from transport (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;97/7, 99/44).&lt;br /&gt;
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The problematic case of unwinding three-party relationships is only mentioned in some European directives concerning [[Consumer Credit (Regulatory Principles)|consumer credit]] agreements. But these directives only determine that when a consumer exercises his right to withdraw from a contract for the supply of goods and services, the credit agreement is also to be cancelled if the credit was rendered to finance these goods or services (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;94/47, 97/7). They are silent on the question as to how to unwind the two contracts.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is well settled in Europe that long-term contracts will not be unwound in respect of performances rendered in the past. However, the European legal systems differ as to how they arrive at this result. The English position is particularly complex and can only be understood against the background of its law of [[Unjustified Enrichment|unjustified enrichment]]. Furthermore, English lawyers stress that termination only has prospective effect. Thus, it follows that the contract cannot be unwound retrospectively. Only if there is a total failure of consideration may the contract be unwound for the past. In long-term contracts there will generally not be a total failure of consideration for the time before the breach occurred if both parties have already performed their respective obligations. The position is different with, for example, a contract of sale: the seller may reject the defective object and as a consequence there will be a total failure of consideration. From a comparative point of view this line of argument seems overly complex. Furthermore, the distinction between &#039;&#039;ex tunc&#039;&#039; avoidance and &#039;&#039;ex nunc&#039;&#039; termination is again of limited value as it is undoubted in Europe that even in the case of an &#039;&#039;ex tunc&#039;&#039; avoidance the contract will, in some cases, not be unwound for the past (Germany, England, Spain, Italy). The solution of German law which distinguishes between two kinds of termination seems to be more straightforward. &#039;&#039;Rücktritt&#039;&#039; operates prospectively to the extent that contractual [[Damages|damages]] may still be awarded and contractual limitation-, exclusion-, and arbitration-clauses are upheld. However, it operates retrospectively in that both parties have to give back what they have received under the contract. In contrast, &#039;&#039;Kündigung&#039;&#039; works in every respect only prospectively. The contract will not be unwound for the past. This model lays open the underlying policy considerations and does not hide them behind the unjust factor of total failure of consideration. Nonetheless, the PECL (but not the UNIDROIT PICC and the Draft Common Frame of Reference) follow the English model.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if a unified approach for the unwinding of contracts has, as yet, not generally been accepted, the applicable law is identical for all regimes (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;12 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;593/ 2008), Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;864/ 2007)).&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Rainer Hornung, &#039;&#039;Die Rückabwicklung gescheiterter Verträge nach französischem&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; deutschem und nach Einheitsrecht&#039;&#039; (1998); Peter Schlechtriem, &#039;&#039;Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich in Europa&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I&#039;&#039; (2000) 403&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; Markus Krebs, &#039;&#039;Die Rückabwicklung im UN-Kaufrecht&#039;&#039; (2000); Daniel Friedrich Berg, &#039;&#039;Die Rückabwicklung gescheiterter Verträge im spanischen und deutschen Recht&#039;&#039; (2002); Christoph Coen, &#039;&#039;Vertragsscheitern und Rückabwicklung&#039;&#039; (2003); Phillip Hellwege, &#039;&#039;Die Rückabwicklung gegenseitiger Verträge als einheitliches Problem&#039;&#039; (2004); Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Restitutio in integrum’ in &#039;&#039;Festschrift Ernst A Kramer&#039;&#039; (2004) 735; Phillip Hellwege, ‘In integrum restitutio and the requirement of counter-restitution in Roman law’ [2004] Juridical Review 165; Daniel Visser, &#039;&#039;Unjustified Enrichment&#039;&#039; (2008) 475&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Die Rückabwicklung nach Widerruf von Verbraucherverträgen’ [2010] Juristische Blätter 205.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Rückabwicklung_von_Verträgen]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unsolicited_Goods&amp;diff=1245</id>
		<title>Unsolicited Goods</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unsolicited_Goods&amp;diff=1245"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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by &#039;&#039;[[Thomas Rüfner]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Delivery of unsolicited goods and its consequences in European private law ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== a) Delivery of unsolicited goods before and after the formation of a contract ===&lt;br /&gt;
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If a person receives goods that he has not ordered, two basic questions arise: the first is whether and under what circumstances the recipient of the goods is obliged to pay for them even though he did not order them. Secondly, if there is no duty to pay, it must be asked whether there is at least a duty to handle the goods with care and to give them back to the supplier. The answers are largely dependent on the reasons that led to the delivery. The supplier may have delivered the goods in order to fulfil a contractual duty (eg to deliver some other goods). In that case, the delivery of goods different from those due under the contract is either the result of a mistake or a deliberate attempt to discharge the contractual obligation without (fully) complying with the contract’s terms. In both cases, the delivery of unsolicited goods is an attempt (though a flawed one) to perform an existing contractual agreement. In other cases the delivery of unsolicited goods constitutes an attempt to procure the conclusion of a contract: the supplier sends goods to a recipient in order to induce him to buy the goods and pay for them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern European legislation generally aims at preventing suppliers from using the delivery of unsolicited goods as a means to procure the conclusion of a contract. The various statutory provisions tend to make the supplier’s position as uncomfortable as possible. Consequently, this entry will focus on the fight against the delivery of unsolicited goods as a marketing tool (or, in the words of the European Distance Contracts Directive (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;97/7), a ‘promotional technique’). We will only deal with the delivery of unsolicited goods in the course of the performance of an existing contract as far as this phenomenon is within the scope of the various provisions primarily aimed at preventing the abusive marketing strategy just explained, particularly the rules enacted by Member States to implement Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9 of the Distance Contracts Directive. The delivery of goods not conforming to the recipient’s order is a problem to be treated more extensively within the context of the seller’s liability for defects in goods delivered under a contract of [[Sale|sale]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) Early history ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Delivery of unsolicited goods as a marketing tool was discussed among the learned jurists on the European continent as far back as the early 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. In Germany the opinion seems to have prevailed among legal scholars for some time that the recipient of unsolicited goods was bound to pay for them if he failed to send them back. At around the same time, some German states enacted statutes designed to put an end to the practice of marketing lottery tickets by sending them to unwitting customers who had never ordered them. According to these statutes, when the recipient had been completely passive there would be no valid contract.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, the tendency among German lawyers and legal scholars to find a binding contract in cases where one party had failed to react in any way to the delivery of unsolicited goods encouraged the use of this marketing technique. The opinion of the jurists was based on the maxim ‘&#039;&#039;qui tacet consentire videtur&#039;&#039;’, derived from canon law. It was only from the middle of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century onwards that a stricter approach prevailed. At this point, it was accepted by legal scholars that a contract would only be concluded ([[Contract (Formation)|contract (formation)]]) when the recipient started to use the goods, processed them, or made his intention to keep the goods known to the outside world (though not necessarily to the supplier) in any other way. The German courts also arrived at the conclusion that passive behaviour on the part of the recipient was an insufficient basis for the conclusion of a contract. However, if the supplier and the recipient were professional merchants, the courts were still ready to accept that a contract had been formed (see eg &#039;&#039;Oberappellationsgericht Dresden&#039;&#039; 18&amp;amp;nbsp;October 1859, &#039;&#039;Seuffert’s Archiv&#039;&#039; 13, 509&amp;amp;nbsp;f.). The French courts stated on several occasions in the 1870s that the recipient of unsolicited goods did not enter into a binding contract by silently accepting the goods. The maxim ‘qui tacet consentire videtur’ lost ground in Europe, and the contracting parties’ right to self-determination became more important ([[Freedom of Contract|freedom of contract]]). The English courts reached similar conclusions in the second half of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. In &#039;&#039;Felthouse v Bindley&#039;&#039; [1862] EWHC CP J35, 142 English Reports 1037, the Court of Common Pleas held that silence does not constitute a valid acceptance of an offer. Although the decision was not based on a case of delivery of unsolicited goods, it nonetheless brought English law in line with the trends prevailing on the Continent.&lt;br /&gt;
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With these court decisions, the rule that no contract of sale would be concluded in cases in which the recipient of unsolicited goods remained passive became prevalent throughout Europe. The question of what—if any—duties of care vis-à-vis the goods were incumbent on the recipient remained open. It was still possible to assume that a contract would be concluded as soon as the recipient started using the goods or that the recipient would be liable for [[Damages|damages]] in the case of destruction of the goods.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) Further development since the middle of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In the late 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, the English courts, unlike those in Germany and France, were not called upon to decide cases involving the delivery of unsolicited goods. In the second half of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, however, the practice of sending unsolicited goods seems to have become particularly widespread in England. In 1971 the English parliament, following the model of legislation in several states of the United States, enacted a statute to suppress this practice, which was now termed ‘inertia selling’. Some European countries followed suit in the following decades. In 1997, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9 of the Distance Contracts Directive made it obligatory for all Member States to prohibit the delivery to a consumer of unsolicited goods combined with a demand for payment. Article 9 also required Member States to ensure that the consumer was not required to give any consideration in exchange for the unsolicited goods and that his silence could not be regarded as an acceptance of the offer implicit in the delivery. The directive forced all countries which had not previously taken particular legislative measures against inertia selling to do so. It also induced changes in existing legislation, including in England. Directive&amp;amp;nbsp;2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and the national laws enacted to implement this directive constitute the latest step in the continuing fight against inertia selling.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Trends of legal development ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The statutes against inertia selling, which now exist everywhere in Europe, are unanimous in stating that the recipient’s silence must never be construed as an acceptance of the supplier’s offer. In addition to this basic rule, the statutes exclude any contractual or statutory duties on the part of the recipient to keep the goods, handle them with care, or restore them to the supplier. In their strict denial of any rights to the supplier, the recent statutes thus go beyond what was achieved by the repudiation of the rule ‘qui tacet consentire videtur’ at the end of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century and—in some cases—beyond what is required by the Distance Contracts Directive.&lt;br /&gt;
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The delivery of unsolicited goods is universally regarded as a practice that is contrary to fair competition. Provisions to that effect supplement the regulations concerning the relationship between the supplier and the recipient. The consequences in competition law vary between the different legal systems. They include injunctions at the motion of competitors or consumer associations, administrative measures against the offending business entity, and the imposition of criminal penalties on those personally responsible ([[Unfair Competition (Consequences)|unfair competition (consequences)]]). Some countries have even enacted special criminal statutes which make it an offence to deliver unsolicited goods in order to procure the conclusion of a contract.&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws specifically designed to fight the use of the delivery of unsolicited goods as a marketing tool are only applicable between a consumer and a professional acting in the course of his trade, business or profession ([[Consumers and Consumer Protection Law|consumers and consumer protection law]]). Thus, the rules are less severe when unsolicited goods are delivered by one consumer to another or by one professional to another. However, even where no special provisions of consumer protection law apply, the passivity of the recipient alone cannot lead to the formation of a binding contract. This follows from the universal rejection of the rule ‘qui tacet consentire videtur’ since the late 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. In line with this universal principle, sets of rules for international trade between professionals such as the CISG (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18(1)2) and the UNIDROIT PICC (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.6(2)2) state that mere silence or passivity of one party may not qualify as the acceptance of a contractual offer.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Details ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== a) No contract ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar to the provisions of the CISG ([[Sale of Goods, International (Uniform Law)|sale of goods, international (uniform law)]]) and the [[UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)]], the Distance Contracts Directive Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9(2) states that ‘absence of a response’ on the part of the recipient of unsolicited goods does not constitute an expression of consent. Many national rules go further and exclude any duty to pay for the goods received, even when the recipient uses the goods as his property, sells them to a third person, processes them, or simply destroys them. Until the end of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, the prevailing approach in most European legal systems had been to regard the contract as validly concluded in such cases and force the recipient to pay the price, even if the supplier of the goods was not aware of the recipient’s acts. The current rules use different strategies to ensure that no court and no legal scholar finds a valid contract in such cases. Austrian law, for example, explicitly states that the fact that the recipient starts using the goods received, or performs similar acts with respect to the goods, must not be construed as a valid acceptance. Switzerland seeks to cut off the potential formation of a contract even earlier: under Swiss law, the delivery of unsolicited goods may not be construed as a valid offer. Germany has no clear statutory rule and therefore the issue as to which acts of the recipient may still lead to the conclusion of a contract is subject to discussion among legal writers. The prevailing opinion, however, takes the view that no contract is formed just because the recipient starts using the goods or because of similar acts.&lt;br /&gt;
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The provision of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401(1)(a) DCFR is in line with a general tendency to deny the existence of a contract even in cases in which the recipient did not remain entirely passive. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401(1)(a) DCFR, no ‘action or inaction by a consumer’, in relation to unsolicited goods delivered to the consumer, can bring about a valid contract. However, the rule in the DCFR is probably not meant to exclude the possibility that under particular circumstances a contract might arise. If the recipient actually pays for the unsolicited goods, this will constitute an implied acceptance of the supplier’s offer notwithstanding the existing statutory provisions against inertia selling in most systems. The same is true when the recipient explicitly declares his intention to conclude a contract with the supplier. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401(1)(a) DCFR should not be construed so as to exclude the recognition of a contract in such cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) Exclusion of extra-contractual claims ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The provisions which make it impossible to construe the recipient’s passivity or even the fact that he starts using the goods as an acceptance giving rise to a valid contract of sale make it equally impossible to find a contract of deposit or a similar contractual relationship between the supplier and the recipient, under which a duty on the part of the recipient to handle the goods received with care might arise. Moreover, most legal systems also exclude claims in tort against the recipient as well as claims for [[Unjustified Enrichment|unjustified enrichment]] arising from the recipient’s handling of the goods.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, claims for the return of the goods themselves, whether based on the supplier’s right of ownership or on any other legal ground, are excluded in most European legal systems (either by explicit statutory provisions or according to the prevailing interpretation of the law). Again, the conceptual vehicles used in different systems to achieve the desired end (protection of the recipient against claims to return the goods to the supplier) vary. Some rules provide that there cannot be a claim for the return of the goods, others (like the English statute) require that the goods be regarded in law as a gift to the recipient, or state that the recipient may keep them without having to pay (this is the Dutch approach). If the statute limits itself to stating that no claims may be brought (as in German law), the question remains whether the recipient becomes the owner of the goods or whether (and how) he can acquire ownership. If the recipient cannot acquire ownership (and the supplier has no legal possibility of regaining control of the goods), there will be a permanent disjunction between possession and ownership. The supplier’s ownership would be a &#039;&#039;dominium sine re&#039;&#039;. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401(1)(b) DCFR excludes all extra-contractual claims but makes no statement regarding the consequences of this exclusion of remedies for the supplier’s right of ownership. Whatever the legal construction, the exclusion of all claims for the return of the goods amounts to a factual expropriation of the supplier and is therefore not uncontroversial. The harsh criticism of the implementation of the Distance Contracts Directive in Germany was to a considerable extent caused by this de facto expropriation of the supplier.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) Error ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The Distance Contracts Directive does not contain a provision dealing with cases of error: most national implementations provide that extra-contractual claims for the return of goods or for monetary compensation are not excluded if the unsolicited goods were delivered because of an error on the part of the supplier. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401(2)(b) DCFR also provides for an exception in such cases. Such exceptions from the strict rules designed to burden the supplier are warranted if the supplier erroneously assumes that the recipient had ordered the goods, or if goods that have actually been ordered are delivered to the wrong person. Depending on the way the exception is framed, provisions of this type may also be applicable when a buyer who actually ordered goods receives deficient goods or goods of a different description than those ordered. If the exceptions cover such cases, they delimit the respective areas of application of the regime governing the delivery of unsolicited goods and the rules regarding the seller’s responsibility for defects of the delivered goods ([[Sale|sale]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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=== d) Further sanctions ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Even before the European Union started its crusade against inertia selling, it was commonly accepted in all Member States that the delivery of unsolicited goods constituted a practice that is contrary to fair competition. Now Annex I of the Directive on unfair commercial practices compels all Member States to treat the delivery of unsolicited goods as an unfair commercial practice. While national legislatures are free to introduce further sanctions, the directive forces them to provide at least a possibility for competitors to obtain injunctive relief against a person or corporation who uses inertia selling as a marketing tool.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England and France, the delivery of unsolicited goods constitutes an infraction for which a fine can be imposed. In Germany, inertia selling is not defined as a criminal or regulatory offence. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== e) Unsolicited services ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Traditionally, the interest of lawyers and lawmakers regarding inertia selling was focused on the delivery of unsolicited goods. The provision on unsolicited services featured less prominently in legislation and legal literature. However, it was specifically addressed by the English statute from 1971. Article 9 of the Distance Contracts Directive subjects the provision of unsolicited services to the same regime as the delivery of unsolicited goods. Accordingly, Member States have introduced national rules against inertia selling applicable to the unsolicited provision of services as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Inertia selling in international codes and restatements of the law ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The most important provisions regarding inertia selling in international codifications have already been mentioned: Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18(1)2 CISG and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.6.1 (2)2 PICC contain a refutation of the old rule ‘qui tacet consentire videtur’.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Article&amp;amp;nbsp;2:202(2) PECL contains a similar statement. Article 16(3) of the draft produced by the &#039;&#039;Académie des Privatistes Européens &#039;&#039;([[Code Européen des Contrats (Avant-Projet)|&#039;&#039;Code européen des contrats (Avant-Projet)&#039;&#039;]]) treats the question in which cases silence may be construed as the acceptance of a contractual offer in great detail. Generally, silence does not constitute a binding acceptance, according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;16(3) lit.&amp;amp;nbsp;a) and b), however, previous dealings of the party or common usage may lead to another result. Silence may also be construed as the acceptance of an offer if the proposed contract creates duties only for the offeror. There is no special provision for the delivery of unsolicited goods.&lt;br /&gt;
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The provisions mentioned so far only reflect the legal situation that had already been achieved by the end of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century when agreement had been reached in most European countries that ‘qui tacet consentire videtur’&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;was not a suitable basis for dealing with the phenomenon of inertia selling. Only Art&amp;amp;nbsp;II.-3:401 DCFR reflects the development which has taken place since the 1970s and the changes introduced by the Distance Contracts Directive and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Roger Nerson, ‘Le Silence (Étude du Droit français)’ in &#039;&#039;Eranion Maridakis&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;II &#039;&#039;(1963) 399; Rudolf B Schlesinger (ed), &#039;&#039;Formation of Contracts&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;II&#039;&#039; (1968)&amp;amp;nbsp;1071&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; Christoph Krampe,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;‘Qui tacet, consentire videtur’ in &#039;&#039;Festschrift Paul Mikat&#039;&#039; (1989) 367; Parviz Owsia, ‘Silence: Efficacy in Contract Formation. A Comparative Review of French and English Law’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 784; Arthur T von Mehren, ‘The Formation of Contracts’ in IECL VII/1 (1991) ch&amp;amp;nbsp;9; Werner Flume, ‘Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung’ (2000) ZIP 1427;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Kerstin Geist, &#039;&#039;Die Rechtslage bei Zusendung unbestellter Waren nach Umsetzung der Fernabsatzrichtlinie&#039;&#039; (2002); Adrian Müller-Helle, &#039;&#039;Die Zusendung unbestellter Ware&#039;&#039; (2005); Franz Dorn, ‘§&amp;amp;nbsp;241a. Unbestellte Leistungen’ in Mathias Schmoeckel, Joachim Rückert and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), &#039;&#039;Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;II&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;1&#039;&#039; (2007); Daniel Walter, &#039;&#039;Die rechtliche Behandlung der Erbringung unbestellter Leistungen nach §&amp;amp;nbsp;241a BGB&#039;&#039; (2010).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unbestellte_Waren]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unjustified_Enrichment&amp;diff=1243</id>
		<title>Unjustified Enrichment</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unjustified_Enrichment&amp;diff=1243"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Sonja Meier]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Basic principles ==&lt;br /&gt;
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‘It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another.’ This statement, attributed to the Roman jurist Pomponius (D. 12,6,14 and D. 50,17,206), is universally acknowledged throughout Europe. Indeed, every jurisdiction has legal remedies for correcting receipts of benefits not approved of by the law. Nonetheless, so far there has been no consensus as to the meaning of Pomponius’ statement. Is it a mere maxim of equity, or is it a substantial (and therefore directly applicable) rule of law? There has always been the fear of boundless sway of natural justice. But, on the other hand, there have always been endeavours to systematize the existing claims for the surrender of benefits received, and to coordinate their requirements and characteristics. Nowadays, Pomponius’ expression is recognized as either a legal rule or at least as a legal principle that underlies the existing claims for restitution of benefits and can also be used to justify newly created claims for restitution.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. &#039;&#039;Ius commune&#039;&#039; foundations ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The European &#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039; did not have a general unjustified enrichment action. There were, however, specific actions directed at the surrender of a benefit the defendant had obtained in some way, at the expense of the claimant, which were associated with Pomponius’ unjust enrichment principle by the &#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039; scholars.&lt;br /&gt;
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Undue or failed transfers could be reclaimed by way of the &#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039; or other &#039;&#039;condictiones&#039;&#039; ([[Restitution in Case of Undue Transfer|restitution in case of undue transfer]]). However, some &#039;&#039;condictiones&#039;&#039;, eg the &#039;&#039;condictio sine causa&#039;&#039; or the &#039;&#039;condictio ex iniusta causa&#039;&#039;, also covered cases in which the defendant had received the claimant’s property not by transfer, but in some other way, such as an act of God or of a third party, and where there was no legal basis for retaining the benefit received. The &#039;&#039;condictio furtiva&#039;&#039; could be brought against thieves and their heirs and was directed at restitution of stolen objects or their value.&lt;br /&gt;
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In other circumstances, the &#039;&#039;actio negotiorum gestorum &#039;&#039;was applied by analogy: if, in a case of an unauthorized [[Management of Another’s Affairs without a Mandate (Negotiorum Gestio)|management of another’s affairs (&#039;&#039;negotiorum gestio&#039;&#039;)]], the manager’s claim for reimbursement of his expenses failed because he had managed the principal’s affair for his own benefit, he could at least bring a claim against the principal insofar as the latter was enriched by the manager’s actions. This claim could be used to help those who had made improvements, whether in good or bad faith, to another’s property. Conversely, where A had, in good faith, disposed of B’s property in favour of C, the principal’s claim against the manager for handing over everything received in course of the management could be used, by way of analogy, to grant B a claim against A for the surrender of the price received from C.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, there was the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039;. Initially, it was applied in cases where persons in power (slaves, sons and daughters) contracted with third parties. As [[Representation|representation]] was not recognized in Roman law, the third party had no contractual claim against the principal (owner/ father). But if and insofar as the third party’s contractual performance had enhanced the principal’s patrimony, the principal could be forced to give up the benefits by the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039;. Later, the action was extended to cases where a free person contracted on behalf of another: if A granted a loan to B, who was secretly acting for C, A could claim repayment from C to the extent that C had received the money from B. This &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso utilis&#039;&#039;, directed towards the enrichment received, was extended to two-party cases in the 18th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, for instance where a contractual performance was made in favour of a minor and the contract was void for lack of the guardian’s consent. As the &#039;&#039;condictio&#039;&#039;, leading to strict liability, could not be brought against a minor ([[Restitution in Case of Undue Transfer|restitution in case of undue transfer]]), there remained the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso utilis&#039;&#039;, forcing the minor to give up his enrichment. The &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039; generally covered cases where the defendant’s patrimony had been enriched, whether directly or indirectly, by the claimant. Thus, it became the basis for a general action of unjustified enrichment in many legal sys tems.&lt;br /&gt;
