Negotiable Instruments (Cheques & Bills of Exchange)

From Max-EuP 2012

by Daniel Annoff

1. Functional commonality and conceptual distinction

‘Negotiable instrument’ is a generic term that refers to a group of commercial papers whose shared function is to facilitate the payment of amounts due under business transactions. From a functional comparative perspective, therefore, a negotiable instrument may be defined as a commercial paper in which a person (drawer) either orders another person (drawee and, upon consent, acceptor), or gives her own undertaking, to pay a given sum of money (to the payee/indorsee, ie holder or, less often, bearer). The core legal characteristics completing this functional definition are: (i) transferability; (ii) enforceability (by the holder); (iii) acquisition of superior title in good faith (by the indorsee). All EU Member States, and all remaining European countries, have established a legal regime of negotiable instruments with all of the attributes (i)–(iii). Notwithstanding this basic commonality, the law of negotiable instruments in Europe has long been overshadowed by a rigid schism between common law countries and civil law countries (see a) below). It follows that, from a doctrine-centred comparative viewpoint, major jurisdictions continue to display a momentous conceptual distinction (see b) below).

a) In Britain, the principal instruments to have evolved over the course of history from objects of commercial life into ones having legal status are: the bill of exchange, the promissory note and the cheque. Beyond its socio-historical evolution, the legal term negotiable instrument is of relatively late origin since English law initially recognized only the bill of exchange. Promissory notes were not legally deemed to be fully negotiable before the end of the 17th century, and cheques gradually gained legal recognition only in the 18th century. This evolutionary lineage may be linked up with the present applicable statutory law: the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 (BEA). The BEA defines a bill of exchange in § 3(1); it then outlines detailed provisions for bills of exchange and in turn applies them, with necessary modifications, to promissory notes while categorizing cheques as a variant of bills. Hence, UK law pertaining to negotiable instruments is, to a significant degree, tantamount to the law respecting bills of exchange.

In European civil law countries, a position comparable to that of the BEA is held jointly by two central laws which, subject to modifications and exceptions, prevail throughout national legislations on negotiable instruments: the Uniform Law on Bills (ULB) and the Uniform Law on Cheques (ULC). Regardless of the extensive impact for substantive uniformity originating from the ULB and the ULC, civil law countries adhering to these conventions have never attempted to harmonize a noticeable lack of common terminology. German-based systems refer to Wertpapiere and Italian law to titoli di credito. The French term l’effets de commerce highlights the element of transferability in much the same way as the BEA, indicating a certain kinship with the English-based systems. In general, all civil law systems encompass a regime of negotiable instruments; or, more accurately, some of the civil systems contain provisions on negotiable instruments not only in specific laws, such as the Wechselgesetz and the Scheckgesetz in Germany, but also in the general parts of the civil or commercial codes. To complement and specify these provisions, some legal orders further postulate a topical definition, such as the Swiss and Turkish Codes, in both of which the particular regulations on bills of exchange are preceded by a succinct definition of a negotiable instrument.