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The late scholastics of 16th&amp;amp;nbsp;century Spain were the first who put all these scattered remedies together in order to form a general action of unjustified enrichment. Regarding non-contractual liability, they made a distinction between claims to compensate a loss on the one hand and claims for giving up an enrichment received on the other hand. This idea was taken up and refined by the school of [[Natural Law|natural law]].&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Unjustified enrichment in the European codifications ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The basis of a codified general claim concerning unjustified enrichment was often the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039;, as in the Prussian codification ([[Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (ALR)|&#039;&#039;Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten&#039;&#039;]]) and in the Austrian Civil Code ([[Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB)|&#039;&#039;Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039;]]). The French legislature, however, rejected its inclusion into the [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]], believing that the &#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039; and the analogous application of the &#039;&#039;negotiorum gestio&#039;&#039; claims were sufficient to redress unjustified enrichment. However, a general action in unjust enrichment, called &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039;, was introduced by the judiciary in the famous &#039;&#039;Boudier&#039;&#039; case of 1892 (Cass. req., 15.6.1892, D.P. 1892.1.596). Legal systems which follow the tradition of the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039; (apart from those mentioned above, also Spain, Italy and the Netherlands) still distinguish between the &#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;sine causa &#039;&#039;as a claim for restitution of undue transfers on the one hand, and a general claim of unjustified enrichment on the other. The latter usually requires the enrichment of the defendant, a corresponding impoverish-ment of the claimant, a causal link, and the lack of a legal basis. It is also usually subsidiary to any other possible claims. The general claim is, in principle, aimed at the surrender of the enrichment, although in the Netherlands it takes the shape of a claim for compensation and is merely limited by the defendant’s enrichment. There is no unanimity whether restitution in cases of undue transfers (the old &#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039;) is a wholly different remedy or (as it is increasingly seen) a special case of unjustified enrichment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The German solution is based on the rejection of the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039; by the pandectists and on Savigny’s teachings of the &#039;&#039;condictio sine causa generalis&#039;&#039; as a general action encompassing all cases in which a defendant has been unjustifiably enriched at the claimant’s expense. The German Civil Code ([[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039;]]) therefore contains a unitary claim of unjustified enrichment for cases where someone has received something without legal basis, either by the claimant’s performance or otherwise at his expense. A similar general claim of unjustified enrichment, including the &#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039;, can be found in Swiss, Portuguese and Greek law. In Germany, it has been the source of innumerable controversies: does the general claim of unjustified enrichment have to be restricted in order to be manageable and, if so, in what manner? Is it actually a unitary claim or a collection of different actions with different characteristics? Eventually, the ‘doctrine of separation’ (&#039;&#039;Trennungslehre&#039;&#039;) developed by Walter Wilburg and Ernst von Caemmerer became widely accepted. It distinguishes between cases of undue or failed transfers (&#039;&#039;Leistungskondiktion&#039;&#039;), infringement of the claimant’s rights by the defendant (&#039;&#039;Eingriffskondiktion&#039;&#039;), expenditure made on another’s property (&#039;&#039;Verwendungskondiktion&#039;&#039;) and payment of another’s debt (&#039;&#039;Rückgriffskondiktion&#039;&#039;). In every category, the requirements ‘at the expense of’ and ‘without legal basis’ have to be determined in a different manner.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Development in England ==&lt;br /&gt;
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For a long time, the principle of unjustified enrichment was viewed with suspicion in England, as there seemed to be the danger of a vague jurisprudence of natural justice and equity. Restitutionary claims based on failed transfers were labelled ‘quasi-contract’ in the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century and thus formed an appendix to the law of contract. Claims for the surrender of benefits gained by way of infringement of another’s property operated under the name ‘waiver of tort’. In addition, restitutionary claims were also part of the law of equity, eg claims for the surrender of gains made in breach of a fiduciary duty, or claims against third parties who had received trust property. It was not until the second half of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century that scholars, inspired by the American [[Restatements|restatements]] and the work of Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, began to collect the various different cases under the name ‘restitution’ or ‘unjust enrichment’ and to organize them systematically. In 1991, the House of Lords finally recognized the existence of a separate law of unjust enrichment (&#039;&#039;Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd&#039;&#039; [1991] 2 AC 548).&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding taxonomy, English scholars went their own way. According to the teachings of Peter Birks, a claim in restitution/unjust enrichment requires a so-called ‘unjust factor’, which is used to identify the receipt of a benefit at another’s expense as unjust. These unjust factors usually refer to the transferor’s will, which may have been vitiated (due to mistake, duress, compulsion, undue influence or minority) or qualified (where counter-performance or another event forming the basis of the transfer—as in fact known by the transferee—did not occur). Other unjust-factors refer to the transferee’s behaviour (free acceptance) or to particular policy reasons. Whether there is a legal basis for the enrichment is irrelevant. The fact that the claimant, by his performance, discharged an existing liability towards the defendant is, at most, the basis for a defence against a restitutionary claim. Because the purpose of the transfer is not taken into account, a claim in restitution for mistake is available regardless of whether the claimant intended to discharge an obligation that did not actually exist, made a gift for erroneous reasons, or improved another’s property in the mistaken belief of being the owner. Problems in identifying the correct unjust factor, in particular in cases involving payments on void contracts, caused Birks to abandon his teachings in 2003 and, following the continental tradition, to base claims of unjust enrichment on an ‘absence of basis’.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 5. Common structures and problems ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The majority of European legal systems have a claim of unjust(ified) enrichment which is composed of three elements: (1) the defendant must have received a benefit (2) at the expense of the claimant and (3) without justification, ie without a legal basis or in some other ‘unjust’ way. There is no unified approach to interpreting the criteria ‘at the expense of’ and ‘without justification’ in detail, in particular as to whether the claim of unjustified enrichment requires the claimant to have suffered a loss. Some legal systems also have further requirements, such as correspondence between the defendant’s gain and the loss suffered by the claimant, immediacy of the shift of wealth between claimant and defendant, or a general subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment claims. The law of unjustified enrichment is generally considered a counterpart to the law of [[Contract|contract]] and the [[Law of Torts/Delict, General and Lex Aquilia|law of torts/delict]]. However, the questions of its &#039;&#039;ratio&#039;&#039;, its scope of application and, in particular, whether there should be an independent law of unjustified enrichment at all have consistently provoked considerable controversy and discussion. Are claims for restitution in case of undue transfers, the surrender of profits arising from an infringement of other’s rights, claims for reimbursement of expenses by someone helping in an emergency, or the apportionment between solidary debtors ([[Solidary Obligations|solidary obligations]]) part of the law of unjustified enrichment, or are they separate institutions? Is the law of unjustified enrichment, more than other areas of law, characterized by equitable considerations? Does it constitute an independent branch of law, or does it exist merely to close gaps in other branches? Should, perhaps, the unity of the law of unjustified enrichment be abandoned and the individual claims integrated into the branches of law (contract, discharge of obligations, fiduciary obligations, law of wrongs, &#039;&#039;negotiorum gestio&#039;&#039;) that they relate to?&lt;br /&gt;
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== 6. Enrichment caused by an act of the claimant ==&lt;br /&gt;
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If the defendant’s enrichment is due to an act done by the claimant, the continental legal systems ask whether the claimant consciously benefited the defendant with respect to a particular purpose such as discharging a contractual or other obligation, ie whether he acted with regard to a specific legal basis between him and the defendant. If this is the case, and the legal basis is lacking, his remedy is [[Restitution in Case of Undue Transfer|restitution in case of undue transfer]] (&#039;&#039;condictio indebiti&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;sine causa&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Leistungskondiktion&#039;&#039;), a remedy to be found separate from, or within, the general law of unjustified enrichment.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the act by the claimant enriching the defendant can be made for reasons other than a legal basis towards the defendant. Improvements of another’s property and payment of another’s debt are cases where most legal systems, at least to a certain extent, grant claims of unjustified enrichment. Following the tradition of the &#039;&#039;ius commune&#039;&#039;, the continental laws have special rules for improvements by possessors which differ from the unjustified enrichment rules, thus causing problems of coordination ([[Improvement of Another’s Property|improvement of another’s property]]). In case of payment of another’s debts, recourse against the debtor may be based not only on unjustified enrichment but also on [[Management of Another’s Affairs without a Mandate (Negotiorum Gestio)|management of another’s affairs without a mandate (&#039;&#039;negotiorum gestio&#039;&#039;)]] or on [[Subrogation|subrogation]]. The fundamental question in both situations is whether a claim in unjustified enrichment should be available only in particular types of cases (eg where the claimant made expenditure on property he believed to be his) or should be granted freely, even in cases where the claimant benefited the defendant without any mistake or compulsion. The benefit may, furthermore, be of no value to the defendant, eg if the claimant built a house on land the defendant wanted to use for agriculture, or if the discharge of the debt was made shortly before the debt would have become statute-barred. English law takes a hostile view to uninvited intermeddling with another’s affairs. Any claim in unjust enrichment is therefore dependent on the existence of a specific reason, such as mistake or duress. The continental legal systems, on the other hand, often do not restrict the claims of unjustified enrichment but rather protect the defendant by using an extremely subjective test of enrichment when the benefit was forced upon him.&lt;br /&gt;
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In some cases the defendant’s gain is merely an indirect consequence of the claimant’s act, eg where he constructed a dam which also protects neighbouring properties. All legal systems tend to exclude claims of unjustified enrichment in these cases. To this end, some laws work with a requirement of an immediate shift of wealth, some with a restrictive interpretation of the criterion ‘at the expense of’, while yet others exclude claims of unjust enrichment where the claimant acted out of self-interest.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 7. Enrichment by infringement of another’s&amp;amp;nbsp;right ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Where someone obtains a benefit through unlawful use, disposal or consumption of another’s property, European laws usually give the holder of that property a claim against the infringer for the surrender of the benefit. However, this claim is not universally considered a claim in unjustified enrichment. In France and Italy, due to the subsidiary nature of unjustified enrichment, a claim of damages in delict has precedence, while in the Netherlands claims in unjustified enrichment often fail because they require a loss suffered by the claimant. Nonetheless, most laws do not allow a defence based on the assertion that the rights holder could not or would not have achieved the gain in question since the claimant having suffered loss or damage is either not a requirement of a claim of unjustified enrichment or is already seen to lie in the fact that his property was used without his consent. The claim is usually for the objective value of the benefit, ie the price the infringer would have had to pay if he had used the right lawfully. A claim directed at the profits achieved by the infringer will only be allowed in special cases, notably in cases of intentional infringement ([[Disgorgement of Profits|disgorgement of profits]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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The restitutionary claim can be explained in two different ways. Under English law, restitution is traditionally seen as a possible remedy, in addition to damages, in case of a wrong such as a tort or a breach of fiduciary duty. Restitution rests on the wrong as such. There is no consensus as to whether restitution for wrongs is part of the law of unjust enrichment at all or whether it rather belongs to the law of torts or the law of trusts. In opposition to that, there is the theory of attribution (&#039;&#039;Zuweisungsgehalt&#039;&#039;), to be found mainly in Germany. Here, the claim is not based on an unlawful act as such, but on the fact that a legal position has been infringed that is attributed (or: assigned) by the law to the claimant for his exclusive use and benefit. A claim in unjustified enrichment by the victim of an infringement will only fail if the gain is legally unattributable to him, for instance if it was achieved through the sale of degrading photographs of the victim, or if it is a reward paid by a third party to the defendant for causing bodily harm to the victim. In order to give the victim a claim for the profits in such circumstances, one often finds a combined solution, as in Dutch law and in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:104 [[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]], Art&amp;amp;nbsp;VI.-6:101(4) DCFR), which allows for gains made by an infringement to be surrendered both through the law of unjustified enrichment and through the law of delict.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 8. Indirect enrichment ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Indirect enrichment cases cause particular problems. A benefit may pass from the claimant to a third party and then to the defendant; or the claimant may perform an obligation towards a third party and, in so doing, benefit the defendant. At least where the third party is insolvent, there is the desire to give the claimant a direct claim against the defendant who, after all, is undoubtedly enriched. On the other hand, there is the need to protect the privity of commercial relations and the security of receipts: the defendant should only be exposed to claims by the person who was his contract partner and from whom he received the benefit. He should not be concerned with problems within the relationship between the claimant and the third party. &lt;br /&gt;
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A direct claim against the defendant is generally permitted where the claimant had a proprietary interest in the object received by the defendant (and a vindication or a proprietary remedy is no longer possible because the claimant has meanwhile lost his title or because the defendant disposed of the property). The claimant’s proprietary interest in the object received by the defendant, making a direct claim possible, can be particularly far-reaching under English law, which acknowledges not only property at law, but also property in equity. In cases of failed transactions, equitable title often remains with the transferor. Moreover, ownership in equity extends to money and to substitutes for the original property. However, all legal systems protect defendants from restitutionary claims when they have acquired the property in good faith and for value.&lt;br /&gt;
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Where a claimant had no proprietary title in respect of the object received by the defendant, any claim of unjustified enrichment is dependent on the extent to which a legal system allows the &#039;&#039;actio de in rem verso&#039;&#039; or, in English terms, ‘leapfrogging’. French law is particularly far-reaching as it allows even benefits transferred under a valid contract with the third party to be reclaimed from the defendant, as long as a legal basis is absent in the defendant’s relationship with the now-insolvent third party. Conversely, English law seems not to allow restitution of benefits transferred under a valid obligation towards a third party. German law is even more restrictive, refusing a direct claim against the defendant also in the case where the contract between the claimant and the third party is invalid, as long as the claimant intended to perform in favour of the third party. However, most laws allow an exception to the restrictions of restitution claims in indirect enrichment cases, where the defendant received the benefit gratuitously.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 9. Unification projects ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Book VII of the DCFR contains extensive model rules for the law of unjustified enrichment, which follow an approach independent of the existing European laws. The basic rule in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;VII.-2:101 is that enrichment is unjustified unless either the defendant had a right to it on the basis of a contract, other juridical act, a court order or a rule of law, or the claimant freely and without error consented to the enriching transaction. Leaving aside the unusual relation of rule and exception, this design is remarkably similar to the unjust factor theory of English law. In addition, there are special rules for disgorgement of profits in delict and against trustees (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;VI.-6:101(4), X.-7:203). Article&amp;amp;nbsp;10 of the Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;864/2007) contains a conflicts of law rule on obligations arising from unjust enrichment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Eltjo Schrage (ed), &#039;&#039;Unjust Enrichment—The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution&#039;&#039; (1995); Tony Weir (tr), Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, &#039;&#039;Introduction to Comparative Law&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 1998) 537&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; Peter Schlechtriem, &#039;&#039;Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich in Europa—Eine rechtsvergleichende Darstellung&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vols 1–2&#039;&#039; (2000 and 2001); Frank L Schäfer, &#039;&#039;Das Bereicherungsrecht in Europa—Einheits- und Trennungslehren im gemeinen&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; deutschen und englischen Recht&#039;&#039; (2001); David Johnston and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), &#039;&#039;Unjustified Enrichment—Key Issues in Comparative Perspective&#039;&#039; (2002); Jack Beatson and Eltjo Schrage (eds), &#039;&#039;Cases&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Materials and Texts on Unjustified Enrichment&#039;&#039; (2003); Reinhard Zimmermann (ed), &#039;&#039;Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen Bereicherungsrechts&#039;&#039; (2005); Sonja Meier, ‘No Basis: A Comparative View’ in Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (eds), &#039;&#039;Mapping the Law—Essays in Memory of Peter Birks&#039;&#039; (2006) 343; Ernst von Caemmerer and Peter Schlechtriem (eds), &#039;&#039;Restitution&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;Unjust Enrichment and Negotiorum Gestio&#039;&#039; in IECL X (2007); Daniel Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Comparative Perspective’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), &#039;&#039;The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law&#039;&#039; (2008), 969. &amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Bereicherungsrecht]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Union_Citizenship&amp;diff=1241</id>
		<title>Union Citizenship</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Union_Citizenship&amp;diff=1241"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Norbert Reich]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Interpreting economic freedoms as citizens’ rights ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Fundamental Freedoms (General Principles)|fundamental freedoms]] of the [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)]], in particular those with a personal content, have been broadly interpreted in the early case law of the ECJ as also applying to economically non-active citizens. This has happened via a broad understanding of the prohibition on [[Discrimination (General)|discrimination]] based on nationality according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18 TFEU/12 EC. A similar tendency can be seen in extending economic freedoms to include recipient rights (so-called ‘passive freedoms’) which can also be invoked by private persons. Thus the scope of application of EU law has been greatly widened and transformed into ‘citizens’ rights beyond the market’. Some examples from the ECJ case law demonstrate this tendency:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EU tourists’ right to non-discriminatory access of museums (Case C-45/93 – &#039;&#039;Commission v Spain&#039;&#039; [1994] ECR I-911); the prohibition of restrictive entry conditions or additional enrolment fees for EU students in institutions of higher education and professional training (Case 293/83 – &#039;&#039;Gravier&#039;&#039; [1985] ECR 593; Case 24/86 – &#039;&#039;Blaizot&#039;&#039; [1988] ECR 379), excluding, however, a right to equal treatment with regard to stipends and other support payments (Case 197/86 – &#039;&#039;Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland&#039;&#039; [1988] ECR 3205; Case 39/86 &#039;&#039;Lair v University of Hannover&#039;&#039; [1988] ECR3161); the prohibition of discrimination in victim compensation (Case 186/87 – &#039;&#039;Cowan&#039;&#039; [1989] ECR 195); the freedom to go to another Member State to obtain services (including health care) without restrictions in relation to payment (joined Cases 286/82 and&amp;amp;nbsp;26/83 – &#039;&#039;Louisi &amp;amp; Carbone&#039;&#039; [1984] ECR 377).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Directives 90/365, 90/364 and 93/96 codified these rights to some extent for retired persons, all other citizens and students, but they are primarily directed against the state or state institutions such as universities, social security bodies and municipalities. The directives do not have specific private law content.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain exception with regard to the state-directed content of non-discrimination rules can be seen in the provisions on names, which usually belong to private law and are coordinated between different jurisdictions by rules on [[Private International Law (PIL)|private international law (PIL)]]. The case of &#039;&#039;Konstandinis&#039;&#039; (ECJ Case C-168/91 [1993] ECR&amp;amp;nbsp;I-1191) concerned the spelling of the name of a Greek citizen who was doing business in Germany. The competent German authority required a Latin transcription which would have distorted the name as used in public. Whereas AG Francis Jacobs, in his opinion of 9&amp;amp;nbsp;December 1992 (para&amp;amp;nbsp;40), argued in favour of an EU citizen’s broad fundamental right to one’s own name ([[Law of Names|law of names]]), the Court somewhat fictitiously referred to the [[Freedom of Establishment|freedom of establishment]] and a self-employed person’s right to be free from rules on transcription which could result in a distortion of his name and confusion in contacts with potential clients. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. ‘Union citizenship’ as a fundamental right of economically inactive EU citizens ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain generalization and extension followed the Community &#039;&#039;acquis &#039;&#039;with regard to the establishment of a Union citizenship in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;8 EC (1992) in its Maastricht version. In its original version it read: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship’. Article 20 TFEU/17 EC in the Amsterdam version added para&amp;amp;nbsp;2 which reads: ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby’. Article 20 TFEU/17 EC as revised (OJ&amp;amp;nbsp;C 290 of 30&amp;amp;nbsp;November 2009) provides: ‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art&amp;amp;nbsp;21 TFEU/18 EC guarantees a right to free movement ‘subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect’. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;22 TFEU/19 EC concerns the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and EU elections, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;23 TFEU/20 EC the right to diplomatic protection, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;24 TFEU/21 EC the right to petition the European Parliament which is extended to all residents in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;227 TFEU/194 EC.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the citizen concept did not limit the Member State competence to determine nationality, the ‘fathers’ of the Maastricht Treaty and most legal authors did not realize its importance in implying a mutual recognition of multiple citizenship by all Member States (ECJ Case C-369/90 – &#039;&#039;Micheletti&#039;&#039; [1992] ECR I-4239; see however ECJ Case C-135/08 &#039;&#039;Rottmann&#039;&#039; (not yet reported) concerning limitations on a Member State’s right to withdraw citizenship in light of the principle of proportionality). It seemed obvious at this time that the citizenship concept only expressed a very obvious idea without imposing additional rights or duties. There was agreement that citizenship did not have any relevance in the sector of private law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Union law guarantees of Union citizenship ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only the ECJ case law after ‘Maastricht’ conferred the status of a fundamental right on Union citizenship. The &#039;&#039;Grzelczyk&#039;&#039; judgment of 20&amp;amp;nbsp;September 2001 (ECJ Case C-184/99 [2001] ECR I-6193) stated that: ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for’ (para&amp;amp;nbsp;31). This general prohibition of discrimination could be invoked by a French student who had received certain social benefits in Belgium (minimex) to finish his studies there, the benefits originally being limited to Belgian citizens. The Belgian state could therefore not require repayment as ‘unjustified enrichment’. The Court did not say anything regarding the effects of its judgment on private law relations, similar to later judgments which usually were concerned with litigation about residence rights, tax and social benefits. Its later &#039;&#039;Baumbast&#039;&#039; judgment (ECJ Case C-413/99 [2002] ECR I-7091, para&amp;amp;nbsp;84) held that the rules on citizenship enjoy direct effect, which shows their importance in the rhetoric of EU law as Union citizenship consequently enjoys the same status as the other free movement rights. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An indirect importance for private law can be shown in the area of name rights, similar to the situation before the introduction of the citizenship concept itself. The case &#039;&#039;García Avello&#039;&#039; (ECJ Case C-148/02 [2003] ECR I-11613) concerned a name change for a child with dual Belgian and Spanish citizenship. Belgian law required either the name of the father or the mother; unlike Spanish law it did not allow for using both names. The Court found a non-justified discrimination because children with dual nationality suffered a disadvantage which could not objectively be justified. As a result, persons with dual nationality have a right to choose between two jurisdictions concerning their name; thereby the respective aims of the otherwise non-harmonized national PIL rules on names are rendered obsolete.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A more recent case, &#039;&#039;Grunkin and Paul&#039;&#039; (ECJ Case C-353/06 [2008] ECR I-7639), concerns the conflict between the Danish PIL rules on names based on &#039;&#039;ius soli&#039;&#039; and the German ones based on &#039;&#039;ius sanguinis&#039;&#039;. The child of German parents was born in Denmark where he could use the names of both parents. This was rejected when he returned to live in Germany because German PIL requires German citizens to take either the name of the father or of the mother; double names for children should be avoided because of the resulting confusion of the public. Although both AG F Jacobs in the first reference proceeding (ECJ Case C-94/04 – &#039;&#039;Standesamt Niebüll&#039;&#039; [2006] ECR I-3561) and AG Sharpston in the final case, with reference to &#039;&#039;Konstantinidis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;García Avello&#039;&#039;, wanted to avoid a general conflict with German PIL rules, they argued for an opening of the strict German rules prohibiting double names of children. It is, in their opinion, not so much a problem of non-discrimination according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18 TFEU/12&amp;amp;nbsp;EC, but relates more to a ‘general principle of equal treatment’ and to free movement under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;21 TFEU/18&amp;amp;nbsp;EC ([[General Principles of Law|general principles of law]]). The ECJ followed this argument by saying: ‘None of the grounds put forward in support of the connecting factor of nationality for determination of a person’s surname, however legitimate those grounds may be in themselves, warrants having such importance attached to it as to justify, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, a refusal by the competent authorities of a Member State to recognise the surname of a child as already determined and registered in another Member State in which that child was born and has been resident since birth’ (para&amp;amp;nbsp;31).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It remains to be seen whether this broad definition of the free movement principle has importance beyond the specific cases on the PIL of Member States in general. The tendency of the ECJ seems to be to avoid strict rules on mandatory connecting factors in cross-border situations and to substitute them with a more flexible rule allowing a broader choice of the persons protected by EU law (for a more narrow reading see however case C-391/09 &#039;&#039;Malgozatza Runevic-Vardyn and others v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybes administracia&#039;&#039; (not yet reported) concerning the transcription of foreign names).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. ‘Horizontal direct effect’ of Union citizenship? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is a debated question whether Union citizenship takes ‘horizontal direct effect’ in private law relations, but this has not yet been expressly decided by the ECJ. The above-mentioned cases (which have not been analysed in their totality) only apply to the relations between the citizen and a Member State, either concerning restrictions on free movement, access to benefits, or restrictive public law rules on names as determined by PIL. As fundamental rights, they are applicable not only in favour of ‘foreign’ but also of ‘home’ EU nationals if they are in a situation covered by EU law like in the case &#039;&#039;Grunkin and Paul&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A horizontal direct effect in a situation similar to Union citizenship has been accepted by the ECJ in the case &#039;&#039;Phil Collins&#039;&#039; (ECJ Joined Cases C-92 and 326/92 [1993] ECR I-5145). It concerned a discrimination against art performers with regard to their protection in the marketing of copyrighted music. The ECJ directly applied the prohibition against discrimination of then Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7 EEC, which is now Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18 TFEU/12&amp;amp;nbsp;EC. It wrote: ‘The Court has consistently held that the right to equal treatment ... is conferred directly by Community law ... That right may, therefore, be relied upon before a national court as the basis for a request that it disapply the discriminatory provisions of a national law which denies to nationals of other member States the protection which they accord to nationals of the State concerned’ (para&amp;amp;nbsp;34).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is a disputed question in legal writing whether this ruling can be generalized or is only applicable for the exercise of intellectual property rights. This author proposes a ‘compromise’ solution. A horizontal direct effect can be seen as existing in similar situations as has already been recognized for the fundamental freedoms. This concept corresponds to the equal status of economic freedoms and citizens’ rights ([[European Internal Market|European internal market]]). The recent case law of the ECJ recognizes horizontal direct effect of the [[Fundamental Freedoms (General Principles)|fundamental freedoms]] when they originate from a ‘collective regulation’ where freedom of contact does not exist (ECJ Case C-438/05 –&#039;&#039; ITWF and others&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;v Viking Line&#039;&#039; [2007] ECR I-10779, paras&amp;amp;nbsp;56–66) or from employment relations (ECJ Case C-94/07 – &#039;&#039;Raccanelli v Max Planck-Gesellschaft&#039;&#039; [2008] ECR I-5939, para&amp;amp;nbsp;43). It is not yet clear whether this case law also applies to areas beyond an economic objective, for instance to by-laws of amateur sport organizations limiting access of EU-citizens in a discriminatory manner, provisions restricting the freedom of members of non-professional associations and unjustified social action with harmful consequences for third parties. Details of such a broad concept and its justifications under EU law still have to be determined. The main idea behind this extension of the effects of the citizenship concept to relations governed by private law is a functional&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;one: restrictions on free movement rights can originate not only from the state, but also from private associations if they act in a collective manner. This is also justified by the different rules of Member States in distinguishing between public and private law, a function which cannot be simply taken over by EU law; an autonomous link has to be found which relates to power structures imposed on EU citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to Union citizenship, this implies that collective restrictions or discrimination against Union citizens fall under the scope of application of the TFEU and have to be evaluated under Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;18, 20, 21&amp;amp;nbsp;TFEU/12, 17, 18&amp;amp;nbsp;EC; they must be justified in order to be compatible with EU law. The following are examples of non-justified discrimination: (i)&amp;amp;nbsp;as in&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;professional sports, unreasonable selection rules of associations concerning participation in sport matches by ‘semi professionals’ or amateurs (ECJ Joined Cases C-51/96 and 191/97 – &#039;&#039;Deliège and others v ASBL&#039;&#039; [2000] ECR I-2549); (ii)&amp;amp;nbsp;discriminatory entrance rules for private higher education institutions which have been accredited by public bodies;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;and (iii)&amp;amp;nbsp;clauses in [[Standard Contract Terms|standard contract terms]] putting EU nationals at a disadvantageous position, like higher tariffs for foreigners in insurance cover or higher costs for cross-border banking services as opposed to national transactions).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 5. No direct horizontal effect of Directive&amp;amp;nbsp;2004/38 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Directive 2004/38 of 20&amp;amp;nbsp;April 2004 on the free movement and residence of EU citizens consolidates and codifies the free movement rights of EU citizens and their family members, but from its wording it has only a ‘vertical direct effect’ against the state, not a horizontal direct effect against restrictions instituted by private law relations. The general prohibition on discrimination in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;24 of Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2004/38 has been shaped similarly to primary law and has a similar effect. There are however four possible cases for a horizontal direct effect: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i)&amp;amp;nbsp;The concept of ‘family member’ is defined in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2(2) and includes the marriage of a Union citizen with a third country national seeking asylum in a Member State, even if the latter did not have a residence right (ECJ Case C-127/08 – &#039;&#039;Blaise Baheteb Metock&#039;&#039; [2008] ECR I-6241). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(ii)&amp;amp;nbsp;The notion of ‘family member’ includes partnership relations under the dual condition that they are registered in the state of origin and put on an equal standing with a marriage in the state of residence. This is important with regard to the prohibition of discrimination with regard to sexual orientation, encompassed by Dir 2000/78 (see ECJ Case C-267/06 – &#039;&#039;Tadao Maruko&#039;&#039; [2008] ECR I-1757). Recital 31 refers to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;21 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights which does not require dual recognition of same sex partnerships.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(iii)&amp;amp;nbsp;Directive 2004/38 does not recognize a right of access to or a supply of goods and services available to the public by Union citizens who reside legally in another Member State. This is quite different from Art&amp;amp;nbsp;11(1)(f) of the Third Country National Residence Directive&amp;amp;nbsp;2003/109. Since it cannot be imputed that the EU legislature wanted to put Union citizens in a less favourable position than third country nationals, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;11 can be applied by analogy in favour of Union citizens as well. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(iv)&amp;amp;nbsp;Art&amp;amp;nbsp;35 transforms the prohibition of the abuse of rights, as known to private law, also into the sphere of residence rights, particularly in cases of marriages of convenience, thus following the case law of the ECJ (Case C-109/01 – &#039;&#039;Akrich&#039;&#039; ECR [2003] I-9607, para&amp;amp;nbsp;57). Recital 28 defines ‘marriage of convenience’ as ‘relationships contracted for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence’. It is an open question whether this broad power of Member States corresponds to the guarantee of marriage and family as fundamental rights under Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;7/9 of the Charter ([[Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (ChFR and ECHR)|human rights and fundamental rights (ChFR and ECHR)]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Torsten Körber, &#039;&#039;Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht&#039;&#039; (2004); Grainne de Búrca (ed),&#039;&#039; The EU and the Welfare State—In Search of Solidarity&#039;&#039; (2005);&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Nicola Rogers and Rick Scannell, &#039;&#039;Free Movement of Persons in an Enlarged Union&#039;&#039; (2005); Ferdinand Wollenschläger, &#039;&#039;Grundfreiheit ohne Markt&#039;&#039; (2006);&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Matthew J Elsmore and Peter Starup, ‘Union Citizenship’ (2007) 26 Yearbook of European Law 57; Francis Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the EU—A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 ELJ 591; Dagmar Schiek, Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell,&#039;&#039; Non-Discrimination Law&#039;&#039; (2007); Norbert Reich, ‘Free Movement v Social Rights in an Enlarged Union—the Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 125; Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Grundsatz der Nichtdiskriminierung im europäischen Privatrecht’ (2008) 16 ZEuP&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;230; Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects (2008) 45 CMLR 13; Juri Borgmann-Prebil, ‘The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship’ (2008) 14 ELJ 328; Norbert Reich, ‘The Interrelation between Rights and Duties? Reflections on the state of liability law in the multilevel governance system of the Union: Is there a need for a more coherent approach?’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European Law 112; Norbert Reich, ‘The Public/Private Divide in EC Law’ in Hans-W Micklitz and Fabrizio Cafaggi (eds), European Private Law After the Common Frame of Reference (2010).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unionsbürgerschaft]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unilateralism_(PIL)&amp;diff=1239</id>
		<title>Unilateralism (PIL)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unilateralism_(PIL)&amp;diff=1239"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Giesela Rühl]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Private International Law (PIL)|Private international law (PIL)]] deals with the question of which law applies in cases that have connections to more than one legal order. To answer this question, essentially two methods are available: the unilateral method dating back to the Middle Ages on the one hand, and the multilateral method established in the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century by Friedrich Carl von Savigny on the other. The methods are fundamentally different. Whilst unilateralism begins with the norm and determines whether it demands application to a particular legal relationship, multilateralism begins from the legal relationship and assigns it to a particular legal order with the help of choice of law rules. In Europe, the multilateral method has dominated since the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. The unilateral method is predominant in the United States. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Theoretical departure point ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The distinction between unilateralism and multilateralism finds its origin in the understanding of the nature and the function of private law: for unilateralism, private law—like public law—is an expression of state sovereignty. It effectuates state interests and fulfils social functions. Cases with ties to multiple legal orders are, from this perspective, conflicts between states and state interests. It follows almost inevitably that determination of the applicable law must start from the statutory provisions in question and refer to the values and functions of substantive law as well as the intentions of the legislature. The situation looks different from the perspective of the multilateral method: for multilateralism private law—unlike public law—is neutral and apolitical. It does not incorporate state interests and has no socially constitutive functions. Instead, it orders personal activities and freedoms and regulates interests of private parties. Cases with ties to multiple legal orders are, therefore, not a matter of conflicts between states and state interests but clashes between private intentions and individual spheres of freedom. The determination of the applicable law is thus a balancing of private interests and is undertaken with the help of general choice of law rules without consideration of legislative intent or the function of the respective substantive laws. And even though multilateralism determines the reach of domestic and foreign law, it does not at the same time impair the sovereignty of the relevant states. Since private law is free of state interests, deter- mination of the reach of foreign norms cannot injure state interests. Given the neutrality of private law, the relevant rules are fundamentally equal and exchangeable. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) Practical implications  ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The distinction between unilateralism and multilateralism has more than mere theoretical meaning. The founder of the multilateral method, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, assumed that multilateralism would regularly come to the same result as the unilateral method. But for the judges trusted with the determination of the applicable law, the differences are enormous. On the basis of unilateralism, the judge determines the applicable law in two steps: in the first step he must decide which law demands application by interpreting the relevant substantive norms. Since the determination of each law takes place separately, it might happen that the laws of various states claim applicability. In such a case the judge must establish which of these laws has priority. On the basis of multilateralism, the judge ascertains the applicable law largely in one step starting from the legal relationship. With the help of general, previously determined criteria, he assigns this legal relationship to a particular substantive law without asking whether this law demands application. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All things considered, unilateralism thus poses greater challenges and practical difficulties for the judge than multilateralism. This is because a court seized in a cross-border case must look into all potentially applicable laws and determine those laws’ interest in being applied. However, courts have neither the necessary (comparative law) education nor the necessary resources. Unilateralism, therefore, runs the risk of producing arbitrary and, for the parties, hardly foreseeable results. The multilateral method, in contrast, avoids these problems. It therefore contributes to legal certainty and can claim greater practicality. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Historical development ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) The medieval statutists’ method ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unilateralism in private international law finds its origin in the medieval statutists’ method. It was developed in the 12th&amp;amp;nbsp;century by Upper Italian courts and scholars to determine the applicable law in disputes between citizens of various northern Italian states. On the basis of the [[Corpus Juris Civilis|&#039;&#039;Corpus Juris Civilis&#039;&#039;]] and the &#039;&#039;lex cunctos populos&#039;&#039; set out therein, it was assumed that the spatial reach of local norms, the so-called statutes, was limited. The jurists tried to determine the reach of local norms by creating different categories of norms. To begin with, they distinguished between norms pertaining to the person (&#039;&#039;statuta personalia&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;and norms pertaining to the territory (&#039;&#039;statuta realia&#039;&#039;). Provisions pertaining to the person were to be applied to the citizens of a state, even independent of their location. Provisions concerning the territory were applicable to persons who remained for six months within the relevant city walls. Later, mixed provisions (&#039;&#039;statuta mixta&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;were added, which could not be unequivocally categorized. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The statutists’ method dominated European private international law—with differences in detail—up until the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. Nevertheless, it did not manage to create generally accepted criteria for categorizing local norms. The Upper Italian courts and scholars—just like their French and Dutch successors—took account of the wording of the respective local laws. In part, the categorization was even made on the basis of the first word. Later, the attempt was to honour the actual or supposed intention of the legislature. But, even here, no agreement about the process in individual cases could be achieved. The criteria for the determination of the jurisdictional reach of local laws, therefore, differed from province to province and from town to town. Although private international law was seen as universally valid, there were no universally valid solutions. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) The classical theory of private international&amp;amp;nbsp;law ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The multilateral method can be traced back to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the founder of the classical theory of private international law. Its basis is to be found in his conviction—corresponding to the spirit of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century—that private law is not a subset of state law and an expression of state power, but a product of civil society. For Savigny, the delineation of various legal orders could, therefore, not start from the substantive law in question. Instead, the analysis had to begin with the legal relationship. After all, if private law is neither part of the state order nor an expression of state power, but rather an expression of the people and of individual will, conflicts between legal orders do not appear as conflicts between sovereign states, but as conflicts between areas of individual will or spheres of freedom. And if law is an expression of the people and of individual will, legal relationships must fit spatially into a particular legal area. They must have—in Savigny’s words—a ‘natural home’ (&#039;&#039;natürliche Heimat&#039;&#039;), a ‘seat’ (&#039;&#039;Sitz&#039;&#039;). For Savigny, the task of private international law was, therefore, to allocate each legal relationship to the legal order where it has its rightful place or ‘seat’. And since he considered private law as a product of civil society, free of state interests and legislative purposes, he aimed at locating legal relationships in the spatially optimal jurisdiction with the help of general criteria but without regard to the content, function and values of substantive law. &lt;br /&gt;
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The multilateral method presides over the conflicts law in the European legal order up until today. It also applies in the [[European Community]]’s recently created choice of law rules. In a slightly altered linguistic form, they state that conflicts between various legal orders are to be solved through application of the law ‘with the closest connection’ to the case. Thus, unlike the United States, where the classical theory of private international law could not, at least not for long, endure and where it only glimmers through in the ‘most significant relationship’ of §&amp;amp;nbsp;6 Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws ([[Restatements|restatements]]), multilateralism has held its ground in Europe. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) The political school of private international&amp;amp;nbsp;law ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whilst the multilateralism of the Savigny brand continues to dominate in Europe, unilateralism enjoys considerable popularity on the other side of the Atlantic. In particular, it formed the basis for the so-called political school of [[Private International Law (PIL)|private international law]], which was founded in the course of the American Conflict of Laws Revolution by Brainerd Currie in the middle of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century. With respect to its structure and orientation, the understanding of private law is, as with Savigny, of decisive significance. Unlike the classical theory, the political school does not see private law as a neutral and apolitical legal zone, free of state interests and social functions. Under the influence of American legal realism, it rather emphasizes its socially formative and purposive character, which assists states in realizing their interests and intentions. For private international law doctrine, this understanding of private law—different from the understanding underlying classical theory—means that conflicts between various legal orders are conceived of as conflicts between various states and their interests. The central problem that private international law must solve is therefore not the discovery of the legal order in which the relevant dispute has its seat. Rather, the concern is the discovery of the legal order with the largest interest in the application of its substantive norms. The determination of the applicable law is therefore—as with the medieval statutists’ theory—dependent on an assessment of the intention of the relevant substantive norms. However, unlike the statutists’ theory, which classified the relevant provisions of substantive law according to their demand to be applied, the political school foresees a judicial investigation and balancing of the affected state interests. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The political school of private international law influences US conflicts law up until today. Next to Brainerd Currie, leading proponents include David Cavers, Robert Leflar, Albert Ehrenzweig, Arthur von Mehren, Donald Trautmann and Russell Weintraub. In Europe, in contrast,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;the political school has not achieved widespread acceptance. As shown by a glance at the Member States’ private international laws and the provisions issued by the European Union in private international law, the classical theory is dominant. Nevertheless, the political school has left its traces, as it led to a politicization and instrumentalization of multilateral choice of law rules. This is obvious in provisions such as Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;5 and 6 Rome Convention as well as Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6 and 8 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I ([[Consumer Contracts (PIL)|consumer contracts (PIL)]]; [[Employment Contracts, Individual (PIL)|employment contracts, individual (PIL)]]). These provisions elevate political intentions as well as values and functions of substantive law to the level of private international law and, thus, contribute to their enforcement with the help of multilateral choice of law rules.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Modern trends ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that multilateralism prevails in Europe—both at the level of the individual Member States and at the level of the European Union—up until today, does not mean that unilateralism has made no impact here. On the contrary, the penetrating state regulation undertaken in the course of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century has increased the number of overriding mandatory provisions and the number of legal areas in which the determination of the applicable law is not dependent on the seat of the legal relationship but on a reading of the legislative intent behind the relevant laws. Since globalization and Europeanization have intensified this trend, the unilateral islands in the sea of multilateral international private law have grown in the last years. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== a) Overriding mandatory provisions ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Unilateral elements manifest themselves in European conflicts law primarily in the form of overriding mandatory provisions (&#039;&#039;Eingriffsnormen&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; loi d’application immédiate&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; legge di applicazione necessaria&#039;&#039;). Friedrich Carl von Savigny&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;had already identified them, ‘as laws of strictly positive, compulsory nature’, and they are recognized by the private international laws of the Member States and the European Union—as is shown by Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I (Reg 593/2008) and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;16 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II (Reg 864/2007). They stand out in that they determine their own sphere of application and do so independent of the applicable law that is otherwise established with the help of general choice of law rules.&lt;br /&gt;
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Exactly when a norm can be categorized as an overriding mandatory norm and thereby, in the manner of unilateralism, determine its own scope of application is a question which eludes a conclusive and generally applicable answer. Basically, overriding mandatory norms can be recognized in that they try to express a public interest in the broadest sense, and, other than norms of classical private law, they do not serve merely to reconcile private interests. Often they are of an economic and socio-political nature and are aimed at regulation of individual areas of social life. In consonance with this broad description, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9(1) Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I Regulation defines overriding mandatory provisions as ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable’. Classic examples are currency mandates and import and export embargoes.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) International economic law ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In the context of the essentially multilateral European private international law, overriding mandatory norms constitute ‘classic’ gateways for unilateralism. Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view they represent exceptions that prove the rule, namely the validity and supremacy of multilateralism. However, this is not the case in international economic law. Here, unilateralism was largely established in the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century and, thus, has displaced the multilateral method. The backdrop to this development was, on the one hand, a changing understanding of the state and its role, and, on the other, insights into the limits of the market. Whereas the liberalism of the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, during which the multilateral method of the Savigny school flourished, assumed the unlimited capacity of the market, the events at the beginning of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century brought an awareness of the dangers of an unregulated market. The resulting insight into the necessity of a framework ordering economic activity led to state intervention not only to protect the economy as an institution, but also to protect the individual from the workings of the economy. Since these regulatory interventions were politically motivated and therefore robbed private law of its neutrality, the multilateral method lost currency. The unilateral method, therefore, gained significance in the entirety of international economic law and is today supreme in determining the application of the relevant norms. It is particularly widespread in the area of competition law ([[Competition Law (International)|competition law (international)]]). However, large parts of labour law, social law and transport law are also influenced. In contrast to overriding mandatory norms, which—at least theoretically—represent only isolated incidences of unilateral influence, international economic law is widely seen as the territory of unilateralism.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) Secondary Union law ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The unilateralist trend, which is apparent in international economic law, is being seamlessly extended into other areas. Unnoticed by many, unilateralism has infiltrated the secondary private law of the EU. A recent study by Stéphanie Francq into [[Regulation|regulations]] and [[Directive|directives]] in the areas of competition, transport, consumer, labour and trade representative law shows that the pertaining provisions—expressly or implicitly—define their own spatial reach. In the area of transport law, the Regulation on the air carrier liability in the event of accidents (Reg 2027/1997, altered by Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;889/2002), for example, mandates that it applies to all companies that are in possession of a licence to operate from a Member State. And in consumer contract law, the Package Holiday Directive (Dir 314/1990) determines that it applies to all package holidays sold within the [[European Union]]. &lt;br /&gt;
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From the viewpoint of conflicts methodology, secondary Union law thus regularly adopts a unilateral approach even in areas not categorized as international economic law. Against this backdrop, a cursory glance at the activity of the European legislature reveals a methodological dualism: while multilateralism prevails in areas that directly deal with the application of laws, unilateralism holds sway in areas that are directly concerned with substantive matters. In this context two points are noticeable: first, unilateralism in secondary Union law is one-dimensional as it only considers and enforces the prescriptions of secondary Union law—and not the prescriptions of national laws. Secondly, unilateralism in secondary Union law is not in accord with the multilateralism of conflicts law regulations. Therefore, the relationship between the unilateralism of Union private law and the multilateralism of Union conflicts law is unclear. Is the current trend towards multilateralism in Union conflicts law inconsistent? Must the role of multilateral choice of law rules in Europe be reconsidered? Which norms take precedence where there is ambiguity? Are the provisions of secondary Union law to be understood as ‘conflicts rules’ of Union law which, according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;23 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I Regulation and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;27 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation, take priority over the choice of law rules fashioned in the Savigny mould? Answers to these and other questions must be found in the coming years. It is, however, clear that the dichotomy between multilateralism and unilateralism has not become irrelevant. Consequently, it will continue to colour the future discussion on methodology in private international law. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Brainerd Currie, &#039;&#039;Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws&#039;&#039; (1963); Christian Joerges, &#039;&#039;Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts&#039;&#039; (1971); Henri Battifol, ‘Le pluralisme des méthodes en droit international privé’ (1973) 139 Recueil des Cours 75; Jürgen Basedow, ‘Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht. Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates’ (1988) 52 RabelsZ 8; Friedrich K Juenger, &#039;&#039;Choice of Law and Multistate Justice&#039;&#039; (1993); Jürgen Basedow, ‘Conflicts of Economic Regulation’ (1994) 42 Am J Comp L 423; Rudolfo de Nova, ‘Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws’ (1996) 118 Recueil des Cours 433; Symeon C Symeonides (ed), &#039;&#039;Private International Law at the End of the 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;Century&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Progress or Regress?&#039;&#039; (2000); Stéphanie Francq, &#039;&#039;L’applicabilité du droit communautaire derivé au regard des méthodes du droit international privé&#039;&#039; (2005); Stéphanie Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private International Law—or the Other Way Around? (2006) 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 333; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law’ in Jan M Smits (ed), &#039;&#039;Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law&#039;&#039; (2006) 566.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unilateralismus_(IPR)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Uniform_Law&amp;diff=1237</id>
		<title>Uniform Law</title>
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		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

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by &#039;&#039;[[Franco Ferrari]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Definition ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The expression ‘international uniform law’ indicates a set of identically worded legal rules that are binding on a general level in at least two jurisdictions where they are supposed to be interpreted and applied in the same manner. International uniform law is the result of specific efforts towards the creation of law that is intended to be the same on an international level. Where this &#039;&#039;animus unificandi &#039;&#039;is lacking, it may well be possible for the laws of different jurisdictions to be identical to each other, but they will nevertheless not constitute international uniform law. This is why, for instance, the spontaneous, unintentional creation of identically worded legal rules in different jurisdictions as an answer to similar problems arising in practice cannot amount to international uniform law. The same is true as regards the unilateral reception of foreign legal rules—although this may lead to legal rules of various jurisdictions being identical, it cannot lead to international uniform law as the newly introduced legal rules will be interpreted and applied independently from their foreign model.&lt;br /&gt;
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Law that is simply ‘harmonized’, that is, law that has not been created with the intention of getting rid of the existing differences, but rather with the goal of merely reducing those differences (as is the case for the law originating from most EU directives) does not constitute uniform law. This does not mean that only those legal rules that fully correspond to each other can be considered uniform law. If this were the case, it would be impossible to ever speak of uniform law, as fully corresponding legal rules are very rare, even where the wording of the legal rules is identical. The reasons for divergence are manifold, such as the fact that the uniform texts are often drafted in different languages and are interpreted and applied differently in practice. Therefore, the starting point for determining whether there is uniform law is the degree of intended similarity of the legal rules in question. Where the maximum degree is intended, ie where the law is supposed to be one and the same, uniform law may exist despite any factors that may have a negative impact on the uniformity. Where, however, from the very beginning the efforts are merely aimed at the creation of a similar, harmonized law, one cannot speak of uniform law.&lt;br /&gt;
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From what has just been said, it becomes apparent that the intended identity of the legal rules is a characteristic of uniform law. The area of law to be unified, however, is completely irrelevant for the purpose of defining the concept at hand, since ‘uniform law’ indicates not so much an area of the law as its status. Consequently, efforts towards the creation of uniform law can relate to the most disparate areas of law. They can, for instance, relate to the private international law area as well as the substantive law area. Regarding the latter, a distinction has to be made between unlimited and limited uniform substantive law. &lt;br /&gt;
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Unlimited uniform substantive law is constituted by those legal rules that also govern purely domestic situations, which is why this kind of uniform substantive law is rather rare (still, there are a few examples, such as the rules laid down by the Convention providing a uniform law for bills of exchange and promissory notes of 7&amp;amp;nbsp;June 1930 and the Convention providing a uniform law for cheques of 19&amp;amp;nbsp;March 1931). Limited uniform substantive law, on the other hand, solely governs trans-border situations, that is, situations that have a relationship to more than one country. Unlike unlimited uniform substantive law, limited substantive law does not per se have an impact on domestic law. This is an advantage insofar as it allows a given state to enter a limited uniform substantive law instrument into force even where it contrasts with that state’s domestic law. This means that the adoption of limited uniform substantive law does not require a high degree of compatibility vis-à-vis the domestic substantive law. The same is true with uniform private international law because it has an impact solely at the conflict of laws level rather than the substantive one. &lt;br /&gt;