b) The conceptual distinction between common law countries and civil law countries may be exemplified by a discussion of the basic legal characteristics outlined above: (i) Transferability depends on whether a negotiable instrument is payable to order or to bearer. An instrument payable to order is transferable by the payee’s indorsement followed by the delivery of the instrument to the transferee. The indorsement may be executed on the bill itself or on an attached paper (alonge), but in practice it is most often inscribed on the back of the instrument; it may be either special or in blank. In the former case, the transferor sets out the name of the transferee above her own signature and the bill thus becomes payable to the transferee’s order; in the latter case the only requisite is the transferor’s signature which by itself renders the bill payable to bearer. By contrast, in common law countries, an indorsement is not a requirement for legal transfer, which is effected by delivery alone. If and when the transferor nevertheless indorses the instrument, the effect in law is her becoming liable as indorser—a legal remedy not provided for in civil law countries since the ULB does not sanction the drawing of a bill payable to bearer. (ii) Enforceability by the holder refers to a procedural right to bring an action in one’s own name; holder means any person in valid possession of the instrument. In common law countries, the phrase includes the original payee, any indorsee and the bearer, but substantive rights depend on the manner in which the instrument is acquired, ie as a mere holder, a holder for value or a holder in due course. Less nuanced than this elaborate position, the ULB system takes a different approach. A holder is any person who holds the instrument under a series of uninterrupted and regular indorsements, without any distinction between classes of holders. Substantive rights in turn depend on two factors: first, a regular chain of indorsements that legitimizes or validates the title and the right to enforce payment; secondly, the nature of the defence that the acceptor, the drawer or an indorser seeks to raise, with pleas based on personal rights available between parties being generally excluded and those between others only excluded if and when a holder has acted in good faith. (iii) Acquisition of superior title in good faith relates to the concept that certain defences which are available against the transferor may not be raised against such a transferee. Pursuant to BEA § 38(2), this is the case for any holder in due course, a status obtained upon the transfer of any instrument, which is complete and regular on its appearance, in good faith and for value. Entitlement to payment then prevails even if the instrument has been obtained by the transferor by means of fraud, duress, coercion or an illegal act. In civil law countries, the holder’s rights depend not so much on the manner in which she has acquired the instrument, but rather on the defences raised by the party against whom she seeks to enforce payment, provided that she holds it under a series of uninterrupted regular indorsements. Although there is no complete uniformity among ULB countries, the basic position may be summarized as follows: a party sued on a bill of exchange may not raise against the holder any defence based on her relationship with the drawer or any other previous party, except if and when the holder has acquired the instrument knowingly against the debtor’s advantage (ULB Art 17), thus contributing to the general principle that acquisition in bad faith does not confer enforcement rights (ULB Art 16). Germany and France have both established sophisticated provisions on this point of law, owing to the recognition or rejection, respectively, of abstract undertakings or undertakings without a cause.

As follows from this overview, a prospective analysis of the European law on negotiable instruments entails synthesizing its functional commonality and conceptual distinction with its historical development.

2. History and current legal position

The study of the legal-historical development of the three principal instruments in existence gives insight into the present European law in two ways: first, by shedding light on modern commercial problems and, second, by enhancing the understanding of the special concepts of the law in finer detail.

a) It is accepted academic wisdom that negotiable instruments in the forms known to us today cannot be witnessed in medieval Europe. Whilst certain 19th century studies suggest that particular medieval forms were influenced by, or patterned on, instruments known in antiquity (syngraphe; chirographe), such a line of continuity may not be considered an established fact. The existence in antiquity of instruments embodying payment obligations is uncontested. But these instruments differ from a modern negotiable instrument in that evidence has not been furnished of their treatment as an item of property, which embodies an undertaking making payment subject to the delivery of the instrument. However, it is precisely this basic concept which led to the development of other characteristics of negotiable instruments, albeit not in the fashion of a simultaneous emergence at a given point of time but in definable stages of a legal evolution stretching from the 12th to the 19th century.

b) To understand the development of negotiable instruments in the Middle Ages, it is helpful to draw attention to the early economic purposes of the bill of exchange. First, as reflected in the words to describe this instrument, ie exchange in English, change in French, Wechsel in German and cambium in Latin, its predominant function was to facilitate the changing of money by merchants. Second, due to the fact that most medieval states minted their own coinage, a bill of exchange also served the function of exchanging one currency for another. This letter of exchange, as it was then known, is the predecessor of the modern instrument used in current trade; its increase in prevalence has been linked to its use by Papal emissaries and at fairs, particularly in the French region of Champagne. The underlying economic cause for the rise of the bill of exchange is nowadays widely observed to have been a global upsurge of trade during the period of the Crusades, which necessitated reliable instruments for transfers of substantial amounts of money. By the end of the 16th century, the bill of exchange had become an instrument common in trade and commerce in southern and central Europe, supported by a self-strengthening network of European banks.

In medieval England, negotiable instrument law was developed in the courts through successive reception of trade customs as good law. Early decisions may be traced back to the Court of Staple and the Court of Admiralty, before the legal position was immensely simplified in the 17th century under the auspices of the Court of King’s Bench by its decisions Woodward v Rowe [84 ER 864] and Bromwich v Loyd [125 ER 870].

In continental Europe, promissory notes have been dated back to the 12th and 13th centuries; their origins have been identified in their use in connection with trading contracts involving the carriage of goods by sea, specifically in the north European Hanseatic towns, such as Hamburg and Lübeck. By contrast, the development of promissory notes in England is less clear with the only definite traces to be found in the notes issued by goldsmiths, with whom merchants and owners of houses started to deposit their money during the period immediately preceding the Civil War years (1641–1651). The supportive legal structure was later consolidated by the Promissory Notes Act of 1704.