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A high degree of compatibility is, however, a prerequisite for the success of any effort towards the creation of unlimited uniform substantive law, which is why there are areas of law in relation to which unlimited uniform substantive law will be nearly impossible. In this respect, it may suffice to mention areas such as family law and the law of succession—areas characterized by national particularities originating from nation-specific social, ideological, religious and cultural values and backgrounds which national legislatures will hardly give up. Even though limited uniform substantive law would not impact the existing national particularities in these areas, insofar as the domestic law would still apply to (purely) domestic situations, limited uniform substantive law in these areas is very rare as well since these areas are far too influenced by the aforementioned values to allow for even the creation of a limited uniform substantive law.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the aforementioned areas, one can find, however, uniform private international law. This is due to the fact that private international law is—as much as its connecting factors—influenced to a much lesser extent than its substantive counterpart by such particularities and values. In other words, it is much easier to forego domestic private international law rules than substantive rules, since the former are rarely the expression of deeply rooted cultural, sociological, ideological or religious beliefs.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Aims and goals ==&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point one must wonder what goals the unification of law pursues and whether the distinction between uniform substantive law and uniform private international law influences not only the possibility of unifying certain areas of law, but also has an impact on the goals of the unification process. The starting point is the realization that unification of law does not in itself constitute a goal that is to be pursued at all costs, independently from any valid justification. Instead, unification of law has to aim at more than ‘just’ obtaining unified law. The issue of which other goals may justify the unification of law depends, in part, on the area of law (such as private international or substantive law) to be unified, as the goals of unification of one area may differ from those of a different area.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, efforts towards the unification of different areas of law may also pursue the same goals. For example, one of the goals behind the unification of both substantive law and private international law is to avoid the unequal treatment to which the application of different legal rules may lead in a specific instance. This does not mean, however, that in light of that common goal, the distinction between private international law and substantive law becomes irrelevant. This is due to the fact that private international law and substantive law have an impact on different levels. With respect to avoiding unequal treatment, uniform private international law guarantees that the courts of the states in which it is in force apply the same substantive law. This leads to uniformity on a conflict of laws level. Consequently, parties have (apart from the cases of &#039;&#039;dépeçage&#039;&#039;) merely to provide for the application of one substantive law. There is a downside to this: courts may well have to apply an unfamiliar law, which leads to uncertainty and costs arising from the determination of the contents of that unfamiliar (foreign) law. In any case, it should be mentioned that uniform private international law cannot prevent all unequal treatment. For example, the party whose law will be applicable will have an advantage, insofar as that party will have no difficulties nor will that party incur any costs in determining the contents of the applicable law. Uniform substantive law, on the other hand, guarantees that all parties from countries where it is in force will have equal access to the substantive law solutions, thus ‘levelling the playing field’. The fact that uniform substantive law always deals with the situations falling within its sphere of application in the same manner, while uniform private international law merely guarantees resort to the same substantive law, also avoids unequal treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The goal of international uniform substantive law most often referred to is, however, a different one, namely making the application of law easier by creating a (substantive) law that, according to the prevailing view, avoids the need to resort both to private international law—considered to be rather complicated—and to the applicable law determined by means of that very same private international law. This promotes certainty of law, makes business decisions easier and facilitates risk assessment. According to the prevailing view, this leads to a reduction of costs, benefiting not only the parties involved but the economy as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, where no resort to private international law is had, an important source of uncertainty is avoided which, in turn, certainly saves costs. However, the assumption that uniform substantive law avoids the need to resort to private international law cannot be embraced. This is due in part to the fact that international uniform substantive law is not exhaustive; it does not constitute a substantive law capable of dealing with all legal issues, thus making resort to the applicable domestic law necessary. This means that private international law is indispensable, as the applicable domestic law must be determined by means of the private international law (of the forum).&lt;br /&gt;
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In part, this is due to the fact that, at times, international uniform substantive rules themselves refer to private international law. For instance, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods drafted by [[UNCITRAL]] (the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), makes its applicability dependent, inter alia, on whether ‘the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1)(b)). Similarly, the [[UNIDROIT]] (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) Convention on International Factoring applies, inter alia, when ‘both the contract of sale of goods and the factoring contract are governed by the law of a Contracting State’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2(1)(b)) ([[Factoring|factoring]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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If one also considers that at least one recent international uniform substantive law instrument, namely the 2005 UNCITRAL Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, itself contains a set of private international law rules, it becomes even clearer that international uniform substantive law and uniform private international law are not antagonists, as the prevailing view seems to suggest, but instead must go hand in hand if overall uniformity is to be achieved.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Sources of international uniform law ==&lt;br /&gt;
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From the definition of international uniform law proposed in 1. above, it can easily be derived that the concept is independent not only from the area of law to be unified, but also from the particular form the unification efforts may take, which is why the form these efforts take can be very heterogeneous.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding the forms these unification efforts may assume, one has to first mention international agreements, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The preference for international agreements is justified because only international agreements (independently of whether they are bi- or multilateral) are capable of achieving the level of uniformity aimed at when trying to create uniform law. This is due to the fact that the states which adopt such agreements may only adopt them as a whole. In other words, an international agreement can only be adopted &#039;&#039;tel quel&#039;&#039;, without any modifications. Moreover, the states adopting an international agreement are bound not to modify it unilaterally at a later stage. This is worth mentioning, as there are constitutions that do not expressly state that international agreements prevail over domestic law enacted at a later stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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In some instances, the rigidity of international agreements, an advantage in those cases where a specific area of law is best governed by rules that are fully identical in at least two jurisdictions, may constitute a disadvantage. This rigidity may push a legislature not involved in the drafting process to refuse international agreement as a whole, simply because of the presence of a single provision, since the all-or-nothing principle applied to international agreements also mandates application of that single provision. This disadvantage cannot always be countered by introducing reservations, which can be found in every recent international uniform law agreement. Even though the possibility of declaring reservations may help, in that it gives legislatures some room to manoeuvre (by allowing them to avoid the application of some provisions), that possibility is generally unable to dissipate all doubts vis-à-vis the disadvantages of a given agreement.&lt;br /&gt;
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Model laws, such as the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, are sources of international uniform law that are much more flexible than international agreements; they are legislative texts that are recommended to states for adoption as part of their national law (with no obligation whatsoever for enactment). The flexibility that characterizes model laws (and that international agreements are missing) allows states to conform their domestic legislation to specific domestic needs and, thus, avoid the concerns that may be triggered by a unification of law based on the aforementioned all-or-nothing principle. This adaptability, which also allows states to unilaterally modify the rules enacted, promotes the willingness of states to participate in the unification efforts. It bears a risk, however: legal rules intended to create uniformity may develop differently in the various states due to their being adapted to fit different needs and situations.&lt;br /&gt;
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The decision of which type of instrument (international agreement or model law) should be resorted to is made on a case-by-case basis and depends on various factors, most notably, but not exclusively, on the degree of unification intended to be reached. It is worth noting that the importance of this decision is reduced by the fact that international agreements can also function as models for domestic legislation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The instruments referred to up to now—as well as the EU regulations which, in relation to the topic at hand, have mainly created uniform private international law—are all instruments of legislative unification. This type of unification of law is to be distinguished from unification of law by non-legislative means, the forms of which are as numerous as that of the legislative unification. According to various commentators, such non-legislative unification may take the form of case law or the law originating from standard contract clauses. This must be doubted, however, since these kinds of ‘laws’ lack one of the prerequisites of uniform law, namely being binding on a general level. In effect, apart from those very rare instances where the law originating from standard contract forms has become customary law, standard contract terms have to be agreed upon by the parties to be at all binding. The same is true for those rules that have been elaborated by scholars and institutions to promote international trade, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (see &#039;&#039;Tribunale di Padova&#039;&#039;, 11 January 2005, Riv Dir Intern Priv &amp;amp; Proc 791 (2005)).&lt;br /&gt;
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Generally, case law is not binding on a general level either and therefore cannot constitute uniform law. Moreover, if one considers that courts generally apply domestic rules that do not pursue unification goals, it is even less appropriate to consider case law a source of uniform law. This, however, does not mean that courts do not have an important role to play in the unification process. Ultimately, it is up to the (domestic) courts to interpret international uniform law, ie to let identically worded legal rules (uniform law in the books) come to life (uniform law in action), at least in those very many cases where the interpretation and application of uniform texts ([[Interpretation of International Uniform Law|interpretation of international uniform law]]) is not left to a supra-national tribunal (such as the [[European Court of Justice (ECJ)]]). Thus, domestic courts are indispensable for the creation of uniform law.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Bernhard C&amp;amp;nbsp;H Aubin, ‘Europäisches Einheitsrecht und intereuropäische Rechtsharmonie?’ in Konrad Zweigert (ed), &#039;&#039;Europäische Zusammenarbeit im Rechtswesen&#039;&#039; (1955) 45&amp;amp;nbsp;ff; René David, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’ in IECL II (1971) ch&amp;amp;nbsp;5;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Jan Kropholler, &#039;&#039;Internationales Einheitsrecht&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Allgemeine Lehren&#039;&#039; (1975); Thomas Weismer, &#039;&#039;Grundfragen grenzüberschreitender Rechtsetzung&#039;&#039; (1995); Jürgen Basedow, ‘Worldwide harmonisation of private law and regional economic integration— general report’ [2003] Uniform Law Review 31; Urs Peter Gruber, &#039;&#039;Methoden des internationalen Einheitsrechts&#039;&#039; (2004); Gudrun Schmid, &#039;&#039;Einheitliche Anwendung von internationalem Einheitsrecht&#039;&#039; (2004); Marco Torsello, &#039;&#039;Common Features of Uniform Commercial Law Conventions&#039;&#039; (2004); Karin Linhart, &#039;&#039;Internationales Einheitsrecht und einheitliche Auslegung&#039;&#039; (2005); Louis Marquis, &#039;&#039;International Uniform Commercial Law&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; Towards a Progressive Consciousness&#039;&#039; (2005).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[de:Einheitsrecht]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unfair_Competition_and_Freedoms_of_Movement&amp;diff=1235</id>
		<title>Unfair Competition and Freedoms of Movement</title>
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by &#039;&#039;[[Matthias Leistner]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. The concept of unfair competition and the requirements of the EC Treaty ==&lt;br /&gt;
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From a European perspective, ‘unfair competition’ does not exist as a clearly defined, unitary concept. However, despite all the differences in scope and characterization, all European Member States have developed instruments based on the principle of fairness to control commercial activities. A common feature of all these mechanisms is the condition that the regulated activities or practices must be of a commercial nature. Thus, unfair competition law regulates market behaviour. Beyond this common starting point, a clear-cut demarcation of unfair competition from other fields of law as well as a common identification of the objectives of the law of unfair competition can hardly be achieved, given the wide variety of statutes and case law in the Member States (see further [[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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In particular, mere terminological reference to the concepts of ‘honest trade practices’ (see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039; of the Paris Convention), ‘unfair commercial practices’ (Dir 2005/29) or &#039;&#039;concurrence&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;déloyale &#039;&#039;(the term used by the French courts when they developed the particularly advanced French unfair competition case law in the broad framework of the general clause of tort law, namely Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1382 &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;) is of only limited relevance for identifying common principles of unfair competition. More important is the construction of these terms in case law and in particular the reference to the respective objectives of unfair competition law in the Member States. In this regard, however, the approaches to unfair competition differ widely throughout the Community. In some Member States, such as Germany, unfair competition has developed into a comprehensive regulation of market behaviour on the basis of a specific statute, protecting the interests of competitors, consumers, and the general public. In other Member States, such as in particular the United Kingdom, which has never developed a tort of unfair competition beyond the extended passing off action, existing case law, statutes and statutory instruments are comparatively fragmented and limited, namely to the protection of competitors (in the context of the existing, narrow actions in tort law) or consumers (in the framework of specific statutes in the field). &lt;br /&gt;
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However, some essential common principles can be identified in all Member States. Thus, the prohibition of misleading and certain aggressive commercial practices does indeed form a common core area of unfair competition, as it is meanwhile part of the Community &#039;&#039;acquis &#039;&#039;in the area of consumer protection ([[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]; [[Commercial Practices, Misleading|commercial practices, misleading]]; [[Commercial Practices, Aggressive|commercial practices, aggressive]]). Beyond this core area, the protection level and scope of unfair competition law differs considerably throughout the Community.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, these differences in substantive unfair competition law can lead to barriers to inter-state trade as ‘measures having equivalent effect’ in the sense of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;28 EC/34 TFEU according to the wide &#039;&#039;Dassonville-&#039;&#039;formula of the ECJ (ECJ Case 8/74 – &#039;&#039;Dassonville&#039;&#039; [1974] ECR 837). This would be the case whenever unfair competition rules on the marketing and sale of a product effectively affect intra-Community trade by directly or indirectly, actually or potentially impeding access to the national market of a Member State through rules that are stricter than those that are applied in the Member State of origin ([[EU Treaty]]; [[Fundamental Freedoms (General Principles)|fundamental freedoms (general principles)]]). Comparable criteria apply with respect to restrictions on the freedom to provide services. However, according to the &#039;&#039;Cassis de Dijon &#039;&#039;principle, Member States are allowed to protect domestic consumers, even where this impedes integration because of disparities between the respective national laws, when the provisions can be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer (ECJ Case 120/78 – &#039;&#039;Cassis de Dijon &#039;&#039;[1979] ECR 649; [[Free Movement of Goods|free movement of goods]]). On that basis the ECJ has developed broad case law concerning the free movement of goods; meanwhile, an increasing body of case law has also developed comparable principles in the field of the free movement of services according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;56 TFEU/49 EC (ECJ Case C-275/92 – &#039;&#039;Schindler&#039;&#039; [1994] ECR I-1039; ECJ Case C-384/93 – &#039;&#039;Alpine Investments &#039;&#039;[1995] ECR I-1141; ECJ Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 – &#039;&#039;De Agostini&#039;&#039; [1997] ECR I-3843; ECJ Case 243/01 – &#039;&#039;Gambelli&#039;&#039; [2003] ECR I-13031; [[Free Movement of Services|free movement of services]]). By contrast, the freedom of establishment ([[Freedom of Establishment|freedom of establishment]]) and the free movement of capital and payments ([[Free Movement of Capital and Payments|free movement of capital and payments]]) are of comparatively limited relevance in the field of unfair competition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Court’s moulding of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;34 TFEU/28 EC and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;56 TFEU/49 EC in this fashion has the consequence that the Court approaches national provisions of unfair competition law from a quasi ‘negative’ perspective, perceiving them as barriers to market integration which need to be justified. The test is whether a national provision of unfair competition law can be justified as being capable, necessary and proportional in order to achieve the fairness of commercial transactions and effective protection of consumers. Despite this ‘negative’ approach, the method of the ECJ at the same time leads to a minimum degree of harmonization, a process which has been characterized as ‘negative’ harmonization. This is because the ECJ, by removing only overly obstructive unnecessary or disproportional national provisions, at the same time established certain minimum criteria of what &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; necessary and justifiable in the fields of the mandatory requirements relating to fair commercial transactions and consumer protection. In that way, the ECJ has indeed developed certain distinct concepts and principles of what might be called a case law &#039;&#039;nucleus &#039;&#039;of European unfair competition and consumer protection law in the framework of its case law on the fundamental freedoms.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Evolution of the ECJ’s case law ==&lt;br /&gt;
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While the judgment in &#039;&#039;Dassonville &#039;&#039;had paved the way for an effectively comprehensive review of national unfair competition law in light of the principle of free movement of goods, further judgments carved out the criteria for assessing the necessity and proportionality of certain national provisions in order to reach the objectives of fairness of commercial transactions and consumer protection in particular (see eg ECJ Case 261/81 – &#039;&#039;Rau &#039;&#039;[1982] ECR 3961, on the necessity of a national provision; ECJ Case 178/84 – &#039;&#039;Commission v Germany&#039;&#039; [1987] ECR 1227,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;on proportionality). As a result, the &#039;&#039;entire&#039;&#039; area of unfair competition was governed by a principle of mutual recognition, qualified only by the possibility to justify stricter provisions of national law (compared to the level of protection in the Member State of origin) by mandatory requirements according to the &#039;&#039;Cassis &#039;&#039;formula.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, this approach led to a comprehensive scope of review with regard to national unfair competition law regimes as well as to any national provision on the modalities of marketing and sales of products, and thus—arguably—to an over-expansion of the concept of free movement of goods beyond the main objective to eliminate market-partitioning measures (as opposed to ‘neutral’ measures simply affecting commerce in general). This eventually led to the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;judgment of the ECJ, in which the Court established the distinction between national rules restricting or prohibiting ‘certain selling arrangements’, such as rules on advertising, sales hours, etc, on the one hand, and product-related rules, such as provisions as to the designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling or packaging of the product as such on the other (ECJ Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 – &#039;&#039;Keck and Mithouard&#039;&#039; [1993] ECR I-6097). According to that judgment, the ‘old’ strict benchmark of &#039;&#039;Dassonville &#039;&#039;and &#039;&#039;Cassis &#039;&#039;shall continue to apply to product-related provisions, thus resulting in comprehensive review of such national provisions along the lines of the principles of necessity and proportionality. By contrast, rules prohibiting or limiting certain selling arrangements shall not fall into the scope of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;34 TFEU/28 EC, provided those rules apply to &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; traders active in the national territory and provided that they affect &#039;&#039;in the same way&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;in law and in fact&#039;&#039; the marketing of national and foreign products.&lt;br /&gt;
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As large areas of unfair competition law are indeed mainly concerned with the regulation of ‘selling arrangements’, at the outset it was argued that the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;judgment would substantially reduce the impact of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;34 TFEU/28 EC on national rules of unfair competition law. However, that argumentation, emphasizing the formalistic distinction between rules on selling arrangements and product-related rules, underestimated the crucial condition for the ‘exemption’ of rules on certain selling arrangements from the treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, namely the condition that such rules have to affect &#039;&#039;in the same way in law and in fact&#039;&#039; all traders active in the national territory and have thus to be &#039;&#039;origin-neutral &#039;&#039;with regard to the marketing and sales of products originating in other Member States&#039;&#039;. &#039;&#039;Thus, the crucial question, namely whether products from other Member States are&#039;&#039; specifically &#039;&#039;affected&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;by a national rule, has only been ‘shifted’ to a subsequent level of assessment by the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;formula. While the specific effect on inter-state trade is assumed &#039;&#039;prima facie &#039;&#039;as far as product-related rules are concerned, in the area of rules on ‘certain selling arrangements’, the specific affectation of products from other Member States has to be assessed concretely. Indeed, in many cases following the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;judgment, the ECJ has meanwhile clearly held that measures which apply equally (in law) to all traders active in a given national market may nonetheless (in fact) often disadvantage traders from other Member States and will then have to be assessed according to the principles of necessity and proportionality (ECJ Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 – &#039;&#039;De Agostini&#039;&#039; [1997] ECR I-3843; ECJ Case C-254/98 – &#039;&#039;TK-Heimdienst&#039;&#039; [2000] ECR I-151; ECJ Case C-405/98 – &#039;&#039;Gourmet&#039;&#039; [2001] ECR I-1795; ECJ Case C-322/01 – &#039;&#039;Deutscher Apothekerverband v DocMorris&#039;&#039; [2003] ECR I-4887; ECJ Case C-71/02 – &#039;&#039;Karner v Troostwijk&#039;&#039; [2004] ECR I-3025). According to the judgment in &#039;&#039;Deutscher Apothekerverband v DocMorris &#039;&#039;(ECJ Case C-322/01 –&#039;&#039;Deutscher Apothekerverband v DocMorris&#039;&#039; [2003] ECR I-4887), the application of the provisions on the free movement of goods will even be triggered if a national rule on the prohibition of certain selling arrangements only &#039;&#039;potentially &#039;&#039;has a stronger impeding effect on the entry of products from other Member States to the national market than on national products. Thus, the resulting test as to the factual &#039;&#039;origin-neutrality &#039;&#039;of national provisions on the prohibition or regulation of certain selling arrangements is rather strict, and consequently, the provisions on the free movement of goods remain of substantial relevance in that area.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, even in this re-extended and specified form, the case law following the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;judgment left one main problem for the completion of the internal market. When it comes to marketing and sales activities in genuinely trans-national media, such as internet platforms or cross-border TV advertising campaigns, additional costs for Europe-wide campaigns may result from the very fact that—according to established private international law provisions (see 4. below)—&#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the different national laws of the affected marketplaces will potentially apply cumulatively to such activities (&#039;&#039;mosaic approach&#039;&#039;). Thus, in these cases additional costs for genuinely pan-European activities—as compared to nationally limited activities—result from the very differences of national laws and not from specific factual disadvantages for foreign traders. The problem has become obvious and more imminent through the rapid development of the internet into one of the main marketing and sales channels for certain products and services in the European market. Consequently, in particular in the fields of trans-border TV and E-Commerce the &#039;&#039;Keck &#039;&#039;judgment has become the catalyst for legislative activities of the European Commission which follow the objective to establish more or less far-reaching country of origin principles for these fields as a basis for completing the internal market and which have eventually also resulted in further legislative activity in the area of substantive unfair competition law (see 4. below). &lt;br /&gt;
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Another question which has not yet been answered by the ECJ’s case law is the question of whether the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;formula can be transposed into the realm of the free movement of services ([[Fundamental Freedoms (General Principles)|fundamental freedoms (general principles)]]; [[Free Movement of Services|free movement of services]]). When it comes to the assessment of national provisions on unfair competition, generally speaking, the broad construction of the concept of measures having equivalent effect as well as the possibility of justifying such measures with the objective of satisfying certain mandatory requirements, such as for example consumer protection or the protection of the fairness of commercial transactions, have also been applied to the concept of free movement of services. However, the specific limitations resulting from the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;formula have never explicitly been applied in that field. Thus, in particular in trans-border cases, the application of the provisions on the free movement of services results in a comparatively broad scope of review as to national law provisions on unfair competition (see ECJ Case C-384/93 – &#039;&#039;Alpine Investments &#039;&#039;[1995] ECR I-1141).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Main principles and limitations of the ECJ’s approach to unfair competition ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Undoubtedly, the main objective of the Court’s case law in applying the freedoms of movement to national provisions on unfair competition has been the effective pursuit of the integrative function of the fundamental freedoms. However, in assessing the necessity and proportionality of national consumer protection measures, the Court has developed the normative benchmark of the European ‘average consumer’, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see eg ECJ Case C-210/96 – &#039;&#039;Gut Springenheide&#039;&#039; [1998] ECR I-4657; ECJ Case C-470/93 – &#039;&#039;Mars&#039;&#039; [1995] ECR I-1923; also [[Commercial Practices, Misleading|commercial practices, misleading]]). The concept of the European average consumer has allowed the Court to balance the involved interests of competitors, different groups of consumers and the general public by focusing on the protection of free and informed consumer choice. Specifically, the application of the proportionality principle has frequently led to the abolishment of strict national rules, which prohibited certain products, product shapes or advertising campaigns in general, where the provision of information (eg by respective product labelling) might have sufficed to achieve effective consumer protection (see ECJ Case 120/78 – &#039;&#039;Cassis de Dijon &#039;&#039;[1979] ECR 649; also [[Free Movement of Goods|free movement of goods]]). Thus, the protection of informed consumer choice through ensuring market transparency, if necessary by providing for specific duties to inform the consumer, lies at the centre of what has been characterized as the &#039;&#039;information model&#039;&#039; of consumer protection in the Court’s case law. Indeed, on the basis of the effective application of the proportionality principle, the Court has developed a genuine concept of consumer protection by information provisions which have even been backed up by the construction of an individual right of the consumer not to be impeded in the access to necessary market information by overly strict national laws on unfair competition (see ECJ Case C-362/88 – &#039;&#039;GB-Inno-BM&#039;&#039; [1990] ECR I-667). &lt;br /&gt;
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Of late, the information model of consumer protection in the Court’s case law has increasingly been criticized in legal literature. The critics point out that a concept of consumer protection based on the provision of all necessary market information neglects more recent economic research on bounded rationality, and in particular the problem of flawed decision making in situations of ‘information overload’. Consequently, the necessity to provide and effectively present an &#039;&#039;optimal&#039;&#039; amount of information is emphasized as compared to a concept relying upon the provision of a &#039;&#039;maximum&#039;&#039; amount of information. However, in fact, the Court’s case law as to the freedoms of movement has never been &#039;&#039;necessarily &#039;&#039;focused on an exclusively integrationist concept based upon the provision of all the necessary information to ‘well informed’ (fictitious) average consumers with unlimited capacity for handling that information. Instead, it seems that the focus of the Court’s case law on the safeguarding of the necessary provision of information to the consumer as a proportionate means of consumer protection is partly of an incidental character and follows from the fact that further reaching provisions of national law, as they were referred to the Court, were simply only seldom justified by legitimate objectives. Where such legitimate and differentiated objectives can be identified, eg with regard to certain specifically vulnerable groups of consumers (ECJ Case 382/87 – &#039;&#039;Buet&#039;&#039; [1989] ECR 1235, 1242) or with regard to certain social, cultural or linguistic distinctions concerning the reception of a particular advertising campaign in a particular Member State (ECJ Case C-220/98 – &#039;&#039;Estée Lauder&#039;&#039; [2000] ECR I-117), the Court has in principle been willing to back up certain provisions of national unfair competition law, which go beyond the mere provision of information, and prohibit certain sales practices or misleading advertising campaigns. In that regard, the Court has also emphasized the additional need to protect the free decision making process of consumers against undue influence, in particular where especially vulnerable consumer groups are concerned. The future role of the ECJ in specifying the concepts and provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which will in the future increasingly complement and replace the case law on the freedoms of movement in the area of business-to-consumer commercial practices, will certainly consolidate this development towards a more comprehensive concept of consumer protection against unfair commercial practices on the European level ([[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]; [[Commercial Practices, Misleading|commercial practices, misleading]]; [[Commercial Practices, Aggressive|commercial practices, aggressive]]; see also 4. below).&lt;br /&gt;
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The preceding analysis shows that the ECJ’s ‘negative’ approach to unfair competition under the perspective of the freedoms of movement has resulted in the development of certain ‘positive’ core elements of a European law of unfair competition. Structural principles of this approach to unfair competition law encompass a focus on the protection of informed consumers’ choice as well as rudimental case law on the protection of the free decision making process of consumers. However, large areas of law, which in some Member States are traditionally treated as part of unfair competition, such as for example the protection against misappropriation of a competitor’s products or services by direct and systematic imitation and other forms of impediment of competitors, are not covered by this case law. Consequently, a comprehensive approach to unfair competition does certainly not exist in the Court’s case law on the freedoms of movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Perspectives: increasing relevance of secondary Union law on unfair competition ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As to the private international law of unfair competition, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6(1) Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation (Reg 864/ 2007) provides for a uniform European choice of law rule ([[Non-Contractual Obligations (PIL)|non-contractual obligations (PIL)]]). According to that provision, in principle the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of acts of unfair competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected (ie&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;the law of all national market(s) affected by a commercial practice). This rule is in line with the respective existing private international law rules in the majority of the Member States. As the choice of law rule contains no specific limitations or adaptations for multi-state or overspill situations, it leads to a mosaic of applicable laws with regard to multi-state cases. Thus, the specific problems of choice of law concerning trans-border commercial practices have certainly not been solved by this new provision. However, the choice of law rule is to be read in light of the precedential framework of primary Union law, namely the freedoms of movement. Consequently, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6 Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation is partly over-ridden by the (substantive law) principle of mutual recognition where stricter national rules of the affected market place, which disadvantage traders from another EU Member State in law or in fact, cannot be justified by mandatory requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
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As for the substantive secondary Union law of unfair competition, the existing case law on the construction of the provisions of the Misleading Advertising Directive (Consolidated Dir 84/450) —as the fountainhead of secondary Union law in the field—is scant compared to the large body of case law on the application of the freedoms of movement to national rules of unfair competition. However, in the field of consumer protection against unfair commercial practices, the Community has meanwhile enacted several directives culminating in the adoption of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in 2005 ([[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]). In that field, the narrowing of the broad &#039;&#039;Dassonville-&#039;&#039;formula in the &#039;&#039;Keck-&#039;&#039;judgment has undoubtedly become a catalyst for further harmonization. The Commission reacted to that judgment, first by enacting the E-Commerce Directive (Dir 2000/ 31), which provided for a secondary law internal market principle (country of origin principle) for information society services, ie applicable in the field of unfair competition law. This area-specific country of origin rule in turn aroused concerns about a possible race-to-the-bottom in Member States’ substantive unfair competition law, which, notwithstanding the questionable validity of these concerns, led to the demand for further harmonization of substantive unfair competition law on the Community level. The adoption of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in 2005 ([[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]), which provides for a comprehensive harmonization of the law concerning certain unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, can indeed be characterized as a reaction to these calls for strengthening consumer protection in the internal market.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result, the emerging case law on the construction of the provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive will become increasingly relevant in the field of unfair competition law. It will complement and at least partly replace the case law on the freedoms of movement in the area of unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the future. However, the existing case law on the freedoms of movement will certainly keep its relevance in the field of business-to-business commercial practices which are not information society services as well as in some other areas of unfair competition law which are not covered by the coordinated field of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Moreover, it has to be emphasized that central conceptions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, namely the reference to the material distortion of the economic behaviour of the &#039;&#039;average consumer &#039;&#039;whom a commercial practice reaches or to whom it is addressed, lean on the ECJ’s case law on unfair competition and freedoms of movement. Specifically, the central benchmark of the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, is explicitly adopted by the directive (see recital 18) and will thus certainly continue to influence the future construction of the main concepts of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Jürgen Basedow,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;‘Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis’ (1995) 59 RabelsZ 1; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Recent Case Law Concerning the Free Movement of Goods: Mapping the Frontier of Market Deregulation’ (1999) 36 CMLR 51; Peter Oliver, &#039;&#039;Free Movement of Goods in the European Community&#039;&#039; (2003); Peter W Heermann,&#039;&#039; Warenverkehrsfreiheit und deutsches Unlauterkeitsrecht&#039;&#039; (2004); Tobias Lettl,&#039;&#039; Der lauterkeitsrechtliche Schutz vor irreführender Werbung in Europa&#039;&#039; (2004); Jochen Glöckner,&#039;&#039; Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht&#039;&#039; (2006); Frauke Henning-Bodewig,&#039;&#039; Unfair Competition Law&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; European Union and Member States&#039;&#039; (2006); Stefan Enchelmaier, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Case Law on the Free Movement of Goods: Movement in all Sorts of Directions’ (2007) 26 Yearbook of European Law 115; Matthias Leistner,&#039;&#039; Richtiger Vertrag und lauterer Wettbewerb—Eine grundlagenorientierte Studie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der europäischen Perspektive&#039;&#039; (2007).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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		<title>Unfair Competition (Consequences)</title>
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		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

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by &#039;&#039;[[Olaf Sosnitza]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Meaning ==&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;119(1) TFEU/4(1) EC the [[European Union]] is bound by the principle of an open market economy with free competition. The guarantee of protection against unfair commercial practices is of vital importance for a pure and functioning competition. In connection with the consequences of violations of competition, the entitlements which result from an infringement of competition laws are of interest. Furthermore, it has to be assessed who is entitled to enforce these rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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Neither EU law nor other treaties of international public law or international [[Uniform Law|uniform law]] impose a specific system of combating [[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition]] or concrete legal consequences. EU law creates substantive-law principles for fair competition and sets targets for law enforcement, whereas implementation and enforcement is a matter for the national legislature. Regulation&amp;amp;nbsp;2006/2004 on Consumer Protection Cooperation ([[Consumers and Consumer Protection Law|consumers and consumer protection law]]) is of importance for the enforcement of competition law along with Directive 2006/114 concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising and Directive 2005/29 on Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP Directive, [[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)|unfair competition (basic principles)]]) which belong to the enforceable directives intended by the regulation. &lt;br /&gt;
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According to the regulation, among the enforcement powers that the competent authority must have are—under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4(3) and (6)—the powers to obtain from the violator an undertaking to cease the infringement (lit e), and to require him to make payments in the event of failure to comply with a decision (lit g). Article&amp;amp;nbsp;11(1) UCP Directive solely obligates the Member States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to combat unfair commercial practices. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;13 UCP Directive substantiates the requirements to be met by the Member States to the effect that they shall lay down penalties for infringements of national provisions adopted in application of the directive and shall take all necessary measures to ensure that these are enforced. The penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. &lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10(1)&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039; of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (PCPIP) only generally regulates that the countries of the Union are bound to ensure that nationals of such countries receive effective protection against unfair competition. For this purpose, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10(1)&#039;&#039;ter&#039;&#039; PCPIP stipulates that the countries of the Union undertake to assure to nationals of the other countries of the Union ‘appropriate legal remedies’ effectively to repress unfair competition. Finally, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1) lit&amp;amp;nbsp;b of the WIPO Model Provisions against Unfair Competition of 1996 also abstains from naming specific sanctions ([[World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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The TRIPS and the Enforcement Directive 2004/48 are of relevance to the law of fair competition and intellectual property. The members of TRIPS are, according to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;41 TRIPS, bound to ensure that certain civil and administrative judicial procedures are available (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;42&amp;amp;nbsp;ff TRIPS), these include provisional measures (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;50 TRIPS), injunctions (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;44 TRIPS) and the obligation to pay [[Damages|damages]] (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;45 TRIPS). The Enforcement Directive contains, inter alia, concrete specifications on provisional and precautionary measures (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;9), corrective measures (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10) and damages (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;13).&lt;br /&gt;
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Within the respective Member States there often exist, cumulatively or alternatively, civil and administrative as well as criminal law enforcement mechanisms. In part, for instance in Italy or in the Czech Republic, certain unfair commercial practices (eg violation of advertising rules) are pursued by administrative bodies, while other acts of unfair competition face civil sanctions. In Germany, the enforcement of fair competition law is subject to civil and criminal law. In contrast fair competition law in the Netherlands is regulated exclusively by civil law. In some countries, self-regulatory bodies of commerce play an important role in the sanctioning of unfair competition. The most prominent example is the UK Advertising Standards Authority which is provided with extensive powers.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Consequences ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Amongst the consequences of unfair commercial practices, &#039;&#039;injunctive relief&#039;&#039; is of the utmost importance. Injunctive relief aims to prevent a concrete infringement from being committed in the future. It serves as legal protection against future infringements and assumes the form of preventive injunctive relief when the unfair commercial practice has not yet been carried out but is imminent (see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;11(2)1(b) UCP Directive). A risk of recurrent infringement or, alternatively, a risk of first infringement is a precondition for injunctive relief, with the risk of recurrent infringement mostly being presumed regarding those infringements which are similar to an already carried-out unfair commercial practice. The risk of recurrent infringement can, for example, be eliminated by a solemn declaration of forbearance subject to punishment in the case of non-compliance. &lt;br /&gt;
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Injunctive relief does not require the proof of intention or negligence on the part of the violator. In practice, the enforcement of injunctive relief by way of an accelerated procedure is of great importance. Where the legal protection is subject to civil law, the legal enforcement of the injunctive remedy is in some countries regulated by the common civil procedure provisions (eg Germany). There also exist special procedures such as the &#039;&#039;référe&#039;&#039;-proceeding in Belgium, which has to be instituted by the president of the Commercial Court. In cases where the fair competition law is subject to administrative law, public authorities can also be entitled to grant injunctive relief (eg Portugal and Italy).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A right to [[Damages|damages]] is possible if the infringer knew or reasonably ought to have known that he was engaging in an unfair commercial practice. In contrast to injunctive relief, the entitlement to damages does require a culpable act of the infringer. The culpable act must have caused a damage. In practice the computation of the actual amount of damage (which includes lost profit) is often problematic. In some countries determining the actual amount of the lost profit is within the court’s discretion (eg Great Britain and the Netherlands). In estimating the damages, reference is in part made to the profit realized by the infringer. In constellations relating to intellectual property rights there often exists the possibility of referring to the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorization to use the intellectual property right (fictitious licence fee, see also Art&amp;amp;nbsp;13(1)2(b) Enforcement Directive).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides injunctive relief (the most relevant remedy in practice) and the right to damages, there also exist a number of other consequences of unfair commercial practices, such as the right to the abatement of the nuisance resulting from the unfair commercial practice. Injunctive relief and the right to abatement represent entitlements irrespective of culpability. The object of this entitlement depends on the nature and extent of the infringement. The most important applications of the entitlement to elimination are the entitlement to revocation of an unfair statement and the entitlement to publication of a corrective statement or a corrective advertisement. Also, the entitlement to publication of a final decision of the courts or administrative authorities competent for the sanctioning of unfair commercial practices (see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;11(2)3(a) UCP Directive) serves the purpose of the removal of the nuisance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the above-mentioned legal consequences, some European Member States provide for &#039;&#039;special sanctioning possibilities&#039;&#039;. Among these are, for example, the market disturbance penalty fee according to §§&amp;amp;nbsp;22&amp;amp;nbsp;ff of the Swedish Marketing Practices Act, the confiscation of profits according to §&amp;amp;nbsp;10 of the German Act Against Unfair Competition or the obligation to pay an adequate sum of money earmarked for a social goal (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;18 of the Polish Act on Combating of Unfair Competition). Article&amp;amp;nbsp;18 of the Spanish Act Against Unfair Competition provides the opportunity to take action for a declaratory judgment that a commercial practice is unfair.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where certain unfair commercial practices are subject to criminal penalties, the competent law enforcement authorities institute the proceedings. They may act &#039;&#039;ex officio&#039;&#039; or only after a request for examination by the injured party. In some Member States proceedings are, in certain instances, only instituted after pre-investigation is undertaken by special authorities (eg the &#039;&#039;Direction générale de la concurrence et de la répression des fraudes&#039;&#039; in France). In other Member States such as Germany, Great Britain and Ireland the injured party can also bring a private suit before the criminal courts. Under the criminal provisions of competition law, unfair commercial practices can be sanctioned with a &#039;&#039;fine or imprisonment&#039;&#039;. In the case of enforcement by administrative bodies, the authorities can often impose—apart from an injunctive relief and an abatement order—an administrative fine for an unfair commercial practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Right to sue and standing to be sued ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In order to answer the question of who is entitled to institute court or administrative proceedings against unfair commercial practices, a differentiation between individual and collective legal protection is necessary. If a trader engages in an unfair commercial practice, the competitors affected normally have the right to sue as individuals. There often exists—at least in theory—the possibility for consumers to take legal action against unfair commercial practices ([[Consumers and Consumer Protection Law|consumers and consumer protection law]]). The provisions of secondary EU law state that means must exist under national law to combat unfair commercial practices for persons having a ‘legitimate interest’ in combating unfair commercial practices (see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;11(1)2 UCP Directive; Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1)2 Directive concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising). In Scandinavian countries, the consumer&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;ombudsman plays a special role in the enforcement of the law. The [[Ombudsman|ombudsman]] is entitled to take legal action in the interest of consumers, yet he can also partially take measures and define guidelines against unfair commercial practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the field of the collective prosecution of unfair commercial practices, consumers’ associations, commerce associations and other interest associations primarily have the right to sue. The collective action ([[Collective Litigation|collective litigation]]) is of particular relevance for the enforcement of fair competition law when individuals refrain from taking legal action or instituting proceedings because, for instance, they economically depend on the injurer or because the caused damage is only minor. The collective prosecution of a right to damages can be legally limited. Especially in criminal or administrative proceedings, specific public enforcement authorities can exclusively have the right to sue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anyone engaging in an unfair commercial practice either himself or through another person can be sued. Claims can also arise against a person who has contributed to an unfair commercial practice committed by another person, while restricting provisions can exist especially for the media, eg in the publication of advertisements constituting unfair commercial practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Frauke Henning-Bodewig and Gerhard Schricker (eds), &#039;&#039;Recht der Werbung in Europa&#039;&#039; (1995); Frauke Henning-Bodewig, ‘International Protection Against Unfair Competition—Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039; Paris Convention, TRIPS and WIPO Model Provisions’ [1999] IIC&amp;amp;nbsp;166; Frauke Henning-Bodewig, &#039;&#039;Unfair Competition Law. European Union and Member States&#039;&#039; (2006); Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, in Peter Heermann and Günter Hirsch (eds), &#039;&#039;Münchener Kommentar zum Lauterkeitsrecht&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;1&#039;&#039; (2006) EG&amp;amp;nbsp;F; Roger W&amp;amp;nbsp;de&amp;amp;nbsp;Vrey, &#039;&#039;Towards a European Unfair Competition Law. A Clash Between Legal Families&#039;&#039; (2006); Thomas MJ Möllers and Andreas Heinemann (eds), &#039;&#039;The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe&#039;&#039; (2007); Otto Teplitzky, &#039;&#039;Wettbewerbsrechtliche Ansprüche und Verfahren&#039;&#039; (9th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2007); Ansgar Ohly, ‘§§&amp;amp;nbsp;8&amp;amp;nbsp;ff UWG’ in Henning Piper, Ansgar Ohly and Olaf Sosnitza (eds), &#039;&#039;Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb&#039;&#039; (5th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2010); Helmut Köhler, ‘§§&amp;amp;nbsp;8&amp;amp;nbsp;ff UWG’ in Helmut Köhler and Joachim Bornkamm (eds), &#039;&#039;Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb&#039;&#039; (29th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2011).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unlauterer_Wettbewerb_(Rechtsfolgen)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unfair_Competition_(Basic_Principles)&amp;diff=1231</id>
		<title>Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unfair_Competition_(Basic_Principles)&amp;diff=1231"/>
		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Admin: 1 revision imported&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Ansgar Ohly]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Concept and purpose ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The general term ‘competition law’ is equivocal, as it may cover two areas: antitrust law ([[Competition Law (Relationship between European and National Law)|competition law (relationship between European and national law)]]) and unfair competition law. Both fields of law serve the common purpose of ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted (see Protocol no 27 TFEU/Art&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;amp;nbsp;3(1)(g) EC), thereby safeguarding one of the basic conditions of a functioning market economy. The immediate aim of regulation, however, differs between both disciplines of competition law. Antitrust law, for which &#039;&#039;competition law&#039;&#039; is used as a synonym in Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;101&amp;amp;nbsp;ff TFEU/Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;81&amp;amp;nbsp;ff EC and in some European jurisdictions (eg in English law) ([[Competition (Internal Market)|competition (internal market)]]), controls the structure of markets. At a macro level it protects free competition against restriction. Unfair competition law (in German legal terminology also traditionally referred to as &#039;&#039;Wettbewerbsrecht&#039;&#039;, ie ‘competition law’), on the other hand, regulates market practices. At a micro level it provides rules for the behaviour of individual actors in existing markets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;(1) of the Paris Convention (PC), ‘any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes unfair competition’, whereas Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1) of the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2005/29, hereinafter UCPD) simply prohibits ‘unfair commercial practices’. Commercial practices are characterized by their relation to markets. In this vein, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2(d) UCPD defines ‘commercial practices’ as ‘any act [or] omission … directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product’. The concept of ‘(un)fairness’, however, cannot be defined in an abstract and general way. Unfairness is ‘a Proteus which turns to a thousand forms’ (Josef Kohler) and is thus not capable of being lexically defined. All general provisions prohibiting unfair competition at the international, the Union or the national level are general clauses, ie umbrella terms. Thus, both considerable flexibility and a certain degree of legal uncertainty are typical features of unfair competition law. In modern enactments, this uncertainty is reduced by a list of statutory examples (see 3. below). Also, the general notion of unfair competition allows the courts to develop rules and principles on a case-by-case basis and thus to proceed in a way comparable to common law methodology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to what Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;(1) PC suggests, the concepts of ‘unfair competition’ prevailing in Europe are by no means uniform. In EU law, the term as such is not used; the UCPD prohibits ‘unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices’ (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;2(d),&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1)). In German law, the term ‘unfair competition’ encompasses all commercial practices which are prohibited by specific provisions or by the general clause of unfair competition law (§&amp;amp;nbsp;3(1) &#039;&#039;Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb&#039;&#039; = Act against Unfair Competition of 2004, hereinafter UWG) for the purpose of protecting competitors, consumers, other market participants and the general public (§&amp;amp;nbsp;1&amp;amp;nbsp;UWG). In French law, &#039;&#039;concurrence déloyale&#039;&#039; is one of the categories of tort law which were developed by the courts on the basis of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1382 &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;; it can be distinguished from the statutory provisions of consumer protection law. In English law, ‘unfair competition’ has never been fully accepted as a legal concept. Depending on the context, the term may be (i)&amp;amp;nbsp;a synonym of the tort of &amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;passing off&#039;&#039;, which protects trade goodwill against misappropriation by misrepresentation, (ii)&amp;amp;nbsp;a general tort of misappropriation of a competitor’s trade values, which is not recognized as such in English law, or (iii)&amp;amp;nbsp;a generic term covering all causes of action available to a trader against tortious behaviour of a competitor (&#039;&#039;Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris&#039;&#039; [1985]&amp;amp;nbsp;RPC 219, 235&amp;amp;nbsp;ff (High Court of Australia)). &lt;br /&gt;
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In particular, there is disagreement about the purpose of unfair competition law. Some jurisdictions (including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) adopt an integral or monistic concept which is based on a triad of purposes. According to this approach, unfair competition law protects competitors, consumers and the general public (see §&amp;amp;nbsp;1 of the German UWG, §&amp;amp;nbsp;1 of the Swedish Market Practices (&#039;&#039;Marknadsföringslag&#039;&#039;), Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1 of the Spanish Act against Unfair Competition (&#039;&#039;Ley&amp;amp;nbsp;20.169&#039;&#039;). Other jurisdictions (including France and England) distinguish between tort law protection available to traders, on the one hand, and consumer protection law, on the other (see 2. below). Whereas earlier EC directives adopted the integral approach (see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1 of the Directive on Misleading Advertising (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;84/450) in its pre-2005 version), more recent directives distinguish between consumer protection and the protection of traders. The UCPD only protects consumers against unfair commercial practices (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1 UCPD); its scope is limited to business-to-consumer (b2c) commercial relations. Whereas the directives on misleading advertising (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;84/450) and on comparative advertising (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;97/55) aimed at protecting ‘consumers, persons carrying on a trade or business or practising a craft or profession and the interests of the public in general’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1&amp;amp;nbsp;Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;84/450), the newly codified Directive on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2006/114) only protects traders; it is only applicable to commercial relations between businesses (business-to-business, b2b). &lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Development and sources of law  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This variety of approaches reflects the differences between European legal traditions. At the risk of oversimplifying, three models can be distinguished. The first model, which corresponds to Austrian, Belgian, Danish, German, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss law, is characterized by specific legislation which protects the interests of competitors, consumers and the general public and which prohibits unfair competition by a combination of detailed provisions and a general clause. Some of these statutes, such as the German UWG of 1896 and 1909, reformed in 2004, have a long tradition. The law is enforced ([[Unfair Competition (Consequences)|unfair competition (consequences)]]) either by civil actions brought by individual competitors, trade and consumer organizations (as in Austria, Germany and Switzerland) or by an administrative authority (such as a competition office or, in Scandinavia, the [[Ombudsman|ombudsman]]). The second model, which is followed by French, Italian and, to some extent, Dutch law, distinguishes between tort law, which protects traders’ interests, and consumer protection law, which is primarily enforced by means of administrative or criminal sanctions. In France, the courts had already allowed a cause of action for &#039;&#039;concurrence déloyale&#039;&#039; on the basis of the general clause of tort law (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1382 &#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;) in the mid-19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century, whereas similar protection is granted on the basis of a statutory provision in Italian civil law (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2598 [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]]). Sources of consumer protection law ([[Consumers and Consumer Protection Law|consumers and consumer protection law]]), however, are consumer protection statutes such as the &#039;&#039;Code de la consommation&#039;&#039; in France or the &#039;&#039;Codice del consumo&#039;&#039; in Italy. This approach can be contrasted, thirdly, with the [[Common Law|common law]], which regards unfair competition law with scepticism (‘To draw a line between fair and unfair competition … passes the power of the courts’, &#039;&#039;Mogul&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Gow &amp;amp; Co&#039;&#039;&amp;amp;nbsp;(1889) LR 23 QBD 598,&amp;amp;nbsp;625&amp;amp;nbsp;ff&amp;amp;nbsp;(CA)). The role of continental unfair competition law is played by (i)&amp;amp;nbsp;economic torts which protect businesses against losses suffered in the course of trade (passing off, injurious falsehood, interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract), (ii)&amp;amp;nbsp;consumer protection legislation of a largely criminal or administrative legal nature, (iii)&amp;amp;nbsp;self-regulation of advertising, which in UK practice relegates the legal supervision of advertising into the second row (but see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act&amp;amp;nbsp;1974, which prohibits misleading advertising and deceptive conduct and which is often applied in practice).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So far, these differences have prevented a detailed regulation of unfair competition law at the international level. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;(1) PC, the Member States are under an obligation to grant effective protection against unfair competition. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;(2) PC defines ‘unfair competition’ by reference to the equally general standard of ‘honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’. Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;(3) PC lists three examples of unfair competition: causing confusion (No&amp;amp;nbsp;1), discrediting competitors by false allegations (No&amp;amp;nbsp;2) and misleading consumers (No&amp;amp;nbsp;3). The WIPO has drafted recommendations for the application of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;10&#039;&#039;bis&#039;&#039;PC, which are, however, not binding and which have been criticized as being too ‘continental’. The TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit unfair competition as such, but it provides for the protection of geographical indications of origin (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;22) and of undisclosed information (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;39), both of which are borderline areas between intellectual property and unfair competition law.