As for cheques, both on the Continent and in England these instruments first made their appearance in the 17th century. In this context, much academic attention has been given to bills of exchange drawn by customers on their Italian banks during the 16th and early 17th centuries, but it is widely accepted to be the more accurate view to conclude certain instruments of 17th century Dutch origin, including an order clause, to be the antecedents of modern-day cheques. Later, cheques attained the height of their popularity in England during the 18th century, although their precise origin in common law has still never been satisfactorily unearthed.

Parallel to the commercial development of negotiable instruments, there is to a remarkable extent also continuity in their legislative regulation. Following some isolated medieval provisions covering specific aspects of the law on bills of exchange, more detailed codifications appeared in the 16th century. Of particular importance, as a model influencing later statutes, was the 1569 Law on Bills of Bologna. Approximately one hundred years later, there was an accelerated diffusion of statutes passed in different parts of Europe, most importantly in France, but also in the Netherlands, in some German states and in Scandinavian countries. The French Ordonnance du Commerce of 1673 was later received as the applicable law in Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Greece, as well as in parts of the German Rhineland, in the Swiss Canton of Geneva and in some of the city-states of Italy. Other laws used as models include those of Braunschweig and Augsburg but above all the Wechselordnung of Leipzig, which served as a central information and working basis for many German states in the second half of the 18th century. England alone refrained from introducing extensive statutory regulations, apart from the one already mentioned.

c) The position at the end of the 18th century was as follows. The legislative effort undertaken until that time had led to certain clarifications of the basic concepts and the specific legal principles, and the substantive rules of law had become well-understood and developed on similar lines in continental Europe. There was uniformity in the statutes regarding such matters as the requisites of form and the inclusion of an order clause, the indorsement and the transfer of bills; and to a lesser degree, there was also uniformity in the provisions concerning acceptance, payment and the procedure on dishonour, the issuing of bills in copies and the granting of an aval. In theoretical analysis, this development was accompanied by a paradigm shift from an effort to fit the novel principles into one of the conventional compartments available in Roman law to the elaboration of new theories. Most notably, the German Litteralvertragstheorie is nowadays regarded as having laid the modern foundation for the analysis of negotiable instruments law.

As on the Continent, in England the law of negotiable instruments developed consistently during the 17th and the 18th centuries, although this process was dominated by the courts and not by the legislature. Important decisions paving the way for modern legal principles on negotiable instruments include Hussey v Jacob [92 ER 929], on the original concept of negotiability, and Miller v Race [97 ER 398], on its re-definition, in which banknotes were compared to money ‘which passed into currency’ and hence could not be recovered once they had been ‘paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration’. In continental Europe, the trajectory of the 18th century legal evolution extended into the beginnings of the 19th century. The French Code de commerce, adopted in 1807, in many ways continued to reflect the notion of the Ordonnance of 1673 to the effect that the bill of exchange constituted a device for the remittance of funds while at the same time taking a number of important steps in the direction of modernity (modernization of the provision doctrine and clarification of the nature of protest). Meanwhile, the provisions on bills of exchange of the Prussian Landrecht 1794 failed to meet recognition outside the immediate Prussian territory, yet this legislation propelled the drive for a unification of laws in Germany. Eventually, the unification was achieved by means of the seminal general law on bills of exchange, the Wechselordnung of 1848, which combined academic study and commercial practice into a modern act of law. The most distinct feature of the Law was the emphasis given to the separation between the obligation created by the bill and the underlying commercial transaction. The quality of this legal concept was later evidenced by its introduction in Finland, Switzerland and Russia. In England, the first half of the 19th century mainly involved the courts’ well-accepted role of legal fine-tuning and settling controversial and novel points; worthy of mention is the creation of the bona fide holder of value concept. The second half of the 19th century was then marked by a turnabout for legislative consolidation: the Stamp Act of 1853, the Crossed Cheques Act of 1856/1876 and the BEA of 1882, which incorporated the former two and also codified the existing case law.

d) The far-reaching developments of the 19th century culminated with the de facto establishment of three major systems of negotiable instruments law: the common law system, the French variant of the civil law system and the German civil law system. Between them, these three systems found application in most countries, not only in Europe but worldwide. The 20th century was marked by attempts to replace these systems by the development of a single uniform system of negotiable instruments. Two major attempts in this direction were made, respectively, in the Hague Conferences of 1910 and 1912 and in the Geneva Conferences of 1930 and 1931. More recently, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has made its own attempt to supplement the existing national systems. At the millennium, though, the end result remained the existence of the two major systems: the common law system influenced primarily by the BEA and the civil law systems based on the ULB and the ULC—a status quo that has been perpetuated during the last decade.