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the [[European Union]], the disagreement about the systemic nature, the level of regulation and the means of enforcement have made the harmonization of unfair competition law a difficult task. For a long time, conflicts between national restrictions and the [[Fundamental Freedoms (General Principles)|fundamental freedoms]] were in the foreground of legal attention ([[Unfair Competition and Freedoms of Movement|unfair competition and freedoms of movement]]). Directive 84/450 (advertising, misleading) obliged the Member States to grant protection against misleading advertising, but it only set a minimum standard and it allowed the Member States to choose between various means of enforcement. The harmonizing effects of this directive were therefore limited. Directive 97/55 amended the directive of 1984 by inserting provisions on comparative advertising ([[Advertising, Comparative|advertising, comparative]]). A significant step forward on the way to harmonization was made by the adoption of the UCPD of 2005. It aims at a full harmonization of unfair competition law in business-to-consumer commercial relations (for more details see 3. below). In 2006, the directives of 1984 and 1997 were newly codified (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2006/114). Further legislative acts with relevance to unfair competition law are the directives on distance selling (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;97/7) ([[Distance Contracts|distance contracts]]), on injunctions (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;98/27), on [[Price Indication|price indication]] (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;98/6) on [[E-Commerce|e-commerce]] (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2000/31), on data protection in electronic communications (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2002/58), on the distance marketing of consumer financial services (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2002/65), on audiovisual media services (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2007/65) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;2006/2004).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Meanwhile, all Member States have implemented the UCPD. The national implementing provisions again reflect the differences between the models outlined above. Countries with specific and unitary legislation against unfair competition have implemented the provisions of the directive in their unfair competition acts. Many of the implementing provisions are equally applicable to b2c and to b2b relations, but there are also new provisions which distinguish between consumer protection and traders’ protection (see §&amp;amp;nbsp;1(1) of the Austrian UWG, to some extent also §&amp;amp;nbsp;3(2) of the German UWG). In France the implementing provisions were inserted into the &#039;&#039;Code de la consommation&#039;&#039;, and they will primarily be enforced by means of criminal law sanctions. In Italy the &#039;&#039;Codice del consumo&#039;&#039; was amended and the Competition Authority (&#039;&#039;Autorità Garante&#039;&#039;) was given supervisory powers. In the UK the directive was implemented by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. Both the Office of Fair Trading and the local Weights and Measures Authorities are in charge of enforcing the regulations. Unlike Ireland, however, the UK did not provide for a private law cause of action. At the same time the codes of advertising self-regulation, in particular Code of Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing, were adapted to the UCPD. It can be expected that most disputes about unfair commercial practices will still be settled by self-regulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. The UCPD: regulatory content and structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The paragraphs of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1) UCPD proceed from the general to the specific. If applied in reverse order, they form a three-step-test. In a first step, Annex I to the directive sets out a ‘Black List’ of 31 practices which are to be regarded as unfair per se (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(5)). At step two, specific provisions prohibit misleading (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6, 7) and aggressive practices (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;8,&amp;amp;nbsp;9) ([[Commercial Practices, Misleading|commercial practices, misleading]], [[Commercial Practices, Aggressive|commercial practices, aggressive]]). Unlike the ‘Black List’, Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6–9 do not prohibit these practices per se, but only when they are likely to have an impact on consumer choice. Mere harassment which does not interfere with the consumer’s freedom of decision-making, such as e-mail spamming, is excluded from the scope of the directive (but see No&amp;amp;nbsp;26 of Annex I UCPD). The third and final step is constituted by Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(1), which prohibits unfair commercial practices in general. A commercial practice is deemed to be unfair if (a)&amp;amp;nbsp;it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and (b)&amp;amp;nbsp;it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of an average consumer (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(2)). Stricter conditions apply where commercial practices are addressed at a particularly vulnerable group of consumers (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5(3)).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The directive had to be implemented by 12&amp;amp;nbsp;June 2007, and since 12&amp;amp;nbsp;December 2007 it has been directly applicable. It aims at full harmonization; it thus neither allows more liberal nor more restrictive national provisions. For a period of six years, however, Member States may retain stricter law, provided it was passed in order to implement other EC directives (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3(5)). While initially the [[Country of Origin Principle|country of origin principle]] was to be included, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4 now only prevents the Member States from restricting the [[Free Movement of Goods|free movement of goods]] or the [[Free Movement of Services|free movement of services]] for reasons falling within the field approximated by the directive. Although the scope of this provision is unclear, it can—subject to a different construction by the ECJ—be interpreted as a reference to the marketplace principle (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6(1) Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;II Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;864/2007)). Whereas, however, in unharmonized parts of unfair competition law the Member States can still rely on the grounds of justification set forth in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;36 TFEU/Art&amp;amp;nbsp;30 EC or on the mandatory requirements as recognized in the &#039;&#039;Cassis de Dijon&#039;&#039; rule ([[Unfair Competition and Freedoms of Movement|unfair competition and freedoms of movement]]), national restrictions which fall within the scope of the UCPD can only be justified if they can be based on the directive. Meanwhile the ECJ has held three provisions of national law to be irreconcilable with the UCPD: a Belgian ban on combined offers (ECJ Joined Cases&amp;amp;nbsp;C-261/07 and 299/07 – &#039;&#039;VTB-VAB &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; Galatea&#039;&#039;, [2009] ECR I-2949) a German provision which prohibited lotteries for the purposes of sales promotion unless the purchase of goods was not a condition of participation (ECJ Case&amp;amp;nbsp;C-304/08 – &#039;&#039;Plus&#039;&#039;, nyr) and an Austrian ban on free gifts (ECJ Case C-540/08 – &#039;&#039;Mediaprint&#039;&#039;, nyr). In these cases the ECJ held that per se prohibitions of particular commercial practices were only permissible if these practices were proscribed by the ‘Black List’ (Annex I UCPD). In all other cases unfair practices could only be prohibited by national law if they were likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of an average consumer. Since these provisions banned the respective practices per se, they were held not to be in accordance with the UCPD.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Conclusion and perspectives ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The UCPD has harmonized a significant part of unfair competition law at a medium level between the formerly restrictive regulation of markets in Germany and the liberal approach of former English law. Given, however, the vagueness of its central provisions, the exclusion of commercial practices which do not have an immediate impact on consumer choice and the restricted relevance of some practices listed in Annex I, the harmonizing effect of the text of the UCPD will remain limited. Much will depend on the interpretation of the ECJ, which, according to the prevailing but by no means undisputed view, has full competence to interpret and apply even general clauses of EU law. What is more, the UCPD has not harmonized the sanctions and the enforcement ([[Unfair Competition (Consequences)|unfair competition (consequences)]]). Thus, the laws of the Member States will remain different in this respect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as the protection of traders is concerned, only the provisions on misleading and comparative advertising ([[Advertising, Comparative|advertising, comparative]]) have been harmonized. The Commission has not put forward any further drafts as yet. In the remaining areas significant differences between the European jurisdictions prevail. There seems to be a widespread European consensus about how to deal with some issues such as disparaging of a competitor by false allegations, causing confusion, inducing breach of contract and the protection of trade secrets, which makes further harmonization of these areas look like a realistic possibility. Other questions, however, remain disputed for systematic reasons or for reasons of policy. There is, for example, significant disagreement about whether the imitation of products which neither deceives consumers nor infringes intellectual property rights is unfair. English judges emphatically deny protection whereas under the French doctrine of parasitic competition, relief can be granted. German law steers a middle course by prohibiting the offer of imitated products only where the imitation causes confusion, where it takes undue advantage or causes damage to the reputation of the original product or where the imitation was made possible by a breach of confidence (§&amp;amp;nbsp;4 No&amp;amp;nbsp;9 UWG). It is also unclear to what extent the breach of statutory provisions law can trigger unfair competition sanctions. Whereas German law considers the breach of a market regulation as unfair competition (§&amp;amp;nbsp;4 No 11 UWG) and sanctions violations of provisions concerning regulated professions, product safety rules or statutes protecting minors from pornography under unfair competition law, the inclusion of such provisions into unfair competition law is unheard of in many other jurisdictions. In these areas harmonization is no more than a very distant prospect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Eugen Ulmer, Friedrich-Karl Beier, Gerhard Schricker and Joseph Straus (eds), &#039;&#039;Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;8 vols&#039;&#039; (1965); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, &#039;&#039;Unfair Competition Law&#039;&#039; (1997); Ansgar Ohly, &#039;&#039;Richterrecht und Generalklausel im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs&#039;&#039; (1997); Hans Micklitz and Jürgen Kessler (eds), &#039;&#039;Marketing Practice Regulation and Consumer Protection in the EC Member States and the US&#039;&#039; (2002); Antonia Bakardjieva Engelbrekt,&#039;&#039; Fair Trading Law in Flux? National Legacies&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Institutional Choice and the Process of Europeanisation&#039;&#039; (2003); Christopher Wadlow, &#039;&#039;The Law of Passing-Off&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2004); Frauke Henning-Bodewig,&#039;&#039; Unfair Competition Law&#039;&#039; (2006); Jochen&amp;amp;nbsp;Glöckner, &#039;&#039;Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht&#039;&#039; (2006); Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds),&#039;&#039; The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices Under EC Directive 2005&#039;&#039;/&#039;&#039;29&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; New Rules and New Techniques&#039;&#039; (2007); Martin Schmidt-Kessel and Silvan Schubmehl (eds), &#039;&#039;Lauterkeitsrecht in Europa—Eine Sammlung von Länderberichten zum Recht gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb&#039;&#039; (2011).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unlauterer_Wettbewerb_(Grundlagen)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unfair_Competition&amp;diff=1229</id>
		<title>Unfair Competition</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Unfair_Competition&amp;diff=1229"/>
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&lt;div&gt;[[Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)]]&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Unfair Competition (Consequences)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Unfair Competition and Freedoms of Movement]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Unlauterer_Wettbewerb]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Undue_Influence&amp;diff=1227</id>
		<title>Undue Influence</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Undue_Influence&amp;diff=1227"/>
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Sebastian A E Martens]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Object and goal ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of private autonomy which is fundamental for European private law requires that it must principally be possible for every individual to regulate his legal relations in a free, self-responsible and self-determined manner. The freedom of formation of the will is thus violated if someone else illegitimately interferes with it. Therefore, all European legal systems grant protection from undue interferences with the process of will formation by laws covering [[Fraud|fraud]] and [[Duress|duress]]. But the freedom of self-determination can also be violated by other persons’ acts that do not reach the severity of these traditional vices of consent. A special problem is presented by transactions which are entered into by someone under the influence of a relationship of trust and emotion (eg a transaction in favour of a close relative). In these cases a rational balancing of the advantages or disadvantages of the transaction is often replaced by purely emotional decisions. Under usual market conditions both parties try to maximize their individual benefit in a negotiating process and this generally leads to a compromise of their contrary interests. If, however, there is an emotional relationship between the parties and one party regards the interests of the other as equally important to his own, this situation is open to abuse by the stronger party. In such a situation a transaction may be entered into that would not have been wanted under usual circumstances and is only concluded because of an undue influence on the dependent contracting party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European legal systems have developed different strategies to address the problems caused by such situations. They have all had difficulties in satisfactorily categorizing them within the general doctrinal system. This problem derives from their acceptance of a market model as a basic assumption according to which everyone is generally capable of rational judgments and is able to control his emotions at least insofar as he can take them into consideration as one factor (along with others, such as price, need, etc) in the process of balancing his interests. According to this model everyone is responsible for his own emotions, and emotions cannot cause a legally relevant vice of consent. Therefore, some legal systems do not analyse the problem in terms of impaired consent but turn to scrutinizing the content of the transaction, eg by regarding bargains&#039;&#039; contra bonos mores&#039;&#039; as unconscionable. However, in this analysis they also take into account the process leading to the conclusion of the contract. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other legal systems, in contrast, refuse to inquire into the substantive fairness of a bargain and focus on procedural justice, ie the freedom of will-formation. These legal systems in turn face the question whether it is really possible completely to suppress all substantive evaluation of the contract in question. They are also faced with the practical difficulty of proving undue influence in a relationship of trust and emotion. Such a proof can be facilitated either by presumptions of undue influence in certain defined types of cases or by formulating the concept of undue influence in a rather abstract way, eg by using a concept of inequality of bargaining power. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, a legal system can also refrain from the idea of a single comprehensive provision for all cases of undue influence, and can instead adopt a case-by-case strategy with specific provisions for every transaction that has proved to be problematic in relationships of trust and emotion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. The legal development on the European continent ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== a) Rise and fall of metus reverentialis ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Roman Law|Roman law]] took account of the need for protection of socially or emotionally dependent persons in a casuistic manner by specific rules and exceptions for the protection of wives, minors and freedmen (&#039;&#039;liberti&#039;&#039;). For example, the &#039;&#039;SC Velleianum&#039;&#039; generally prohibited women from standing surety for the debts of other persons and accepted such transactions to be valid only if strict formalities had been complied with.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The general remedies because of &#039;&#039;metus&#039;&#039; (fear, [[Duress|duress]]) did not apply in cases of mere reverence, as was explicitly stated in the Digest. Nevertheless, lawyers developed the concept of &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis&#039;&#039; in the course of the [[Reception|reception]] of [[Roman Law|Roman law]] generalizing the fragment D.&amp;amp;nbsp;44.5.1.6 which contained a specific rule for the protection of freedmen. It was argued that a judge, notwithstanding the limits of the statutory provisions as to &#039;&#039;metus&#039;&#039;, had a discretionary power to recognize reverence as an obstacle to the binding force of an agreement, eg the reverence of a wife towards her husband that had caused her to undertake a disposition in his favour. Mere reverence was, however, not sufficient. The transaction in question also had to be substantively unfair ([[Laesio Enormis|&#039;&#039;laesio enormis&#039;&#039;]]), or the revered dominant person at least needed to have a violent character which justified the &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis&#039;&#039;. The lawyers developed a number of presumptions to determine the existence of such a relevant &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis &#039;&#039;in judicial practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis&#039;&#039; disappeared in the times of the secular [[Natural Law|natural law]] and the late &#039;&#039;usus modernus&#039;&#039;. Interferences with the free formation of the will in the contracting process were now seen to jeopardize the binding force of the contract only if such interferences could be qualified as delictual wrongdoings, as in the cases of [[Fraud|fraud]] and [[Duress|duress]]. Thus, even today there remain provisions such as Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1114 [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]] and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1437 [[Codice Civile|&#039;&#039;Codice civile&#039;&#039;]] that explicitly declare mere &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis&#039;&#039; to be irrelevant. But not only the concept of &#039;&#039;metus reverentialis &#039;&#039;was abandoned in the course of the codification of private law. Additionally, lawyers increasingly regarded the traditional special provisions of protection, particularly those for wives (eg the &#039;&#039;SC&amp;amp;nbsp;Velleianum&#039;&#039;), to be in conflict with the general system of law. Thus, these provisions were slowly phased out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== b) The modern development, particularly with respect to suretyship contracts ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it has become clear that it is often only with great difficulty, that the rules for standard business transactions can be applied to contracts which are concluded within a relationship of trust and confidence. In particular intercessions by spouses, most often suretyship contracts by wives vis-à-vis banks for their husband’s debts, have caused many problems to the European legal systems since the late 20th&amp;amp;nbsp;century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Germany, following a fundamental ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG 19&amp;amp;nbsp;October 1993, BVerfGE&amp;amp;nbsp;89, 214), the validity of such suretyship contracts is determined by the Federal Supreme Court in terms of §&amp;amp;nbsp;138&amp;amp;nbsp;[[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (BGB)]], which concerns contracts &#039;&#039;contra bonos mores&#039;&#039; ([[Illegality of Contracts|illegality of contracts]]), and the court takes account of both substantive and procedural aspects. While §&amp;amp;nbsp;138 BGB usually requires a material imbalance between the corresponding contractual obligations, in the cases of suretyship contracts it is regarded as sufficient if the obligation under the suretyship contract is grossly out of proportion to the financial circumstances of the person standing surety. However, the conclusion of such a contract is only seen as being &#039;&#039;contra bonos mores&#039;&#039; if the creditor took advantage of some special weakness of the surety, eg her special emotional relationship to the principal debtor. Some German legal writers reject the approach of the Federal Supreme Court for systematic reasons. They propose to overcome the narrow limits of the two recognized forms of unlawful interference with the formation of the will ([[Fraud|fraud]] and [[Duress|duress]]) by introducing a general concept of undue influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Austrian, Dutch and French laws have special provisions for suretyship contracts concluded by consumers. Of these, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;341-4 &#039;&#039;Code de&amp;amp;nbsp;la consommation&#039;&#039; is particularly strict and forbids a creditor from accepting a consumer as surety, if the obligation undertaken by him would be out of proportion to his financial capacity. However, only Art&amp;amp;nbsp;31 of the Nordic Contract Codes and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3:44(4)&amp;amp;nbsp;[[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]] regard the abusive exploitation of some weakness, especially within a relationship of trust and confidence, as a wrongful interference with the formation of the will comparable to fraud and duress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 3. Undue influence in English law ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In principle, English law refuses an evaluation of the substantive justice of contracts and focuses instead on a control of the procedural fairness of the negotiations. In doing so, the judges can, amongst other devices, make use of the equitable doctrine of ‘undue influence’. Since the 19th&amp;amp;nbsp;century the courts have granted protection to persons who have entered into transactions under such ‘undue influence’. It was, however, left unclear what exactly was meant by ‘undue influence’. Courts recognized undue influence if a legal disposition could not be regarded as a free and voluntary decision in a particular case. Over the course of time two types of cases were distinguished: On the one hand, there were cases of ‘actual undue influence’ where some wrongful interference with the formation of the will could actually be proven. On the other hand, undue influence was presumed in certain relationships of trust and confidence if the trusting party made a disadvantageous disposition in favour of the party trusted. Recently, attempts have been made, once again, to merge both lines of cases of undue influence by demanding that ‘presumed undue influence’ is to be restricted to cases where some real wrongdoing, as it has to be proven in cases of ‘actual undue influence’, can justifiably be presumed in fact. If this reasoning were to prevail, the special protection for dependent persons in relationships of trust and confidence would be significantly weakened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 1980s, the concept of undue influence has been used by the courts in particular to control intercessions on the part of relatives or other people who are emotionally close to the principal debtor. A non-commercial contract of suretyship can be avoided in case of undue influence if the creditor did not insist on independent advice being provided to the surety. The [[Mixed Legal Systems|mixed legal systems]] of Scotland and South Africa have functionally adopted this solution to a large extent under the general umbrella of the principle of [[Good Faith|good faith]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 4. The provisions concerning undue influence in PECL and UNIDROIT PICC ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In view of the described disparate state of law it comes as no surprise that the relevant provisions of the international uniform model projects, ie Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109 PECL (adopted verbatim in Art&amp;amp;nbsp;II-7:207 DCFR) and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.10 UNIDROIT PICC, contain compromise solutions. Both provisions are systematically close to the traditional vices of consent [[Mistake|mistake]], [[Fraud|fraud]] and [[Duress|duress]]. They grant a right of avoidance in case of gross disparity (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.10 UNIDROIT PICC) or in case of an excessive benefit or unfair advantage (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109 PECL). This substantive injustice of the contract needs to be due to the fact that one party took unfair advantage of a weak position of the other party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.10 UNIDROIT PICC and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109 PECL proceed from the concept of a contract with interconnected mutual obligations where the values of these obligations can be put into proportion with each other. Therefore, it is unclear how an excessive benefit or a gross disparity is to be determined in cases of unilaterally binding contracts such as suretyship contracts, gifts or testamentary dispositions. In case of suretyships, most European legal systems take the financial capacity of the person standing surety into consideration. Sometimes, as for example in England, no substantive unfairness is required in cases of unilateral acts, and substantive criteria such as a lack of personal interest are only used as factors indicating the presence of undue influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.10 UNIDROIT PICC and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109 PECL grant a right to avoid a substantively unjust contract only if it has been concluded in objectionable circumstances. The disadvantaged person has to have been in a weak bargaining position due to one of a number of specific, enumerated reasons. Article&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109(1)(a) PECL explicitly mentions as one such reason the fact that a party was dependent on, or in a relationship of trust with, the other party. It does not, however, cover the situation in which the weakness of one contractual party is due to an emotional relationship with a third party. The European legal systems also have problems to analyse such three-party constellations within their usual doctrinal framework, as has particularly become clear in the cases of non-commercial suretyships. In the PECL this problem is meant to be solved by Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:111, which extends the consequences of vices of consent caused by a third party to the contractual partner under certain circumstances. Thus, Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:111&amp;amp;nbsp;PECL also requires that the third party has fulfilled all elements of Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109&amp;amp;nbsp;PECL in his own person, ie the third party needs to have gained an excessive benefit by taking unfair advantage of the other party’s weak position; under certain circumstances this is then attributed to the contractual partner of the weak party. This rule may have the advantage of systematic logic, but it is not clear how it is supposed to work in practice. The PECL reflect the doctrinal uncertainty of many European legal systems as to whether in three-party constellations some personal wrongdoing by the contractual partner is required or whether it is the third party’s wrongdoing which is to be attributed to the contractual partner. In both cases it is uncertain just what constitutes the actual wrongdoing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the usual two-party cases, the other party must have known or must at least be reasonably supposed to have known about the weakness of the disadvantaged party. The other party also has to have taken advantage of this weakness (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:109(1)(b) PECL).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apart from establishing a right of avoidance, PECL and UNIDROIT PICC also grant the disadvantaged party a right to request the court to adapt the contract in order to bring it into accordance with good faith and fair dealing. The disadvantaged party may alternatively or cumulatively claim damages under Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:117 PECL or Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.18 UNIDROIT PICC. According to Art&amp;amp;nbsp;4:118(1) PECL and Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.19 UNIDROIT PICC, these remedies cannot be excluded or restricted contractually.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 5. Unitary law ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The topic of vices of consent is usually excluded from the scope of international model laws or treaties and left to the national legal system to regulate. Until now, in European secondary legislation only Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;85/577 concerning contracts negotiated away from business premises controls some negotiation practices. The new consumer credit directive (Dir&amp;amp;nbsp;2008/48/EC) does not contain any provisions as to non-commercial sureties despite suggestions from legal writers to that effect; rather, the directive explicitly excludes from its scope even the topic of credit agreements secured by real estate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
John Cartwright, &#039;&#039;Unequal Bargaining&#039;&#039; (1991);&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Peter Birks and Nyuk Yin Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman (eds), &#039;&#039;Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law&#039;&#039; (1995) 57; Stephan Lorenz, &#039;&#039;Der Schutz vor dem unerwünschten Vertrag&#039;&#039; (1997) 445;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Jacques du Plessis and Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘The Relevance of Reverence: Undue Influence Civilian Style’ (2003) 10 MJ 345; Peter Birks, ‘Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation’ (2004) 120 LQR 120 34;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Nelson Enonchong, &#039;&#039;Duress&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing&#039;&#039; (2006); Stephan Wagner, ‘Undue Influence—mögliche Einflüsse des Civil law vom Ende des 16. bis Anfang des 19.&amp;amp;nbsp;Jahrhunderts’ (2006) 123 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 248; Nils Jansen, ‘Seriositätskontrollen existentiell belastender Versprechen: Rechtsvergleichung, Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsdogmatik’ in Reinhard Zimmermann (ed), &#039;&#039;Störungen der Willensbildung bei Vertragsschluss&#039;&#039; (2007) 125; Sebastian Martens, &#039;&#039;Durch Dritte verursachte Willensmängel&#039;&#039; (2007).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Undue_Influence]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Runggaldier&amp;diff=1225</id>
		<title>Ulrich Runggaldier</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Runggaldier&amp;diff=1225"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Ulrich Runggaldier&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Professor and Head of the Institute for Austrian and European Labour Law and Social Security Law, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Ulrich_Runggaldier]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Ulrich_Runggaldier}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Runggaldier, Ulrich}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Magnus&amp;diff=1223</id>
		<title>Ulrich Magnus</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Magnus&amp;diff=1223"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Ulrich Magnus&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Emeritus Professor of Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law, Universität Hamburg&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Ulrich_Magnus]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Ulrich_Magnus}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Magnus, Ulrich}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Ernst&amp;diff=1221</id>
		<title>Ulrich Ernst</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Ernst&amp;diff=1221"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Ulrich Ernst&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Magister (Poznań), Lecturer, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Ulrich_Ernst]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Ulrich_Ernst}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Ernst, Ulrich}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Drobnig&amp;diff=1219</id>
		<title>Ulrich Drobnig</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=Ulrich_Drobnig&amp;diff=1219"/>
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Ulrich Drobnig&#039;&#039;, Dr.iur., Dr. h.c. mult., M.C.J. (NYU), Professor, Emeritus Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Authors]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Ulrich_Drobnig]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{Special:Whatlinkshere/Ulrich_Drobnig}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Drobnig, Ulrich}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=UNIDROIT_Principles_of_International_Commercial_Contracts_(PICC)&amp;diff=1217</id>
		<title>UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://max-eup2012.mpipriv.de/index.php?title=UNIDROIT_Principles_of_International_Commercial_Contracts_(PICC)&amp;diff=1217"/>
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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Jan Kleinheisterkamp]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 1. Conception ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) are the most successful attempt, so far, to codify transnational rules on the law of international commercial contracts. The ongoing work is being conducted under the auspices of [[UNIDROIT]] and has been said to reflect the tradition of the [[Lex Mercatoria|&#039;&#039;lex mercatoria&#039;&#039;]] and to follow the spirit of the US [[Restatements|restatements]] at a global level. Its roots can be traced back to Ernst Rabel’s comparative work for UNIDROIT on the international [[Sale of Goods, International (Uniform Law)|sale of goods]] in 1935, which eventually led to the Hague Conventions and Uniform Laws of 1964. In 1968 UNIDROIT launched the idea of a non-binding code that would go beyond the sale of goods and that would reflect the general principles derived from the contract laws of different countries so as to constitute a kind of [[General Part|general part]] of a uniform international commercial code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Work started in 1970 under the leadership of René David (France), Tudor Popescu (Romania) and Clive M Schmitthoff (England). This committee elaborated drafts for uniform rules on the formation of contracts (based on the 1964 Uniform Law) and on the [[Interpretation of Contracts|interpretation of contracts]], which were partially taken over by [[UNCITRAL]] and incorporated into the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG). In 1980, a much larger working group was created under the chairmanship of the committee’s former secretary, Michael Joachim Bonell. In the ensuing 14 years, the Working Group drafted a body of rules which covered legal issues ranging from the commencement of negotiations to the remedies for non-performance. The first version of the PICC, which was published by UNIDROIT in 1994, consisted of 119 articles and the corresponding official comments. The reactions to the first edition were perceived as very positive and encouraging, and a new working group was thus nominated in 1997, which in 2004 presented a significantly expanded second version of the PICC. In its formal approval of the 2004 version, the Governing Council of UNIDROIT recommended that the work on the PICC be expanded into a continuing project. The third edition of the PICC was presented in May 2011 and shows the efforts of trying to fine-tune the existing principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is worth mentioning that the PICC Working Group not only kept a very attentive eye on the CISG, but also worked in close cooperation with the [[Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)]] project. Numerous members of the PICC working group were also members of the PECL commission, such as Bonell, Ole Lando, Ulrich Drobnig, Arthur S Hartkamp, Dennis Tallon and (since 2005) also Reinhard Zimmermann.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== 2. Method  ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards the working method for the elaboration of uniform international rules, it was clear from the outset that the starting point would be a comparison of numerous national legal systems, including their legislation, case law and academic literature. As far as it was possible to find corresponding national solutions for specific contractual problems, this allowed the reformulation of general principles reflecting a ‘common core’ of international contract law. In that respect the PICC are, similar to the US [[Restatements|restatements]], not a primary source of law, but a secondary source that makes internationally accepted principles of contract law accessible in a systematic manner.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was clear from the outset that in many instances it would not be possible to find the necessary congruence between the national solutions. Accordingly, the PICC intend primarily ‘to provide a satisfactory set of rules for those relationships that come about, by definition, across national frontiers, whereas the traditional national laws are essentially based on the requirements of normal internal relationships; ... [consequently] the code should not attempt chiefly to reconcile the latter, but rather to lay down the principles and solutions which seem to be best adapted to the special requirements of international trade’ (UNIDROIT 1979 Study L-Doc 15 p&amp;amp;nbsp;8). In line with this logic, many provisions of the PICC do not reformulate general principles that are already broadly accepted, but instead have to be understood as propositions for what should be considered the best solutions for specific problems of contract law which, by proving convincing and becoming accepted in practice, could grow into new general principles.&lt;br /&gt;
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The official comments on the black letter rules of the PICC contain some reference to the CISG where its provisions have been adopted, but there are no references to national legal provisions that have formed the basis of the comparative study. This silence has been justified by the fear of undermining the autonomous and uniform interpretation required by Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.6(1) PICC. The result is, however, that it is frequently unclear whether individual provisions actually reflect existing general principles or whether they propose new solutions. Comparative law remains therefore an indispensable tool for the practical application of the PICC, especially in view of the − as yet − very sparse (and sometimes rather poorly reasoned) decisions by courts and tribunals published on &amp;lt;www.unilex.info&amp;gt;. The scholarly analysis of comparing and contrasting the provisions of the PICC with the rich experience of national contract laws and international instruments is essential for rendering the PICC more readily accessible and comprehensible and, thus, operational for practice. Putting them back into the comparative context allows the PICC to be interpreted and criticized in such a way as to give them the degree of robustness and certainty upon which—being merely a soft law instrument—their legitimacy and persuasive authority depends to a large extent.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Application and significance ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether the provisions of the PICC can actually be applied to a specific case depends on the &#039;&#039;lex fori&#039;&#039; of the court or the &#039;&#039;lex arbitri&#039;&#039; of the tribunal confronted with that question. The PICC’s own intention in that regard, as stated boldly in their preamble, is irrelevant in this respect.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== a) Choice of the PICC as the applicable law ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The application of the PICC to a specific dispute is unproblematic when merely chosen as a set of pre-drafted clauses (comparable to the choice of the [[Incoterms]]) which are incorporated into the contract by reference. In that case they remain subject to all mandatory rules of the proper law of the contract ([[Mandatory Law|mandatory law]]). Their application as the ‘applicable law’ by way of a [[Choice of Law by the Parties|choice of law by the parties]], however, is much more problematic, at least in state courts. Except for provision in the US state of Oregon, no conflicts of law rules allow courts to apply non-state law rules. A draft by the [[European Commission]] for the Rome&amp;amp;nbsp;I Regulation (Reg&amp;amp;nbsp;593/ 2008) had proposed that the ‘parties may also choose as the applicable law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community’ (COM(2005) 650 final). This proposal, however, was rejected by the Member States in the Council because of the difficulties of establishing general criteria for the official recognition of such rules as well as fears that national mandatory rules could be circumvented by such an option.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most national [[Arbitration Law (National)|arbitration laws]], however, allow parties to submit their disputes to arbitration and thus to remove them from state court scrutiny due to the prohibition of substantive review ([[Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards|recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards]]). The same arbitration laws allow the parties not only to chose ‘laws’, but also ‘rules of law’ as the basis for decision, which corresponds to the generally accepted possibility of letting the arbitrators decide &#039;&#039;ex aequo et bono&#039;&#039; or upon ‘other considerations’ than law. It follows that parties can choose the PICC as applicable law if this choice is coupled with an arbitration agreement.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has to be borne in mind, however, that the choice of the PICC does not allow the parties to circumvent national [[Mandatory Law|mandatory law]] that has a legitimate claim to apply to a dispute (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.4). Furthermore, the PICC are necessarily incomplete. The model choice-of-law clause suggested in the footnote to their preamble highlights the possibility of supplementing the PICC with the choice of an embedded national law. In the absence of such a supplementing choice, an arbitral tribunal must first attempt to fill any gaps in the PICC by recourse to [[General Principles of Law|general principles of law]] (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.6(1)) and thus through comparative law. If no such general principles can be found, the tribunal will have to determine the applicable national law on the basis of the conflicts provisions applicable according to the arbitration law at the seat of arbitration.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== b) Application of the PICC in the absence of&amp;amp;nbsp;an&amp;amp;nbsp;explicit choice ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The preamble of the PICC encourages arbitrators to apply the PICC also ‘when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, the &#039;&#039;lex mercatoria&#039;&#039; or the like’. The implicit claim that the PICC represent general principles or even the mythical [[Lex Mercatoria|&#039;&#039;lex mercatoria&#039;&#039;]] is highly questionable from a theoretical point of view. This claim, however, may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy if and to the degree that the PICC are effectively embraced in practice due to their mostly convincing and well-balanced solutions and the legal certainty that may result from their growing application.&lt;br /&gt;
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The preamble also invites application of the PICC ‘when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their contract’. Many national [[Arbitration Law (National)|arbitration laws]] do not allow arbitrators such &#039;&#039;voie directe&#039;&#039; in the absence of choice but instead require the application of conflict-of-law rules. All arbitration laws do, however, allow the parties to delegate the choice to the arbitrators. Accordingly, most institutional arbitration rules contain provisions allowing the arbitrators to choose not only ‘laws’, but also ‘rules of law’ if the parties have not made a choice. It can hardly be presumed that the parties by their silence opted against the application of any state law, since their silence could be interpreted &#039;&#039;a fortiori&#039;&#039; as opting against the application of non-state law. It is, however, conceivable that in certain circumstances an arbitral tribunal could conclude that, for example, failed negotiations over the applicable law indicate that the application of some state law would unduly privilege one of the parties and that the application of the neutral and transnational rules of the PICC would therefore constitute the fairest and most appropriate solution.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== c) Interpretation and supplementation of national and international law ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of the few published arbitral awards only a small number explicitly refers to or relies on the PICC. The PICC have, however, a significant role to play in the interpretation and supplementation of international instruments, such as the CISG in particular, and national laws, as far as they are applied to international contracts. State courts have occasionally referred to the PICC in a rather eclectic manner to justify or corroborate new developments in their own laws. Arbitrators will often glance at the PICC to obtain a first rough appreciation of a case to which they have to apply unknown foreign law, or in order to reinforce their findings under such laws with reference to an internationally accepted standard. Unfortunately, this attractiveness of the PICC also entails the danger of their unconsciously or consciously being misused as a shortcut that allows an avoidance of the proper analysis—or even the prescribed solutions—under the actually applicable law, as evidenced by some awards and court decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== d) The model function of the PICC ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the preamble of the PICC commends them ‘as a model for national and international legislators’. Indeed, reforms of national contract law can hardly ignore the propositions contained in the PICC. Their influence on the 2002 reform of the German law of obligations in the [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)|&#039;&#039;Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch&#039;&#039; (BGB)]] and on the present attempts to modernize the law of obligations in the French [[Code Civil|&#039;&#039;Code civil&#039;&#039;]] is not as readily visible as the influence on the Dutch [[Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW)|&#039;&#039;Burgerlijk Wetboek&#039;&#039; (BW)]] and on the discussions to reform [[Scottish Private Law|Scottish private law]]. The PICC have been highly influential on the reform of the general part of the Spanish Commercial Code, on the new civil codes of Lithuania (2000) and Estonia (2002), on the Chinese contract law of 1999 and, to a lesser degree, on the [[Russian Civil Code]] and the Israeli Civil Code. Furthermore, the PICC have been the model for the UNIDROIT sponsored draft uniform contract act for the Organisation of the (16) francophone African States (OHADA), which has not yet been adopted.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Normative structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The 185 articles of the 2004 version of the PICC are divided into 10 chapters and preceded by the aforementioned preamble. Each article is accompanied by official comments. According to their drafters, these comments are to be treated as an integral part of the PICC. In substance, however, some of the comments go considerably beyond the respective ‘black letter rule’, sometimes in order to keep the provisions as abstract and lean as possible, sometimes as a compromise solution when no consensus could be found in the working group on individual points. The comments frequently contain illustrations to clarify the practical application of the respective provisions, a goal that is not always attained.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;1 is (in the traditions of the BGB and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)) a [[General Part|general part]] with ‘General Provisions’, some of which are mere programmatic enunciations that guide the interpretation, such as the principles of &#039;&#039;pacta sunt servanda&#039;&#039; (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.1) and [[Good Faith|good faith]] (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.7). Among the truly operational provisions are the priority of applicable mandatory rules (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.4), the rules on interpretation and supplementation of the PICC (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.6), and the rules on the effectiveness of notices (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;1.10).&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;2 (section 2.1) covers the formation of contracts ([[Contract (Formation)|contract (formation)]]) as well as the [[Authority of Agents|authority of agents]] (section 2.2). Among the provisions on formation, one can observe several good examples of the difficulty in formulating clear and generally acceptable rules when trying to find a compromise between the different solutions in English, US, French and German law, such as the revocability of offers (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.4), or liability for negotiating in bad faith (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.15). Also problematic are some provisions taken directly from US sales law which facilitate the conclusion of the contract despite remaining doubts as to its content, such as for cases of modified acceptance (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.11) or contracts with open terms (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.14). Provisions with particular practical relevance are those on [[Standard Contract Terms|standard contract terms]], which allow for the scrutiny of the inclusion of standard terms (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.20) but not of their content (but see Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.10), and provide for the knock-out rule when there is a battle of the forms (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;2.1.22).&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;3 treats the validity of contracts and has been restructured in the 2010 edition in three sections. Section 1 generally clarifies that questions of [[Capacity|capacity]] are left to the applicable national laws (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.1.1). National requirements of [[Indicia of Seriousness|indicia of seriousness]], such as the English doctrine of consideration or the French &#039;&#039;cause&#039;&#039;, or national impediments relating to initial impossibility ([[Impossibility, Initial|impossibility, initial]]) are clearly irrelevant if the contract is governed by the PICC (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;3.1.2, 3.1.3). Section 2 on grounds for avoidance is mainly dedicated to [[Mistake|mistake]], [[Fraud|fraud]] and threat ([[Duress|duress]]) and the respective remedies of termination ([[Termination of a Contract|termination of a contract]]) and [[Damages|damages]]. Worth noting is a provision on gross disparity which allows tribunals generally to police the content of contracts for unfairness (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;3.2.7). Section 3 includes new provisions on [[Illegality of Contracts|illegality of contracts]] and possibly resulting obligations of restitution ([[Unjustified Enrichment|unjustified enrichment]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;4 contains uniform rules on the [[Interpretation of Contracts|interpretation of contracts]] and statements and other conduct of the parties. The need for such international uniform rules of interpretation is highlighted by the fact that these provisions of the PICC are those most cited in practice by far. Despite the existing differences between national rules of interpretation, Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;4 can be said to contain mostly provisions which actually reflect internationally accepted general principles.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;5, in its first section, covers the general content of contracts, such as the duty of co-operation (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.3), the distinction (taken from French law) between the duty to obtain a specific result and the duty of best efforts (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.4) ([[Contract for Work and Labour|contract for work and labour]]; [[Service Contracts|service contracts]]), the determination of the quality of performance (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.6) or price (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.7), the right to end contracts concluded for an indefinite period (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.8—taken from Art&amp;amp;nbsp;6:109 PECL), as well as the (oddly placed) possibility to [[Release|release]] a debtor (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;5.1.9). Section&amp;amp;nbsp;2 of Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;5 was only introduced in 2004 and covers [[Contract in Favour of a Third Party|contracts in favour of third parties]]. The 2010 edition of the PICC then included Section 3 on suspensive and resolutive conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;6 contains, in its first section, default rules on how [[Performance and its Modalities|performance]] is to be rendered, eg by defining the time and place of performance (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6.1.1 and 6.1.6), the right to refuse partial or earlier performance (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6.1.3 and 6.1.5), modalities of payment (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6.1.8–6.1.12), as well as the consequences of public permission requirements (Arts&amp;amp;nbsp;6.1.14–6.1.17). Section&amp;amp;nbsp;6.2 deserves particular attention as it introduces remedies for hardship resulting from a [[Change of Circumstances|change of circumstance]], despite the clear rejection of such a possibility in numerous national laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;7 consists of four sections dedicated to [[Non-Performance|non-performance]]. Section&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1 starts out with a definition of non-performance (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.1) and addresses, inter alia, the non-performing party’s right to cure (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.4) ([[Supplementary Performance|supplementary performance]]), the other party’s right to withhold performance (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.3) ([[Right of Retention|right of retention]]), the limits of exemption clauses (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.6) and the exemption of liability in cases of &#039;&#039;force majeure&#039;&#039; (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.7). Section&amp;amp;nbsp;7.2 clarifies that there is a right to performance, yet—as a concession to the common law which accepts [[Specific Performance|specific performance]] only in very limited instances—not without reducing that right significantly by providing a number of important exceptions (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.2.2). Conversely, the PICC adopt the French concept of &#039;&#039;astreintes&#039;&#039; by allowing a tribunal to order payment of ‘judicial penalties’ where there is an order to perform that is not being respected (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.2.4). Similarly to the CISG, section&amp;amp;nbsp;7.3 grants [[Termination of a Contract|termination of a contract]] only when non-performance can be qualified as ‘fundamental’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.3.1), but in that case also when such fundamental non-performance can be anticipated before the due date (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.3.3). Otherwise, the contract can only be terminated if the additional period fixed by the aggrieved party has expired without effect (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.1.5). Unilateral termination of the contract does not affect the right to claim damages (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.3.5) and leads to the [[Unwinding of Contracts|unwinding of the contract]] (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.3.6). Section&amp;amp;nbsp;7.4 regulates the obligation to pay [[Damages|damages]] for non-performance, including [[Interest|interest]] for [[Delay in Payment|delay in payment]] (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.4.9), and allows for conventional penalties ([[Penalty Clauses|penalty clause]]), to which (contrary to the French and English tradition) the aggrieved party is entitled ‘irrespective of the actual harm’ (Art&amp;amp;nbsp;7.4.13).&lt;br /&gt;
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New to the second edition of the PICC of 2004 are Chapter 8 on [[Set-Off|set-off]]; Chapter 9 on [[Assignment|assignment]], the assumption of debt ([[Transfer of Obligation|transfer of obligation]]) and the [[Transfer of Contract|transfer of contracts]]; and Chapter&amp;amp;nbsp;10 on limitation periods ([[Prescription|prescription]]), which has been significantly influenced by the PECL. Moreover, the third edition of 2010 includes a new Chapter 11 on the plurality of debtors and creditors ([[Solidary Obligations|solidary obligations]]; [[Plurality of Creditors|plurality of creditors]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 5. Future ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The increasing interest in, and the use of, the PICC both by academics for their research and teaching as well as by practitioners for the drafting of contracts and dispute resolution suggest that the PICC will, in the future, be a significant element at least in international arbitration. In any case, they have the potential to live up to their drafters’ expectation of becoming a [[General Part|general part]] of transnational commercial law. The official endorsement of the PICC by UNCITRAL in 2007 is yet another step in that direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Edward Allen Farnsworth, ‘The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles’ (1998) 72 Tul L Rev 1985; Michael Joachim Bonell, &#039;&#039;An International Restatement of Contract Law&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts&#039;&#039; (3rd&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2005); Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004 in Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 21 Tulane Euro Civ LF 1;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Eleanor C Ritaine and Eva Lein&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;(eds), &#039;&#039;The UNIDROIT Principles 2004&#039;&#039; (2007); Stefan Vogenauer and Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds), &#039;&#039;Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts (PICC)&#039;&#039; (2009); Ralf Michaels, ‘Umdenken für die UNIDROIT-Prinzipien’ (2009) 73 RabelsZ 866.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:UNIDROIT_Principles_of_International_Commercial_Contracts]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>UNIDROIT</title>
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		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:36Z</updated>

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&lt;div&gt;__FORCETOC__ &lt;br /&gt;
by &#039;&#039;[[Herbert Kronke]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. History, purposes, member states ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, better known as UNIDROIT, the abbreviation of the organization’s French name, &#039;&#039;Institut International pour l’Unification du Droit Privé&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;was founded in 1926 as one of six specialized agencies (&#039;&#039;bureaux&#039;&#039;) of the League of Nations&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039; The initiative had been taken by Vittorio Scialoja, professor of Roman law and senator. The first Statute of 1926 (as with the 1993 Statute presently in force) describes the objectives of the Organization as follows: ‘The purposes … are to examine ways of harmonising and coordinating the private law of States and groups of States, and to prepare gradually for the adoption by the various States of uniform rules of private law&amp;amp;nbsp;…’. The Council of the League of Nations appointed the Institute’s Governing Council, whereas Italy provided the historic &#039;&#039;Villa Aldobrandini&#039;&#039;, enlarged by an important library building, as its seat as well as the budgetary means for the carrying out of its activities. On 30&amp;amp;nbsp;May 1928, the Institute commenced its work with the official inauguration, attended by King Victor Emmanuel&amp;amp;nbsp;III and his prime minister Benito Mussolini, and the opening of the Governing Council’s first session. A member of the first Governing Council was Ernst Rabel, under whose direction the former Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative and International Private Law had been founded in Berlin in 1926 (today the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg). He emphasized the need to focus the available resources on work aimed at the unification of the law concerning the sale of goods ([[Sale of Goods, International (Uniform Law)|sale of goods, international (uniform law)]]). Apart from that, priority items on the agenda were the law of bills of exchange and cheques, culminating in the Geneva Conventions of 1930 and 1931 ([[Negotiable Instruments (Cheques &amp;amp; Bills of Exchange)|negotiable instruments (cheques and bills of exchange)]], arbitration ([[Arbitration (International)|arbitration (international)]]), and the enforcement of maintenance obligations ([[Maintenance|maintenance]]). When work on the sale of goods was about to come to fruition, Italy and Germany left the League of Nations. Ernst Rabel’s forced emigration brought the work temporarily to an end.&lt;br /&gt;
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UNIDROIT’s new constitutional arrangement as an intergovernmental organization is based on a multilateral treaty, the Statute of 1940, which entered into force in the same year for 23 member states. However, there is no evidence for its having been more than a mere shell. No substantial activity appears to have been carried out.&lt;br /&gt;
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While the European member states were predominant both in numbers and with respect to pro-active involvement in the Institute’s work until the 1960s (only Japan and a number of Latin American states initially represented non-European regions), today, with 63 member states from all corners of the world, the Organization is truly a global one. The two states that acceded most recently (2008)—Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—are particularly significant examples for the growing attraction at being involved in co-ordinated efforts for law reform.&lt;br /&gt;
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A peculiarity worth mentioning is that only as late as 1988 have instruments developed by UNIDROIT actually been named after the Organization (eg UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring and UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, Ottawa 1988). Prior to that time, the Organization considered itself an academic forum where Conventions were conceived and elaborated by experts only to be handed over to other organizations (eg the UN and its specialized agencies, [[Council of Europe (Institutional Aspects)|Council of Europe]], [[Hague Conference on PIL]]) for the purpose of being adopted. Prominent examples for its role as an academic back office are the 1956 Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR; [[Carriage of Goods by Road|carriage of goods by road]]) and the 1964 Hague Conventions on the International Sale of Goods ([[Sale of Goods, International (Uniform Law)|sale of goods, international (uniform law)]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. Legal status, languages ==&lt;br /&gt;