Following intermittent though eventually futile unification attempts by the forerunner of the International Law Association (1876–1878/1882/ 1885/1889) and the Chamber of Commerce of Verona (1905), the Hague Conference on the Unification of Laws on Bills of Exchange and Cheques, held in June 1910, ended in the drafting of two model laws: the Uniform Law on Bills and the Uniform Law on Cheques. These laws were referred for comments to the governments of attending countries (including the United Kingdom). To consider the reactions, a second conference was convened and held in June/July 1912 (with the United Kingdom not attending). In the end, the two laws were adopted subject to relatively few amendments. By and large, the two laws were based on the Wechselordnung but, in addition, showed a certain influence of French draftsmanship and ideas (provision doctrine). Interestingly, the two Conventions drafted at the second conference included a provision according to which the two laws would be reviewed no later than five years from the date of their first ratification. Although UK representatives had made it clear from the start that the laws were unlikely to be adopted in their jurisdiction, steps for the ratification were taken even before the outbreak of World War I. However, the anticipated wide ratification of the Conventions was ultimately hindered by the ensuing five-year duration of the War.

After the War, initiative to revitalize the Hague Convention was first taken up by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at its congresses in 1921 and 1923, before it was overtaken by a new effort by the League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN, with a new drive for unification which led to the convening of the first Geneva Conference. The first Geneva Conference, held in May/June 1930, covered the topics, originally settled in the Hague Convention on Bills, in three separate Conventions: the Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes including two annexes (the law itself and ‘reservations’), the Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes and the Convention on the Stamp Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. This arrangement was conceived to enable common law countries to accept some of the common principles for the settlement of questions of conflict of laws and of stamp duty. An important aspect regarding which the Geneva system is similar to the Hague system is the provision for ‘reservations’; the matters covered here relate mainly to technical points, the only genuine matter of substance being a departure concerning the rights in the cover or provision. By September 1930, the first two Conventions had been signed by 27 attending countries, 26 of these also signed the third Convention, among which many common law countries. The ULB came into effect on 3 October 1933 when the necessary number of ratifications had been reached.

Unlike the Hague Convention, which applied to the law of cheques, in many of the provisions of the Uniform Law on Bills the Geneva Conference opted for a separate self-sufficient and detailed code. The Convention on Cheques further made provision for reservations. As with the first conference, the subjects in the second conference were split into three separate Conventions: the Convention Providing a Uniform law on Cheques, the Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection with Cheques and the Convention on Stamp Laws in Connection with Cheques. The United Kingdom adopted only the Convention on Stamp Laws, the other Conventions were adopted by 24 attending states.

As mentioned above, an alternative system that could be utilized by countries all over the world in respect of international bills of exchange and promissory notes was initiated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1971. The text of the Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (UNB) was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly in 1988 but until present has never been ratified by a sufficient number of Member States to enter into force. The UNB contains a detailed regulation seeking to find a suitable compromise between the common law systems and the ULB, which has been achieved, even in respect of the major inconsistencies, first and foremost by elaboration of the concept of holder. In the end, however, despite its spirit of compromise, the ratification of the Convention failed for various interrelated reasons (political acceptance by Member States; opposition by multinational financial institutions; resistance to change). Parallel to the UNB, the UNCITRAL, in 1972, also set up a working group on the law of cheques, but this project never reached a stage beyond a draft Convention and was eventually discontinued.