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UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization based on its Statute, currently in its 1993 version. According to its provisions, ‘[t]he Institute shall enjoy, in the territory of each participating Government, the necessary legal capacity to enable it to exercise its functions and to realise its purposes. The privileges and immunities which the Institute and its agents and officers shall enjoy shall be defined in agreements to be concluded with the participating Governments.’ Of crucial importance is the 1966 headquarters agreement with the Italian Republic, as most recently amended in 1995. Jurisdiction in internal matters, notably in matters concerning the staff’s status and labour relations, is vested in the UNIDROIT Administrative Tribunal whose judges are elected by the General Assembly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Co-operation agreements govern relationships with the United Nations and a number of other international and regional organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the Statute the official languages are English, French, German, Italian and Spanish, a reflection of the importance of German, Italian and Spanish-speaking scholars during the early decades of the Institute’s history. Today, the working languages are English and French. A number of instruments are, however, available in the remaining official languages as well as numerous other languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. Organizational structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The Statute establishes three organs: the General Assembly, the Governing Council elected by the Assembly and the Secretariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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The General Assembly, the supreme organ of the Institute, consists of the representatives of all member states (currently 63). They are the respective ambassador of the member states in Italy or diplomats delegated by them. The ambassador of one of the member states, chosen according to a system of rotation from among the states of one world region, exercises the office of President of the General Assembly. The Assembly’s competence is general. However, the most important acts for which it has responsibility are the approval of the annual budget, the triennial work programme, the strategic plan and its amendments and, occurring every five years and of particular importance, the election of the members of the Governing Council. The General Assembly moreover deliberates and adopts internal regulations regarding administrative, financial and staff matters. The Finance Committee, which oversees the development of the budget, and ad hoc committees, charged with, for example, the preparation of amendments to the regulations, assist the Assembly in carrying out its functions. The General Assembly is convened once a year for its ordinary session. It may also be convened for an extraordinary session, as most recently occurred in November 2008 when it adopted the Model Law on Leasing (see 5. below) in a joint session with a committee of governmental experts.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Governing Council is a unique body distinguishing UNIDROIT from other organizations. It is due to its composition, competences and working methods that the Organization owes its nickname, the ‘Republic of scholars’. Twenty-five members elected for a five-year term of office and an honorary President appointed by the Italian Government (also for five years) formulate strategic objectives, discuss and submit proposals for the working programme to the General Assembly, monitor the development of each project and make key decisions with respect to Secretariat officials. The Council, moreover, forwards the draft budget, as proposed by the Secretariat, to the General Assembly with its comments and recommendations. The Council’s members are typically eminent scholars, high ranking members of the judiciary or senior government officials or diplomats. Each member government follows its own traditions in selecting and proposing its candidate, and recently there would appear to be a tendency to ensure a stronger presence of governments themselves. Traditionally, notwithstanding their having been initially nominated by their respective Governments, members of the Council—once elected—saw themselves not so much as Government representatives but rather as experts in matters of private law who served in that specific capacity independently from any instructions. As long as a member was a civil servant—as has traditionally been the case in the continental European countries, China, Japan and Australia—the difference was but nominal. Where, however, members of the Council were academics or judges who insisted on their independence, this potentially impaired the effectiveness of communication between the member state and the organization. The aforementioned more recent tendency in selecting candidates with government backgrounds is in all likelihood a reaction to this shortcoming. Yet the price for enhanced effectiveness may be diminished originality and a reduced scholarly character in respect of programmatic and substantive discussions at the Council’s sessions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Secretariat is the executive organ. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Governing Council on the nomination of the President for a term of office of five years. The President’s proposal is based on the decision of an ad hoc committee which concludes an open international selection procedure. The Secretariat consists furthermore of one or two Deputy Secretaries- General of different nationalities, a staff of qualified lawyers from various jurisdictions and legal families, as well as qualified librarians and clerical staff. In 2008, nationals from 12 countries served on the Secretariat. The Secretary-General is &#039;&#039;ex officio&#039;&#039; Secretary of the General Assembly, the Governing Council and all Diplomatic Conferences convened by UNIDROIT. The Secretariat’s tasks and responsibilities include: (1)&amp;amp;nbsp;the organization and preparation of all legislative activities, such as receiving and analysing proposals for the work programme submitted by member states’ governments, industry and academics, making enquiries with relevant circles as to the need for an instrument, conducting feasibility studies, drafting opinions assisting the Governing Council and the General Assembly with their decisions, etc; (2)&amp;amp;nbsp;establishing the composition of working groups, in particular the identification of potential members with the requisite expertise, preparing and following-up work of the groups’ working sessions and assisting the chairpersons; (3)&amp;amp;nbsp;the organization of sessions of committees of governmental experts, including the production of drafts, reports and commentaries, and the keeping of minutes and reports on the sessions; (4)&amp;amp;nbsp;preparation and organization of diplomatic conferences for the adoption of conventions; (5)&amp;amp;nbsp;once an instrument has been finalized, ensuring its promotion and providing assistance in its implementation. The Secretariat furthermore carries out all non-legislative activities (see 7. below). Apart from work on individual projects, the most resource-consuming activity is nurturing the relationship with member states’ governments, governments of states contemplating accession to the UNIDROIT Statute as well as with other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Close cooperation and coordination of work with the two ‘sister’ organizations, namely the [[Hague Conference on PIL|Hague Conference on Private International Law]] and [[UNCITRAL]], and related work carried out within this framework enjoys highest priority. The Secretariat represents UNIDROIT as an observer with the two just-mentioned organizations as well as with other international and regional organizations engaged in activities relevant for its own pro-jects.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. Organization of work on the part of member&amp;amp;nbsp;states ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Locally, member states’ embassies or trade missions in Italy are in charge of ensuring communication with their governments as well as all routine consultations, such as attending to the Finance Committee’s and the General Assembly’s business. Conversely, a wide range of organizational models for substantive involvement can be found in the member states’ capitals. In some cases the ministry of foreign affairs has primary competence for all matters concerning UNIDROIT (eg in the majority of Latin American member states, a few European countries, such as Greece and Italy, in India, Pakistan, South Africa and the United States). In others competence lies with the ministry of justice or the attorney general (examples here are Australia, Canada, the majority of countries in continental Europe, Japan and Nigeria) or the ministry of trade, industry, the economy or some specific governmental branch of economic regulation (as in, for example, China, Poland, the Russian Federation, or the United Kingdom). The key criterion seems to be whether the ministry of justice has comprehensive competence for all areas of legislation—as in Germany for example—or whether its focus is—as in Italy—on the organization of the judiciary and all matters relating to the execution of penal judgments.&lt;br /&gt;
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Typically, it is the ministry with primary competence that attends to matters such as internal coordination for the government as a whole and consultation with that country’s industry and other interested circles. In this respect, fundamentally different approaches and priorities have a significant impact. Governments of countries whose policies and objectives regarding &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; activities relevant for private and economic law in &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; organizations—from UNIDROIT and its ‘sisters’ to the World Bank and regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and the Regional Economic Integration Organizations—are formulated or coordinated by one department or office and where continual presence of governmental and private-sector interests in internal preparation and on negotiating delegations is ensured are typically those that contribute most effectively to negotiations and secure the strongest impact on the outcome.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 5. Working methods ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Thanks to the exceedingly low degree of regulation typical of an independent organization, the organization and administration of any work process is extremely flexible. There is, obviously, a fundamental difference in approach which flows from the decision as to whether an international Convention, ie a treaty (&#039;&#039;hard law&#039;&#039;), or one of the various types of &#039;&#039;soft law&#039;&#039;, such as model laws, general principles or guides, is being prepared.&lt;br /&gt;
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Proposals from member governments, international organizations, central banks, industry, academia, or members of the Governing Council that have been included in the work programme are submitted to a study group consisting of independent experts (scholars and practitioners) after having been the subject of further analysis on the basis of comparative law reports, feasibility studies, economic impact assessment studies and the like carried out or commissioned by the Secretariat. Apart from excellence, the only criterion for being invited to serve on a study group is UNIDROIT’s desire to have expertise drawn from the major legal families and from jurisdictions likely to be particularly strongly affected by, or to benefit particularly strongly, from a particular project. Traditionally, study groups were very small (four to seven experts). More recently, and where considered useful for the particular project (eg secured transactions, financial markets law), up to 14 experts have been invited to participate. The result of a study group’s work—eg a position paper, or a first draft of a future Convention—is submitted to the Governing Council for examination and, if approved, transmitted to a committee of governmental experts. Only now, during this second phase, do member states’ governments become directly involved. International organizations, international trade and other professional associations as well as non-member states may be invited to attend the committee’s sessions as observers. Again, the result of this phase, usually a reasonably mature draft convention, will be examined by the Governing Council and, if approved, transmitted to a diplomatic conference for final deliberation and adoption. Diplomatic conferences are hosted by a member state (during the period 1988–2008 the hosts were Canada, Italy, South Africa, Luxembourg and Switzerland); all UN member states and relevant international organizations are invited to attend. For the text adopted by such a conference to become law it requires ratification or accession according to the relevant constitutional procedures.&lt;br /&gt;
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Beginning in the 1980s there has been a tendency towards more frequent use of one of the many types of non-binding instruments in those cases where the subject matter area permits or requires such an approach. The prime example of this trend are the [[UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)]] (first version 1994; second, enlarged edition 2004; third, further enlarged edition 2010). This international [[Restatements|‘restatement’]] has been elaborated without any governmental involvement by a group of 17&amp;amp;nbsp;(2004) or 21&amp;amp;nbsp;(third version) experts (scholars, eminent practitioners and judges, with the participation of the most important arbitration institutions). In this case, a finalized draft of black-letter rules and a detailed explanatory text (‘comments’) is laid before the Governing Council and adopted by that body.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two model laws elaborated so far by UNIDROIT, the Model Franchise Disclosure Law of 2002 ([[Franchising|franchising]]) and the Model Law on Leasing of 2008 ([[Leasing|leasing]]), were, after the first stage, finalized and adopted by a committee of governmental experts. As regards the latter, the committee had been convened in a joint session with the General Assembly with a view to emphasizing its political importance, in particular for the intended users in developing countries and transition economies.&lt;br /&gt;
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The development of the Guide for Master Franchise Arrangements (1998, second edition 2007) permitted an even more informal process: a restricted group of experts formulated the individual chapters, and the Council merely authorized the publication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Coordination of the work with that done in other intergovernmental organizations is of utmost importance in order to avoid duplication and ensure efficient use of scarce resources. With respect to the Hague Conference on Private International Law and UNCITRAL, coordination occurs on the one hand by way of reciprocal participation in the sister organizations’ meetings and, on the other hand, by means of an annual meeting of the three Secretaries-General which is aimed at exchange of information and the fine-tuning of the various projects under development. Currently, a common guide to the instruments on secured credit transactions which has been developed by the three organizations is under preparation.&lt;br /&gt;
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UNIDROIT attaches considerable importance to efficient and rational coordination with the work on private law carried out by regional organizations (eg Organization of American States (OAS); &#039;&#039;Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique &#039;&#039;(OHADA); Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL); and, in the future, possibly additional organizations in Africa and Asia). Such coordination is more difficult and complex where—as in the case of the European Union—member states of a regional supra-national organization have transferred legislative competences to that organization. Here, unanimity regarding the exact scope of the (transferred) competence and a clear mandate for the negotiating organ (&#039;&#039;in casu&#039;&#039; the European Commission [[Legislative Competence of the EU|legislative competence of the EU]]) are needed. Where a globally applicable instrument is under preparation, the European participants must be mindful that they cannot dictate time-tables and content in the belief that the given subject matter requires a deeper and more detailed harmonization in the framework of the internal market.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 6. Important instruments ==&lt;br /&gt;
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It is impossible to list even only those of the more than 75 projects (or ‘studies’) carried out since the 1920s that have actually entered into force (complete index up to 2004 in Lena Peters,&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;see Literature). Worth mentioning are the CMR (1956—in cooperation with UN/ECE and ICC [[International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)|International Chamber of Commerce]]); the two Hague Uniform Laws on Sale, predecessors of the CISG (1964); the Conventions on International Factoring and International Leasing (1988); the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994, 2004, 2010); the Convention on Restitution of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995 [[Cultural Property|cultural property]]); the Guide on International Master Franchise Arrangements (1998, 2007); the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (2001—in cooperation with ICAO); the Luxembourg Protocol on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (2007—in cooperation with OTIF); the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (2004 [[Harmonization of Procedural Law|harmonization of procedural law]]); the draft Uniform Act on Contract Law for the Member States of OHADA (2004/2007); the Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (2009 [[Intermediated Securities|intermediaries]], [[Markets for Financial Instruments|markets for financial instruments]]); and the Model Law on Leasing (2008).&lt;br /&gt;
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== 7. Non-legislative activities ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The Statute provides for the Institute’s maintaining a library which currently holds about 300,000 volumes and which, notwithstanding a permanent lack of funding, continues to represent a world standard specifically in the area of the harmonization of private law. Among other publications, the Uniform Law Review/&#039;&#039;Revue de droit uniforme&#039;&#039; (new series since 1996) stands out. The database UNILEX, devoted to the UNIDROIT Contract Principles and the CISG, is maintained in association with the Institute. Another database, UNILAW, devoted primarily to the law of carriage of goods is being developed. UNIDROIT’s programme of legal assistance rests on two pillars: first, scholarships for young scholars, government officials or practitioners, in particular from developing countries and transition economies, permitting them to work in Rome on projects of their own choice and, secondly, assistance with the development and the implementation of instruments of uniform private and commercial law in such states.&lt;br /&gt;
==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Ernst Rabel, ‘On Institutes of Comparative Law’ in HG Leser (ed), Ernst Rabel, &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Aufsätze III&#039;&#039; (1967) 235; René David, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’ in IECL&amp;amp;nbsp;II (1971) ch&amp;amp;nbsp;5; Riccardo Monaco, ‘L’unification du droit dans le cadre d’UNIDROIT (1926–1986)’ [1986] Rev dr unif &#039;&#039;vol&amp;amp;nbsp;I&#039;&#039;, 46; Gonzalo Parra-Arranguren, ‘La importancia del Instituto para&amp;amp;nbsp;la Unificación del Derecho Privado (UNIDROIT) en la futura uniformidad juridica del hemisferio americano’ [1992] Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas 34; Peter Winship, ‘Introduction to Harmonization of Private Law’ in &#039;&#039;Introduction to Transnational Legal Transactions&#039;&#039; (1995) 159; Walter Rodinò, Malcolm Evans and UNIDROIT: ‘A Chronology’ [1998] Uniform Law Review 249; Pierre Widmer, ‘The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Ship-Yard for World-Wide Unification of Private Law’ [1999] EJLR 181; Walter Rodinò, &#039;&#039;UNIDROIT&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Digesto&#039;&#039;, Discipline Privatistiche—Sezione Civile, Aggiornamento (4th&amp;amp;nbsp;edn, 2000) 742; Herbert Kronke, ‘Ziele—Methoden, Kosten—Nutzen: Perspektiven der Privatrechtsharmonisierung nach 75 Jahren UNIDROIT’ (2001) JZ 1149; Lena Peters, ‘International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)’ in Roger Blanpain and Jan Wouters (eds), &#039;&#039;International Encyclopedia of Laws&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Intergovernmental Organizations&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; vol&amp;amp;nbsp;2&#039;&#039; (2005) suppl 23; Herbert Kronke, ‘Methodical Freedom and Organizational Constraints in the Development of Transnational Commercial Law’ (2005) 51 Loy L Rev 287; Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, &#039;&#039;Transnational Commercial Law—Text&#039;&#039;,&#039;&#039; Cases and Materials&#039;&#039; (2007) ch&amp;amp;nbsp;5.&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:UNIDROIT]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>UNCITRAL</title>
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		<updated>2025-06-05T16:39:35Z</updated>

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by &#039;&#039;[[Franco Ferrari]]&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== 1. Background and structure ==&lt;br /&gt;
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With the objective of promoting international trade by removing obstacles originating from the divergences of the laws of the different states, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral) was set up at Hungary’s request on 17&amp;amp;nbsp;December&amp;amp;nbsp;1966 by the United Nations General Assembly by its Resolution 2205 (XXI). UNCITRAL, originally headquartered in New York and relocated to Vienna in 1979, consists of a limited—but steadily increasing—number of member states of the United Nations. At the outset, UNCITRAL was composed of 29 member states of the United Nations; subsequently, membership was expanded to 36 (1973) and thereafter to 60 (2002) states. The increase in the number of member states (elected for terms of six years) makes it easier to guarantee that the various geographic regions and the principal economic and legal systems of the world are represented.&lt;br /&gt;
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Uncitral’s secretariat is provided by the International Trade Law Division of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), whose director also serves as the Secretary to UNCITRAL. Hence, the International Trade Law Division is, by way of example, in charge of the preparation of studies, reports and draft texts on issues that are being considered for potential inclusion in UNCITRAL’s work programme. It is that Division that is also responsible for elaborating and revising working papers and legislative texts on issues already included in the work programme. The secretariat is also tasked with reporting on the annual meetings of UNCITRAL (the venues of which alternate between Vienna and New York) as well as on the meetings of the various working groups which carry out the substantive preparatory work on the issues included in UNCITRAL’s work programme. At present, there are six working groups on namely, procurement, international arbitration ([[Arbitration (International)|arbitration (international)]]) and conciliation, transport law, electronic commerce ([[E-Commerce|e-commerce]]), insolvency law and security interests. These working groups, which carry out the actual work on the issues included in UNCITRAL’s work programme, meet once or twice a year, with the venue again alternating between Vienna and New York. The membership of these working groups includes all of UNCITRAL’s member states as well as non-member states and accredited international and regional organizations which all play an active role in the work and may well impact the output of the working groups, because decisions are taken by consensus and not by vote.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 2. UNCITRAL’s coordination activities  ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As outlined in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2205, UNCITRAL aims to achieve the aforementioned goal of promoting international trade via efforts made ‘towards the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade’. The Resolution also describes how that progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade shall be achieved. In this respect, reference is made, for example, to the need to coordinate the work of organizations active in the field of harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. One must wonder, however, precisely how such coordination shall be accomplished, especially the coordination with the work of those organizations that are not integrated into the United Nations system and, therefore, cannot be obliged by either the United Nations or UNCITRAL to be subject to UNCITRAL’s coordination efforts. Therefore, it must be emphasized that these coordination efforts may only take the form of equal-footed cooperation which may be achieved, for instance, by allowing UNCITRAL to participate—as an observer—in the work of these organizations and vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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Occasionally, cooperation may take other forms. When drafting the 1988 United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory notes, for instance, UNCITRAL relied on preparatory work done by [[UNIDROIT]] in the early 1950s. A similar method was applied to the 2008 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, for which UNCITRAL heavily relied on initial work done by the Comité Maritime International.&lt;br /&gt;
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Undoubtedly, the coordination of UNCITRAL’s activities with other bodies and special organizations of the United Nations is much easier. For example, recall the close cooperation between UNCITRAL and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), upon the suggestion of which the working group on international legislation on shipping was established which elaborated the 1978 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea—the ‘Hamburg Rules’, in force since 1992.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 3. UNCITRAL’s codification activities ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As stated in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2205, UNCITRAL is not only meant to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade by coordinating the work of organizations engaged in the field, but also by promoting wider participation in existing international conventions and wider acceptance of existing model laws and [[Uniform Law|uniform law]] instruments and by carrying out codification activities of its own. Codification appears to have been UNCITRAL’s preferred means of trying to reach this goal since its first session in 1968, on the occasion of which UNCITRAL adopted nine subject areas as the basis of its future work programme, namely international sale of goods, international commercial arbitration, transportation, insurance, international payments, intellectual property, elimination of discrimination in laws affecting international trade, agency, and legalization of documents. While some of these subject areas have not been taken up at all by UNCITRAL, others have been focused on extensively over the years (international&amp;amp;nbsp;sale&amp;amp;nbsp;of&amp;amp;nbsp;goods, transportation, international commercial arbitration and international payments), and other subject areas in which UNCITRAL has done extensive work have been added at a later stage (government contracts, insolvency and electronic commerce).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the area of international sale of goods, UNCITRAL’s efforts first led to the 1974 Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;; thereafter, they led to UNCITRAL’s most successful uniform law instrument, the &amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which is in force today in more than 70 countries and governs more than two-thirds of the overall trade of goods. It is worth mentioning that the adoption of the 1980 Convention made a revision of the Limitation Convention necessary, which is why the Limitation Convention was amended by a Protocol adopted in 1980 by the diplomatic conference that adopted the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Both the original Limitation Convention and the Convention as amended by the Protocol entered into force on 1&amp;amp;nbsp;August 1988.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the area of transportation, both the Hamburg Rules and the recent 2008 Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea ought to be mentioned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Uncitral has also been particularly active in the area of international commercial arbitration since its founding. In 1976, it adopted the Arbitration Rules, widely used both in ad hoc arbitrations and administered arbitrations, which provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial relationship. UNCITRAL’s major achievement in this area is, however, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, amended in 2006 (with a view towards the modernization of the form requirement of an arbitration agreement to better conform with international contract practices). The Model Law, which covers all stages of the arbitral process, has been developed with the objective of providing national legislators with an ideology-free and globally suitable model for the drafting of national rules on international commercial arbitration. Considering that the arbitration legislation of more than 50 states is based upon the Model Law, it appears that UNCITRAL has achieved its goal. UNCITRAL’s work in this area has also led to the 1996 UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, designed to assist arbitration practitioners by providing an annotated list of issues in relation to which decisions of the arbitral tribunal are desirable, including the determination of the set of arbitration rules, the language and place of arbitration and questions relating to confidentiality, as well as other matters.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is well known that the subject of commercial conciliation is closely related to that of commercial arbitration. It is therefore unsurprising that UNCITRAL has also worked, and continues to work, in the area of commercial conciliation, and has one working group, Working Group II, specifically dedicated to ‘international arbitration and conciliation’. As a result of UNCITRAL’s efforts in this specific area, the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation were adopted in 1980 and 2002 respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards UNCITRAL’s work in the area of international payments, the adoption of the following [[Uniform Law|uniform law]] instruments should be mentioned: the 1988 United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, the 1992 Model Law on International Credit Transfers, and the 1995 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that UNCITRAL focused its attention mainly on the aforementioned areas does not mean that UNCITRAL has ignored other areas. For instance, consider the work done on security interests, an area in which efforts have been underway since the very first session of the Commission. In 2001, this work resulted in the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Over the years, UNCITRAL has also become active in areas not listed in the 1968 work programme. This is true, for instance, for the area of electronic commerce, to which, for obvious reasons, no thought had been given in 1968. The efforts undertaken in this area have resulted in various instruments, namely the 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce (amended in 1998), the 2001 Model Law on Electronic Signatures and the 2005 Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts. Likewise, insolvency law is an area UNCITRAL has been concerned with for some time now, although it did not start looking into the subject until 1993. The efforts in this field allowed, however, for the adoption in 1997 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, an instrument designed to assist states to equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized and fair framework to address instances of cross-border insolvency more effectively.&lt;br /&gt;
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== 4. UNCITRAL’s additional activities  ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from the types of texts mentioned in the previous section (namely conventions, model laws and rules), UNCITRAL has also drafted legislative guides and recommendations. These types of texts are resorted to when it appears impossible for a consensus to be reached on specific provisions. Thus, these texts offer a number of possible legislative solutions to specific issues without promoting any one specific solution in particular. Where it seems appropriate, the texts include variants to mirror the varying policy choices that can be made vis-à-vis a given issue. For an example of these types of texts, see the 2004 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, as well as the 2007 Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Uncitral’s mandate is, however, not limited to the aforementioned coordination and codification activities. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2205, UNCITRAL shall also promote ‘ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of international conventions and uniform laws in the field of the law of international trade’. This is necessary since the mere drafting of uniform texts does not by itself create&amp;amp;nbsp;[[Uniform Law|uniform law]]. Rather, it is necessary that uniform texts also be interpreted and applied in the same manner throughout the states where it is in force. This requires interpreters to be aware of how a given uniform text is interpreted and applied by interpreters of other states, ie that the courts of one state know what happens in the courts of other states. In practice, this may cause some difficulties since foreign court decisions are not easily accessible. Where they are accessible, they are most likely drafted in a foreign language. To overcome these practical obstacles, UNCITRAL created in 1988 a system for the gathering and distribution (in all official languages of the United Nations) of information concerning the case law on UNCITRAL texts rendered in various countries. This system is known as ‘CLOUT’, the acronym for ‘Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts’, and comprises abstracts of court decisions rendered in application of texts drafted by UNCITRAL, in particular the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. These abstracts are drafted in one of the official United Nations languages by national reporters appointed by the different governments and are then sent to the secretariat, which edits and translates them into the other official United Nations languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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The CLOUT system is not the only UNCITRAL project intended to further the uniform interpretation and application of UNCITRAL texts. On the basis of a decision taken during the 2001 commission session, UNCITRAL prepared, with the help of a number of experts, a ‘Digest of case law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods’, published in June 2004 and revised in 2008. The Digest is meant to reflect the evolution of case law by offering a synopsis of the relevant case law, highlighting common views and reporting any divergent approach, thus enabling the interpreters to become aware of how that particular Convention is interpreted and applied around the world. This is certainly useful, which is why other Digests are being prepared. One has to wonder, however, whether this kind of publication can really promote the uniform interpretation and application of the uniform texts they relate to, since it does nothing but promote knowledge of foreign case law which is insufficient to create uniformity. A critical evaluation of the court decisions, which is absent due to a conscious decision taken by UNCITRAL to avoid any criticism—or any praise for that matter—would certainly have been helpful in guiding the interpreters through the vast case law that is, at times, contradictory. Thus, the Digests do not allow the interpreters to distinguish between case law that should and case law that should not be followed. Regrettably, UNCITRAL missed the chance to truly promote uniform interpretation and application.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Literature==&lt;br /&gt;
Allan E Farnsworth, ‘UNCITRAL’ (1972) 20 Am&amp;amp;nbsp;J&amp;amp;nbsp;Comp&amp;amp;nbsp;L 314; Gerold Herrmann, ‘The Contribution of UNCITRAL to the Development of International Trade’ in Norbert Horn, Clive M Schmitthoff (eds), &#039;&#039;The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions&#039;&#039; (1982) 35; Bernadine WM Trompenaars, &#039;&#039;UNCITRAL en haar mandaat—Molengrafica&#039;&#039; (1989) 3; Bernadine WM Trompenaars, &#039;&#039;Pluriforme unificatie en uniforme interpretatie&#039;&#039;:&#039;&#039; In het bijzonder de bijdrage van UNCITRAL aan de internationale unificatie van het privaatrecht&#039;&#039; 1989; Geoff Fischer, ‘UNCITRAL gives international trade law CLOUT’ [1993] Australian Business Law Review 362; Jacques Bischoff, ‘Allgemeine Erfahrung bei der Rechtsvereintlichung in der UNCITRAL’ [1993] Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht 623; Gerold Herrmann, ‘The Role of UNCITRAL’ in Ian Flechter, Loukas Mistelis, Marise Cremona (eds), &#039;&#039;Foundations and perspectives of international trade law&#039;&#039; (2001) 28; Gerold Herrmann, ‘A Vision for UNCITRAL: Global Commerce Needs a Global Uniform Law’ [2001] Business Law International 249; Spiros V Bazinas, ‘Harmonisation of International and Regional Trade Law: The UNCITRAL Experience’ [2003] Uniform Law Review 53; Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner, Ronald A Brand (eds), &#039;&#039;The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond&#039;&#039; (2004).&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:A–Z]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:UNCITRAL]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Admin</name></author>
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