3. Bills of exchange and cheques

To better appreciate the functional commonality and conceptual distinction observable in European negotiable instruments law, the following comparative report elaborates on selected aspects of the law on bills of exchange (see a) below) and the law on cheques (see b) below).

a) Bills of exchange

i) Negotiability

BEA § 31(1) provides that a bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee as the holder of the bill, and ULB Art 14 similarly stipulates that ‘an indorsement transfers all the rights arising out of a bill of exchange’. The starting point is thus very much the same. Conditions (ULB Art 12; BEA § 33) or partial restrictions (BEA § 32) on a transfer are disregarded by both common law and civilian law systems; however, ‘non-transferability’ may be ensured by adding the words ‘only’ (BEA § 8) or ‘not to order’ (ULB Art 11). The details concerning the negotiation of a bill payable to bearer or to order have been outlined above. Special provisions address certain cases in which the holder of a bill wishes to transfer it for a specific or restricted purpose; such ‘restrictive indorsements’ may be divided into indorsements for collection and indorsements by way of security: BEA § 35, ULB Art 18 (indorsement for collection) and Art 19 (indorsement by way of pledge).

ii) Drawee, acceptor

An important point of the law relates to the drawee’s position prior to acceptance (whereupon she becomes liable to pay the bill on maturity). In common law systems, the drawing of a bill does not in itself confer any duties on the drawee (BEA § 53), but this position differs in French law and in systems based on it, and similarly in Scotland, all of which adhere to the concept of provision or a comparable doctrine. Under this doctrine, the holder of the bill obtains an interest in the funds held by the drawee as cover for the payment instruction given to her by the drawer (BEA § 52(2), applicable in Scotland); the drawer’s duty to arrange for cover or provision has consequences for the relationship with the holder (dishonour; protest; discharge). Special provisions apply to the form and date (BEA § 17; ULB Art 25) and the presentment (BEA § 39; ULB Arts 21, 22) for acceptance which may be general or qualified in some respect. The basic right of the acceptor pertains to the presentment of the bill, as she cannot be held in default unless the bill has been presented for payment and dishonoured. The acceptor’s duties are two-fold: first, she may owe the drawer a contractual duty to accept the bill; second, upon acceptance, she assumes the duty, embodied in the bill, to discharge payment to the holder, all indorsers and to the drawer, subject to a cancellation right only in narrow circumstances (BEA § 21; ULB Art 29).

iii) Drawer, indorsers, holders

By the issuance of a bill the drawer undertakes that it will be accepted by the drawee and paid on maturity. The two main legal issues following from these undertakings are the drawer’s rights against the acceptor (ULB Art 28) and bills drawn ‘without recourse’, ie excluding drawer’s liability (BEA § 16(a); ULB Art 9(2)). The indorser’s position lies in giving to subsequent indorsees the very undertaking of a drawer (BEA § 55(2)(b); ULB Art 15). In turn, the position enjoyed by holders follows from the respective definition and classification of holder in common law and civil law systems. Similarities include: distinction between a mere holder and holder in good faith; acquisition of superior title if and when the bill appears regular (BEA: general regularity; ULB: unbroken chain of indorsements); the holder’s state of mind; the concept of ownership (holder not necessarily identical with owner). The main distinction is the greater protection given to the good faith acquirer by the civil law systems because, while there is no enforcement against the person whose signature is a forgery, enforcement is allowed against all persons whose signatures appear above and beneath the forged indorsement. The holder’s duties include presentment, notice of dishonour and protest.

iv) Consideration, cause

Pursuant to BEA § 27, valid consideration may be any consideration adequate to support a simple contract or any antecedent debt or liability; consideration must be furnished by the creditor. Absence of consideration does not provide a valid defence to an enforcement action by a holder in due course and, in certain cases, a holder for value. Cause is a comparable requisite for the enforceability of a bill issued in civil law systems that is not spelt out in the ULB but is based on national laws; Germany takes an exceptional position (abstract undertakings; undertaking without cause; doctrine of enrichment).

v) Forgery; completion of inchoate bills

At common law, a party cannot be bound by a forged signature; however, a plea of trickery or coercion can be raised against any holder except a holder in due course. German law takes the view that a person is bound by her signature only if she had the intention or will to assume an undertaking, thus denying liability of the drawer in case of a forgery but not in such cases in which the drawer ought to have known that her signature might be used. Regarding inchoate bills, the common law position can be framed by reference to BEA § 12 (insertion of date), BEA § 20 (all other types of missing details) and the doctrine of estoppel (non est factum), whereas civil law systems, with the exception of France, address the question of ‘blank instruments’ (letter de change en blanc or Blankowechsel) in ULB Art 10.

vi) Promissory notes

The provisions pertaining to bills of exchange are modified by special rules applying to promissory notes in the following fields: delivery (BEA § 84); presentment (acceptance ULB Art 78; payment BEA § 86(1)).

b) Cheques

i) Special features

Cheques are associated with banks: ‘a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand’ (BEA § 73), and sometimes also called a draft. Apart from the requirement that the cheque be drawn on a bank, the ULC additionally stipulates that it has to be drawn against funds at the disposal of the drawer and in conformity with an agreement entitling the drawer to draw against these funds, but non-compliance does not invalidate a cheque (ULC Art 3). Particularly difficult is the meaning of ‘bank’ (BEA § 2; ULC Art 54). A cheque may be payable to a specified person or to bearer, and is payable on demand. Restrictions on transfer are sanctioned both under the BEA and the ULC.

ii) Duties of drawee bank

The bank’s duty to the drawer is based upon the contractual relationship as the bank’s customer. The drawing of a cheque does not confer any rights to the holder against the bank, but in France the holder acquires certain rights over the provision. Neither the BEA nor the ULC recognize a form of acceptance or certification, as it is sometimes named.

iii) Presentment; countermand; drawer’s demise

Common law systems do not provide special provisions on the presentment of a cheque for payment and refer to banking practice; by contrast, ULC Art 29 outlines different time limits for cheques payable ‘home’ or ‘abroad’. Under UK law, a cheque can be countermanded at any time prior to its payment by the bank; ULC Art 32 takes a distinctive approach. Under BEA § 75(2), the bank’s authority to pay a cheque is terminated when it receives notice of the drawer’s death, whereas ULC Art 33 provides for the continuity of the cheque irrespective of the drawer’s demise.

iv) Crossed cheques

The crossing of cheques is practised in countries with systems based on both the BEA and on the ULC; general and special crossings exist (BEA § 76). The effect of the former is to preclude a bank from paying the cheque across the counter (BEA § 79(2)), which means that it has to be ‘paid to a banker’; the latter refers to a clearing requirement only to the banker involved or to that bank’s ‘agent for collection being a banker’. The position is similar under ULC Art 38; additionally, under ULC Art 39(1) ‘the drawer or the holder of a cheque may forbid its payment in cash by writing transversally across the face of the cheque the words “payable in account” (à porter en compte; nur zur Verrechnung) or a similar expression’.

4. Perspectives

The law of negotiable instruments in Europe has evolved from being merely a framework supporting commercial life to a legal institution of its own accord. Conventional scholarship has often emphasized doctrinal dissimilarities across European jurisdictions, focusing on the conceptual distinction between common law countries and civil law countries. While, as a starting point, this analysis embodies an accurate observation, it appears advisable for future research to shift focus onto the notion of functional commonality. Traditionally, negotiable instruments have a fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics and fulfil a fundamentally similar set of economic functions in all European jurisdictions. Today, in the age of mass computerization and communication, the practical usage of negotiable instruments in commercial life faces increased competition by functional substitutes, such as money wiring and credit card payments. For this reason, it becomes a challenging and interesting task for the economics and legal academia to: (i) evaluate the present economic value of negotiable instruments; (ii) frame the present economic functions of negotiable instruments and of functional substitutes; and (iii) on the strength of the findings in (i)–(ii), develop a model legal framework based on functional commonality across European jurisdictions in order to serve legislatures with a benchmark for a future re-conceptualization of the law of negotiable instruments.


Levin Goldschmidt, Handbuch des Handelsrechts I (1891); Edward Jenks, ‘On the Early History of Negotiable Instruments’ (1893) 9 LQR 70; Carl S Grünhut, Wechselrecht (1897); Josef Hupka, ‘Das Haager Wechselrechtsübereinkommen und der Völkerbund’ (1930) 4 RabelsZ 205; James M Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (1955); Ernst Jacobi, Wechsel- und Scheckrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des ausländischen Rechts (1955); Wolfgang Schettler and Heinrich Büeler, Das Wechsel- und Scheckrecht aller Länder (1957); Daniel E Murray, ‘Drafts, Promissory Notes and Cheques: A Comparison of Civilian, Quasi-Civilian and Non-Civilian Suggestions’ (1983) 15 Lawyer of the Americas 211; Nicholas Elliott, John Odgers and Jonathan M Phillips (eds), Byles on Bills of Exchange and Cheques (28th edn, 2007); AG Guest (ed), Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange and Cheques (7th edn, 2009).

Retrieved from Negotiable Instruments (Cheques & Bills of Exchange) – Max-EuP 2012 on 19 May 2022.

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